The abuses which sometimes creep into the local and provincial administration of a local and provincial revenue, how enormous soever they may appear, are in reality, however, almost always very trifling in comparison of those which commonly take place in the administration and expenditure of the revenue of a great empire. They are, besides, much more easily corrected. Under the local or provincial administration of the justices of the peace in Great Britain, the six days labour which the country people are obliged to give to the reparation of the highways, is not always, perhaps, very judiciously applied, but it is scarce ever exacted with any circumstance of cruelty or oppression. In France, under the administration of the intendants, the application is not always more judicious, and the exaction is frequently the most cruel and oppressive. Such corvees, as they are called, make one of the principal instruments of tyranny by which those officers chastise any parish or communeaute, which has had the misfortune to fall under their displeasure.

subjects of conversation at the court and in | sort of benefit from the lighting and paving of the capital, are attended to. and all the rest the streets of London. neglected. In China, besides, in Indostan, and in several other governments of Asia, the revenue of the sovereign arises almost altogether from a land tax or land rent, which rises or falls with the rise and fall of the annual produce of the land. The great interest of the sovereign, therefore, his revenue, is in such countries necessarily and immediately connected with the cultivation of the land, with the greatness of its produce, and with the value of its produce. But in order to render that produce both as great and as valuable as possible, it is necessary to procure to it as extensive a market as possible, and consequently to establish the freest, the easiest, and the least expensive communication between all the different parts of the country; which can be done only by means of the best roads and the best navigable canals. But the revenue of the sovereign does not, in any part of Europe, arise chiefly from a land tax or land rent. In all the great kingdoms of Europe, perhaps, the greater part of it may ultimately depend upon the produce of the land: but that dependency is neither so immediate nor so evident, In Europe, therefore, the sovereign does not feel himself so directly called upon to promote the increase, both in quantity and value of the produce of the land, or, by maintaining good roads and canals, to provide the most extensive market for that produce. Though it should be true, therefore, what I apprehend is not a little doubtful, that in some parts of Asia this department of the public police is very properly managed by the executive power, there is not the least probability that, during the present state of things, it could be tolerably managed by that power in any part of Europe.

Even those public works, which are of such a nature that they cannot afford any revenue for maintaining themselves, but of which the conveniency is nearly confined to some particular place or district, are always better maintained by a local or provincial revenue, under the management of a local and provincial administration, than by the general revenue of the state, of which the executive power must always have the management. Were the streets of London to be lighted and paved at the expense of the treasury, is there any probability that they would be so well lighted and paved as they are at present, or even at so small an expense? The expense, besides, instead of being raised by a local tax upon the inhabitants of each particular street, parish, or district in London, would, in this case, be defrayed out of the general revenue of the state, and would consequently be raised by a tax upon all the inhabitants of the kingdom, of whom the greater part derive no

Note 40.

of the public Works and Institutions which are necessary for facilitating particular Branches of Commerce.

The object of the public works and institu tions above mentioned, is to facilitate commerce in general. But in order to facilitate some particular branches of it, particular institutions are necessary, which again require a particular and extraordinary expense.

The disorders in

Some particular branches of commerce which are carried on with barbarous and un civilized nations, require extraordinary protection. An ordinary store or countinghouse could give little security to the goods of the merchants who trade to the western coast of Africa. To defend them from the barbarous natives, it is necessary that the place where they are deposited should be in some measure fortified. the government of Indostan have been supposed to render a like precaution necessary, even among that mild and gentle people; and it was under pretence of securing their persons and property from violence, that both the English and French East India companies were allowed to erect the first forts which they possessed in that country. Among other nations, whose vigorous government will suffer no strangers to possess any fortifi ed place within their territory, it may be necessary to maintain some ambassador, mi nister, or consul, who may both decide, according to their own customs, the differences arising among his own countrymen; and, in their disputes with the natives, mav

