diers must obey the prince who pays them. Before the extenfion of commerce and manufactures in Europe, the hofpitality of the rich and the great, from the favereign down to the finalleft baron, exceeded every thing which in the prefent times we can eafily form a notion of. Weftminster hall was the dining-room of William Rufus, and might frequently, perhaps, not be too large for his company. It was reckoned a piece of magnificence in Thomas Becket, that he ftrowed the floor of his hall with clean hay or rushes in the feafon, in order that the knights and fquires, who could not get feats, might not spoil their fine clothes when they fat down on the floor to eat their dinner. The great Earl of Warwick is faid to have entertained every day at his different manors, thirty thoufand people; and though the number here may have been exaggerated, it muft, however, have been very great to admit of fuch exaggeration. A hofpitality nearly of the fame kind was exercifed not many years ago in many different parts of the Highlands of Scotland. It feems to be common in all nations to whom commerce and manufactures are little known. I have feen, fays Doctor Pocock, an Arabian chief dine in the streets of a town where he had come to fell his cattle, and invite all paffengers, even common beggars, to fit down with him and partake of his banquet. The occupiers of land were in every refpect as dependent upon the great proprietor as his retainers. Even fuch of them as were not in a state of villanage, were tenants at will, who paid a rent IV. a rent in no respect equivalent to the fubfiftence CHA P. which the land afforded them. A crown, half a crown, a fheep, a lamb, was fome years ago in the Highlands of Scotland a common rent for lands which maintained a family. In fome places it is fo at this day; nor will money at prefent purchase a greater quantity of commodities there than in other places. In a country where the furplus produce of a large estate must be confumed upon the estate itself, it will frequently be more convenient for the proprietor, that part of it be confumed at a distance from his own houfe, provided they who confume it are as dependent upon him as either his retainers or his menial fervants. He is thereby faved from the embar raffment of either too large a company or too large a family. A tenant at will, who poffeffes land fufficient to maintain his family for little more than a quit-rent, is as dependent upon the proprietor as any fervant or retainer whatever, and must obey him with as little referve. Such a proprietor, as he feeds his fervants and retainers at his own houfe, fo he feeds his tenants at their houses. The fubfiftence of both is derived from his bounty, and its continuance depends upon his good pleasure. Upon the authority which the great proprie. tors neceffarily had in such a state of things over their tenants and retainers, was founded the power of the ancient barons. They neceffarily became the judges in peace, and the leaders in war, of all who dwelt upon their eftates. They could maintain order and execute the law within their respective III. BOOK refpective demefnes, because each of them could there turn the whole force of all the inhabitants against the injuftice of any one. No other perfon had fufficient authority to do this. The king in particular had not. In thofe ancient times he was little more than the greatest proprietor in his dominions, to whom, for the fake of common defence against their common enemies, the other great proprietors paid certain refpects. To have enforced payment of a fmall debt within the lands of a great proprietor, where all the inhabitants were armed and accustomed to stand by one another, would have coft the king, had he attempted it by his own authority, almost the fame effort as to extinguish a civil war. He was, therefore, obliged to abandon the administration of juftice through the greater part of the country, to thofe who were capable of adminiftering it; and for the fame reafon to leave the command of the country militia to thofe whom that militia would obey. It is a mistake to imagine that those territorial jurifdictions took their origin from the feudal law. Not only the highest jurifdictions both civil and criminal, but the power of levying troops, of coining money, and even that of making byelaws for the government of their own people, were all rights poffeffed allodially by the great proprietors of land several centuries before even the name of the feudal law was known in Europe, The authority and jurifdiction of the Saxon lords in England, appear to have been as great before the conqueft, as that of any of the Norman lords IV. lords after it. But the feudal law is not fup- CHAR posed to have become the common law of England till after the conqueft. That the most extenfive authority and jurifdictions were poffeffed by the great lords in France allodially, long be fore the feudal law was introduced into that country, is a matter of fact that admits of no doubt. That authority and thofe jurifdictions. all neceffarily flowed from the ftate of property and manners juft now defcribed. Without re mounting to the remote antiquities of either the French or English monarchies, we may find in much later times many proofs that fuch effects muft always flow from fuch caufes. It is not thirty years ago fince Mr. Cameron of Lochiel, a gentleman of Lochabar in Scotland, without any legal warrant whatever, not being what was then called a lord of regality, nor even a tenant in chief, but a vaffal of the Duke of Argyle, and without being fo much as a juftice of peace, ufed, notwithstanding, to exercise the highest criminal jurifdiction over his own people. He is faid to have done fo with great equity, though without any of the formalities of juftice; and it is not improbable that the ftate of that part of the country at that time made it neceffary for him to affume this authority in order to maintain the public peace. That gentleman, whose rent never exceeded five hundred pounds a year, carried, in 1745, eight hundred of his own people into the rebellion with him, The BOOK III. The introduction of the feudal law, so far from extending, may be regarded as an attempt to moderate the authority of the great allodial lords. It established a regular fubordination, accompanied with a long train of fervices and duties, from the king down to the smallest proprietor. During the minority of the proprietor, the rent, together with the management of his lands, fell into the hands of his immediate fuperior, and, confequently, thofe of all great proprietors into the hands of the king, who was charged with the maintenance and education of the pupil, and who, from his authority as guardian, was fuppofed to have a right of difpofing i of him in marriage, provided it was in a manner not unfuitable to his rank. But though this inftitution neceffarily tended to ftrengthen the authority of the king, and to weaken that of the great proprietors, it could not do either fuffici ently for establishing order and good government among the inhabitants of the country; because it could not alter fufficiently that state of property and manners from which the diforders arofe. The authority of government still continued to be, as before, too weak in the head and too strong in the inferior members, and the exceffive ftrength of the inferior members was the caufe of the weakness of the head. After the inftitution of feudal fubordination, the king was as incapable of reftraining the violence of the great lords as before. They ftill continued to make war according to their own discretion, almoft |