VII. European market. It is to fell the one as dear C H A P. and to buy the other as cheap as poffible, and confequently to exclude as much as poffible all rivals from the particular market where they keep their shop. The genius of the adminiftration, therefore, fo far as concerns the trade of the company, is the fame as that of the direction. It tends to make government fubfervient to the intereft of monopoly, and confequently to ftunt the natural growth of some parts at least of the furplus produce of the country to what is barely fufficient for answering the demand of the company. All the members of the administration, befides, trade more or lefs upon their own account, and it is in vain to prohibit them from doing fo. Nothing can be more completely foolish than to expect that the clerks of a great counting-house at ten thousand miles diftance, and confequently almoft quite out of fight, fhould, upon a fimple order from their mafters, give up at once doing any fort of business upon their own account, abandon for ever all hopes of making a fortune, of which they have the means in their hands, and content themselves with the moderate falaries which those masters allow them, and which, moderate as they are, can feldom be augmented, being commonly as large as the real profits of the company trade can afford. In fuch circum. ftances, to prohibit the fervants of the company from trading upon their own account, can have fcarce any other effect than to enable the fuperior fervants, under pretence of executing their mafters' order, to opprefs fuch of the inferior ones IV. BOOK as have had the misfortune to fall under their displeasure. The fervants naturally endeavour to establish the fame monopoly in favour of their own private trade as of the public trade of the company. If they are fuffered to act as they could with, they will establish this monopoly openly and directly, by fairly prohibiting all other people from trading in the articles in which they chufe to deal; and this, perhaps, is the best and least oppreffive way of establishing it. But if by an order from Europe they are prohibited from doing this, they will, notwithstanding, endeavour to establish a monopoly of the fame kind, fecretly and indirectly, in a way that is much more deftructive to the country. They will employ the whole authority of government, and pervert the administration of juftice, in order to harass and ruin those who interfere with them in any branch of commerce which, by means of agents, either concealed, or at least not publicly avowed, they may chufe to carry on. But the private trade of the fervants will naturally extend to a much greater variety of articles than the public trade of the company. The public trade of the company extends no further than the trade with Europe, and comprehends a part only of the foreign trade of the country. But the private trade of the fervants may extend to all the different branches both of its inland and foreign trade. The monopoly of the company can tend only to ftunt the natural growth of that part of the furplus produce which, in the cafe of a free trade, would be exported to Europe. That of the fervants tends to ftunt the natural growth of VII. every part of the produce in which they chufe to CHAP. deal, of what is deftined for home confumption, as well as of what is deftined for exportation; and confequently to degrade the cultivation of the whole country, and to reduce the number of its inhabitants. It tends to reduce the quantity of every fort of produce, even that of the neceffaries of life, whenever the fervants of the company chufe to deal in them, to what thofe fervants can both afford to buy and expect to fell with fuch a profit as pleases them. From the nature of their fituation too the fervants must be more difpofed to fupport with rigorous feverity their own intereft against that of the country which they govern, than their mafters can be to fupport theirs. The country belongs to their mafters, who cannot avoid having fome regard for the intereft of what belongs to them. But it does not belong to the fervants. The real intereft of their mafters, if they were capable of understanding it, is the fame with that of the country*, and it is from ignorance chiefly, and the meannefs of mercantile prejudice, that they ever opprefs it. But the real intereft of the fervants is by no means the fame with that of the country, and the most perfect information would not neceffarily put an end to their oppreffions. The regulations accordingly which have been fent out from Europe, though they have been frequently weak, have upon moft occafions been *The intereft of every proprietor of India Stock, however, is by no means the fame with that of the country in the government of which his vote gives him fome influence. See Book V. Chap. i. Part 3d. BOOK well-meaning. More intelligence, and perhaps IV. lefs good meaning, has fometimes appeared in those established by the fervants in India. It is a very fingular government, in which every member of the administration wishes to get out of the country, and confequently to have done with the government, as foon as he can, and to whofe intereft, the day after he has left it, and carried his whole fortune with him, it is perfectly indifferent though the whole country was fwallowed up by an earthquake. I mean not, however, by any thing which I have here faid, to throw any odious imputation upon the general character of the fervants of the Eaft India company, and much less upon that of any particular perfons. It is the system of government, the fituation in which they are placed, that I mean to cenfure; not the character of those who have acted in it. They acted as their fituation naturally directed, and they who have clamoured the loudeft against them would, probably, not have acted better themselves. In war and negociation, the councils of Madras and Calcutta have upon feveral occafions conducted themselves with a refolution and decifive wisdom which would have done honour to the Senate of Rome in the beft days of that republic. The members of thofe councils, however, had been bred to profeffions very different from war and politics. But their fituation alone, without education, experience, or even example, seems to have formed in them all at once the great qualities which it required, and to have inspired them both with abilities and virtues which they themselves I VII. themfelves could not well know that they pof- CHAP. feffed. If upon fome occafions, therefore, it has animated them to actions of magnanimity which could not well have been expected from them, we fhould not wonder if upon others it has prompted them to exploits of fomewhat a dif ferent nature. Such exclufive companies, therefore, are nuifances in every refpect; always more or less inconvenient to the countries in which they are established, and deftructive to those which have the misfortune to fall under their government. CHAP. VIII, Conclufion of the Mercantile Syftem.. THO VIII. HOUGH the encouragement of exporta. CHA P. tion, and the difcouragement of importation, are the two great engines by which the mercantile fyftem propofes to enrich every country, yet with regard to fome particular commodities, it seems to follow an oppofite plan: to difcourage exportation, and to encourage importation. Its ultimate object, however, it pretends, is always the fame, to enrich the country by an advantageous balance of trade. It dif courages the exportation of the materials of manufacture, and of the inftruments of trade, in order to give our own workmen an advantage, and to enable them to underfell thofe of other nations in all foreign markets: and by restrain |