by means of his public character, interfere merchants have had the address to persuade with more authority and afford them a more the legislature to entrust to them the perfor powerful protection than they could expect mance of this part of the duty of the sovefrom any private man. The interests of reign, together with all the powers which are commerce have frequently made it necessary necessarily connected with it. to maintain ministers in foreign countries, These companies, though they may, perwhere the purposes either of war or alliance haps, have been useful for the first introducwould not have required any. The commerce tion of some branches of commerce, by of the Turkey company first occasioned the making, at their own expense, an experiment establishment of an ordinary ambassador at which the state might not think it prudent to Constantinople. The first English embassies make, have in the long-run proved, univer. to Russia arose altogether from commercial sally, either burdensome or useless, and have interests. The constant interference with either mismanaged or confined the trade. those interests, necessarily occasioned between When those companies do not trade upon a the subjects of the different states of Europe, joint stock, but are obliged to admit any perhas probably introduced the custom of keep son, properly qualified, upon paying a certain ing, in all neighbouring countries, ambassa- fine, and agreeing to submit to the regulations dors or ministers constantly resident, even in of the company, each member trading upon the time of peace. This custom, unknown to his own stock, and at his own risk, they are ancient times, seems not to be older than the called regulated companies. When they trade end of the fifteenth, or beginning of the six- upon a joint stock, each member sharing in teenth century; that is, than the time when the common profit or loss, in proportion to his commerce first began to extend itself to the share in this stock, they are called joint-stock greater part of the nations of Europe, and companies. Such companies, whether reguwhen they first began to attend to its in-lated or joint-stock, sometimes have, and sometimes have not, exclusive privileges.

terests.

It seems not unreasonable, that the extra- Regulated companies resemble, in every reordinary expense which the protection of any spect, the corporation of trades, so common in particular branch of commerce may occasion, the cities and towns of all the different counshould be defrayed by a moderate tax upon tries of Europe; and are a sort of enlarged that particular branch; by a moderate fine, monopolies of the same kind. As no inhabifor example, to be paid by the traders when tant of a town can exercise an incorporated they first enter into it; or, what is more trade, without first obtaining his freedom in equal, by a particular duty of so much per the incorporation, so, in most cases, no subject cent, upon the goods which they either im- of the state can lawfully carry on any branch port into, or export out of, the particular of foreign trade, for which a regulated comcountries with which it is carried on. The pany is established, without first becoming a protection of trade, in general, from pirates member of that company. The monopoly is and freebooters, is said to have given occasion more or less strict, according as the terms of to the first institution of the duties of cus-admission are more or less difficult, and actoms. But, if it was thought reasonable to lay a general tax upon trade, in order to defray the expense of protecting trade in general, it should seem equally reasonable to lay a particular tax upon a particular branch of trade, in order to defray the extraordinary expense of protecting that branch.

cording as the directors of the company have more or less authority, or have it more or less in their power to manage in such a manner as to confine the greater part of the trade to themselves and their particular friends. In the most ancient regulated companies, the privileges of apprenticeship were the same as in The protection of trade, in general, has other corporations, and entitled the person always been considered as essential to the who had served his time to a member of the defence of the commonwealth, and, upon that company, to become himself a member, either account, a necessary part of the duty of the without paying any fine, or upon paying a executive power. The collection and appli- much smaller one than what was exacted of cation of the general duties of customs, other people. The usual corporation spirit, therefore, have always been left to that power. wherever the law does not restrain it, prevails But the protection of any particular branch in all regulated companies. When they have of trade is a part of the general protection of been allowed to act according to their natural trade; a part, therefore, of the duty of that genius, they have always, in order to confine power; and if nations always acted consis- the competition to as small a number of pertently, the particular duties levied for the sons as possible, endeavoured to subject the purposes of such particular protection, should trade to many burdensome regulations. When always have been left equally to its disposal. the law has restrained them from doing this, But in this respect, as well as in many others, they have become altogether useless and insignations have not always acted consistently; nificant.

and in the greater part of the commercial The regulated companies for foreign com tates of Europe, particular companies of merce which at present subsist in Great Bri

tain, are the ancient merchant-adventurers | miles of London, and not free of the city, company, now commonly called the Ham- could be admitted a member; another restricburgh company, the Russia company, the tion which, joined to the foregoing, necessari. Eastland company, the Turkey company, and ly excluded all but the freemen of London. the African company. Ás the time for the loading and sailing of

been so.

