The American Economic Review, Volume 86American Economic Association., 1996 |
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Página 784
... Note also that s1 / s2 is bounded above by ( say ) M. - - Also , ensure that ɛ is chosen to be small enough that for all ( S1 , S2 ) in R , $ 2 / $ 2 is bounded away from zero , by ( say ) L. So within R , 0 < $ 1 / − $ 2 < M / L . Note ...
... Note also that s1 / s2 is bounded above by ( say ) M. - - Also , ensure that ɛ is chosen to be small enough that for all ( S1 , S2 ) in R , $ 2 / $ 2 is bounded away from zero , by ( say ) L. So within R , 0 < $ 1 / − $ 2 < M / L . Note ...
Página 1063
... Note that v ; < 1 since for- eigners acquire the " lemons " among domes- tic firms . Given the definition of ɛ * , we find that in equilibrium ( 5 ) 1 + ε 1+ e * = 1 + r 1 + r * Since e is a function of only ε * , the left- hand side of ...
... Note that v ; < 1 since for- eigners acquire the " lemons " among domes- tic firms . Given the definition of ɛ * , we find that in equilibrium ( 5 ) 1 + ε 1+ e * = 1 + r 1 + r * Since e is a function of only ε * , the left- hand side of ...
Página 1162
... Note , in particular , that a is estimated to equal 0.674 and 0.682 in the factor - hoarding and benchmark models , respectively . Thus , the time series on the Solow residual that emerge from the two models are very similar to those ...
... Note , in particular , that a is estimated to equal 0.674 and 0.682 in the factor - hoarding and benchmark models , respectively . Thus , the time series on the Solow residual that emerge from the two models are very similar to those ...
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JUDITH A CHEVALIER AND DAVID S SCHARFSTEIN | 703 |
JOSÉ MANUEL CAMPA AND P H KEVIN CHANG | 726 |
NORDHAUS AND ZILI YANG | 741 |
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