(bb) from more than

tical maxims, and to act in a perfectly rational manner.' "' 1

Even where this requisite is complied with, it one self-con- would still remain possible, in the second place, sistent code that two or more of the assumed principles might

being

possible,

(cc) from its

assumption

yield systems of practical rules perfectly self-consistent, and yet inconsistent with one another.2 It would be very hard indeed to show that both the theory of Egoistic Hedonism, and what is generally called Utilitarianism, do not succeed in doing so: and thus the examination of methods is not of itself sufficient to settle the question of the end of conduct. And since-to quote Professor Sidgwick it is "a fundamental postulate of ethics that so far as two methods conflict, one or other of them must be modified or rejected," it follows that the criticism of methods leads naturally up to an independent criticism of principles, unless indeed it can be shown that one method only yields a consistent code of practical rules.

Even in this case, however, if it led to the adoption of the end in question, it must be borne in

1 Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, book i. chap. i. § 5, 3d ed., p. 11; 6th ed., p. 12 (where the word 'rational' is replaced by 'consistent').

2 "The rule, 'Let every one care for me,' is quite as simple and, in a logical point of view, defines conduct as consistently and reasonably as the rule, 'Love your neighbour as yourself." "-Sir Leslie Stephen, Science of Ethics (1882), p. 73.

3 Methods of Ethics, I. i. 3, 6th ed., p. 6.

end must

sistent

rules.

mind that the postulate would be implied that the that the true
true ethical end must be able to yield a consistent give per-
and harmonious system of rules for practical life. fectly con-
Without altogether denying this postulate, it yet
seems to me that it stands in need of qualification.
For in different circumstances, and at different
stages of individual and social development, the
application of the same ethical end may naturally
produce different and conflicting courses of conduct.
We must not start with any such assumption as
that the rationality of the end consists in some sort
of mathematical equality which ignores alike the
different environments with which one age and
another surround successive generations, and the
different functions which one individual and an-
other have to perform in the social whole. We
must leave open the possibility that particular
kinds of action which are right now may be wrong
in another age; we must allow that everybody may
not count for one, and that some people may count
for more than one; we must admit that we may
have sometimes to do to others what we would not
that others should do to us. The only consistency
must leave room for

we have a right to demand
such a variety of different conditions as to be, by
itself, a very imperfect guide.

From the difficulty of complying with the above conditions, it seems practically impossible for the criticism of ethical methods to decide the question

(B) distinct

from moral psychology and sociology.

of the ethical end. Even if the application to conduct of every important end has been taken account of, we are met with the difficulty that two or more mutually antagonistic though self-consistent practical codes may perhaps have been developed, while we are not even justified in assuming that inability to yield a system which will fit the complex circumstances of life in a perfectly harmonious manner is sufficient ground for rejecting an end shown in some other way to be reasonable.

The last department of ethics referred to that which has to do with the origin and nature of moral sentiments and social customs-has a bearing on the question of the end of conduct in some respects more important than the investigation of ethical methods. For, whereas the latter expressly assumes certain ends as prima facie reasonable, the former enquiry, on the contrary, is frequently held to be able, without presupposing any ethical relations whatever, to trace the way in which, from primitive feelings and customs, morality itself has been evolved. The psychological side of ethical enquiry has always occupied an important place with English moralists. At times, indeed, the question of the 'moral faculty' has excited so much interest as to divert attention from the nature of morality itself. Moral truth has been supposed to be something known and indisputable, the only question being how we come to know it.

But the psychology of ethics, reinforced by the knowledge sociology gives of the development of morality, rises now to larger issues. It attempts to show the genesis of the moral from the nonmoral, to account thus for the origin of ethical ideas, and even to determine what kinds of ends are to be striven after. In this way, a theory of the origin and growth of moral sentiments and institutions is made to render important help to more than one of the theories which will fall to be considered in the sequel.

enquiry

The present enquiry is concerned with the way 8. Present in which we may determine either the end of limited human conduct, or the criterion which distinguishes good from evil. But I do not propose to offer an exhaustive investigation of all the theories which have been or may be started in solution of the problem. On the contrary, I will begin by excluding from the enquiry all theories which proceed on the assumption that the moral code depends upon arbitrary law or convention:1 not because I con

1 The difference between Aristotle and Kant in ethics is sometimes expressed (see Trendelenburg, Hist. Beiträge zur Phil., iii. 171 ff.) as if it consisted in the fact that the former investigated human nature in order to find its Téλos, whereas the latter sought the standard of action in a transcendental ground. There is reason for this distinction in Kant's manner of statement. But both may be regarded as investigating human nature. Their difference rather consists in the different position and function assigned to reason in man. It is because Kant is for the moment looking upon reason as something distinct from

to theories depending on the

human constitution,

tend that all such theories are primâ facie unreasonable, but because it is at any rate the more obvious course to seek to determine the function of an organism by studying its inner constitution, and its relation to the world of which it is a part. For this reason I shall not take into consideration the views of the basis of ethics which find it in positive law either divine or human. It is not necessary for me to deny that the source of all moral obligation may be the will of God, or the commands of the sovereign, or the opinion of society, and that the highest moral ideal may be obedience to such a rule. But theories of this kind make ethics merely an application of positive theology, or of legislation, or of social sentiment, and seem only to have an appropriate place when we have failed to find an independent basis for action.

The question which remains to be put may be expressed in these terms: Can we find in human nature (taken either alone or in connexion with its environment) any indications of the end of human conduct, or, in other words, of the principle on which human beings ought' to act? and if so, in

human nature that he says that "the ground of obligation is to be sought, not in the nature of man or in the circumstances in the world in which he is placed, but à priori simply in the notions of pure reason" (Werke, iv. 237). His "metaphysical" view of ethics, however, follows from the rational constitution of the human subject and his experience, and does not depend on any source that really "transcends" the reason of man.