The terms of admission into the Hamburgh those general ships depended altogether upon company are now said to be quite easy; and the directors, they could easily fill them with the directors either have it not in their power their own goods, and those of their particular to subject the trade to any troublesome re- friends, to the exclusion of others, who, they straint or regulations, or, at least, have not of might pretend, had made their proposals too late exercised that power. It has not always late. In this state of things, therefore, this About the middle of the last cen- company was, in every respect, a strict and tury, the fine for admission was fifty, and at oppressive monopoly. Those abuses gave ocone time one hundred pounds, and the con- casion to the act of the 26th of George II. c. duct of the company was said to be extremely 18, reducing the fine for admission to twenty oppressive. In 1643, in 1645, and in 1661, pounds for all persons, without any distinction the clothiers and free traders of the west of of ages, or any restriction, either to mere merEngland complained of them to parliament, chants, or to the freemen of London; and as of monopolists, who confined the trade, granting to all such persons the liberty of exand oppressed the manufactures of the coun- porting, from all the ports of Great Britain, try. Though those complaints produced no to any port in Turkey, all British goods, of act of parliament, they had probably intimi- which the exportation was not prohibited, updated the company so far, as to oblige them to on paying both the general duties of customs, reform their conduct. Since that time, at and the particular duties assessed for defrayleast, there have been no complaints against ing the necessary expenses of the company; them. By the 10th and 11th of William III. and submitting, at the same time, to the lawc. 6, the fine for admission into the Russia ful authority of the British ambassador and company was reduced to five pounds; and by consuls resident in Turkey, and to the byethe 25th of Charles II. c. 7, that for admis- laws of the company duly enacted. To presion into the Eastland company to forty shil-vent any oppression by those bye-laws, it was lings; while, at the same time, Sweden, Den-by the same act ordained, that if any seven mark, and Norway, all the countries on the members of the company conceived themselves north side of the Baltic, were exempted from aggrieved by any bye-law which should be their exclusive charter. The conduct of those enacted after the passing of this act, they might companies had probably given occasion to those appeal to the board of trade and plantations two acts of parliament. Before that time, (to the authority of which a committee of the Sir Josiah Child had represented both these privy council has now succeeded), provided and the Hamburgh company as extremely op- such appeal was brought within twelve months pressive, and imputed to their bad manage- after the bye-law was enacted; and that, if ment the low state of the trade, which we at any seven members conceived themselves agthat time carried on to the countries compre- grieved by any bye-law which had been enact hended within their respective charters. But ed before the passing of this act, they might though such companies may not, in the pre- bring a like appeal, provided it was within sent times, be very oppressive, they are cer- twelve months after the day on which this act tainly altogether useless. To be merely use- was to take place. The experience of one less, indeed, is perhaps, the highest eulogy year, however, may not always be sufficient to which can ever justly be bestowed upon a re- discover to all the members of a great com. gulated company; and all the three compa- pany the pernicious tendency of a partic' lar nies above mentioned seem, in their present bye-law; and if several of them should afterstate, to deserve this eulogy. wards discover it, neither the board of trade, The fine for admission into the Turkey nor the committee of council, can afford them company was formerly twenty-five pounds any redress. The object, besides, of the greatfor all persons under twenty-six years of er part of the bye-laws of all regulated com. age, and fifty pounds for all persons above panies, as well as of all other corporations, is that age. Nobody but mere merchants could not so much to oppress those who are already be admitted; a restriction which excluded members, as to discourage others from becom all shop-keepers and retailers. By a bye- ing so; which may be done, not only by a law, no British manufactures could be ex-bigh fine, but by many other contrivances. ported to Turkey but in the general ships The constant view of such companies is al of the company; and as those ships sailed ways to raise the rate of their own profit as always from the port of London, this re- high as they can; to keep the market, both striction confined the trade to that expensive for the goods which they export, and for those port, and the traders to those who lived in which they import, as much understocked as London and in its neighbourhood. By an- they can; which can be done only by restrainother bye-law, no person living within twentying the competition, or by discouraging new

adventurers from entering into the trade. Aadmission fines, and from the corporation dufine, even of twenty pounds, besides, though ties imposed upon the trade of the company. it may not, perhaps, be sufficient to discour- Though they had the same interest, therefore, age any man from entering into the Turkey to attend to the maintenance of such forts and trade, with an intention to continue in it, may garrisons, they can seldom have the same abibe enough to discourage a speculative mer-lity to render that attention effectual. The chant from hazarding a single adventure in it. maintenance of a public minister, requiring In all trades, the regular established traders, scarce any attention, and but a moderate and even though not incorporated, naturally com- limited expense, is a business much more suitbine to raise profits, which are noway so like-able both to the temper and abilities of a rely to be kept, at all times, down to their pro-gulated company. per level, as by the occasional competition of Long after the time of Sir Josiah Child, speculative adventurers. The Turkey trade, however, in 1750, a regulated company was though in some measure laid open by this act established, the present company of merchants of parliament, is still considered by many peo- trading to Africa; which was expressly chargple as very far from being altogether free. ed at first with the maintenance of all the BriThe Turkey company contribute to maintain tish forts and garrisons that lie between Cape an ambassador and two or three consuls, who, Blanc and the Cape of Good Hope, and aflike other public ministers, ought to be main-terwards with that of those only which lie betained altogether by the state, and the trade tween Cape Rouge and the Cape of Good laid open to all his majesty's subjects. The Hope. The act which establishes this comdifferent taxes levied by the company, for this pany (the 23d of George II. c. 31), seems to and other corporation purposes, might afford a revenue much more than sufficient to enable a state to maintain such ministers.

sons.

have had two distinct objects in view; first, to restrain effectually the oppressive and monopolizing spirit which is natural to the direcRegulated companies, it was observed by tors of a regulated company; and, secondly, Sir Josiah Child, though they had frequently to force them, as much as possible, to give supported public ministers, had never main- an attention, which is not natural to them, tained any forts or garrisons in the countries towards the maintenance of forts and garrito which they traded; whereas joint-stock companies frequently had. And, in reality,| For the first of these purposes, the fine for the former seem to be much more unfit for admission is limited to forty shillings. The this sort of service than the latter. First, the company is prohibited from trading in their directors of a regulated company have no par- corporate capacity, or upon a joint stock; from ticular interest in the prosperity of the gene- borrowing money upon common seal, or from ral trade of the company, for the sake of which laying any restraints upon the trade, which such forts and garrisons are maintained. The may be carried on freely from all places, and decay of that general trade may even frequent- by all persons being British subjects, and payly contribute to the advantage of their own ing the fine. The government is in a commitprivate trade; as, by diminishing the number tee of nine persons, who meet at London, but of their competitors, it may enable them both who are chosen annually by the freemen of to buy cheaper, and to sell dearer. The di-the company at London, Bristol, and Liverrectors of a joint-stock company, on the con- pool; three from each place. No committeetrary, having only their share in the profits man can be continued in office for more than which are made upon the common stock com- three years together. Any committee-man mitted to their management, have no private might be removed by the board of trade and trade of their own, of which the interest can plantations, now by a committee of council, afbe separated from that of the general trade of ter being heard in his own defence. the company. Their private interest is con- committee are forbid to export negroes from nected with the prosperity of the general trade | Africa, or to import any African goods into of the company, and with the maintenance of Great Britain. But as they are charged with the forts and garrisons which are necessary for the maintenance of forts and garrisons, they its defence. They are more likely, therefore, may, for that purpose export from Great Brito have that continual and careful attention tain to Africa goods and stores of different which that maintenance necessarily requires. kinds. Out of the moneys which they shall Secondly, The directors of a joint-stock com-receive from the company, they are allowed a pany have always the management of a large sum, not exceeding eight hundred pounds, for capital, the joint stock of the company, a the salaries of their clerks and agents at Lonpart of which they may frequently employ, don, Bristol, and Liverpool, the house-rent of with propriety, in building, repairing, and their offices at London, and all other expenses maintaining such necessary forts and garri- of management, commission, and agency, in But the directors of a regulated com- England. What remains of this sum, after pany, having the management of no common defraying these different expenses, they may capital, have no other fund to employ in this divide among themselves, as compensation for way, but the casual revenue arising from the their trouble, in what manner they think pro

sons.

The

It

per. By this constitution, it might have been | company; and the fear of the punishment can expected, that the spirit of monopoly would never be a motive of sufficient weight to force have been effectually restrained, and the first a continual and careful attention to a busiof these purposes sufficiently answered. ness to which he has no other interest to atwould seem, however, that it had not. Though tend. The committee are accused of having by the 4th of George III. c. 20, the fort of sent out bricks and stones from England for Senegal, with all its dependencies, had been the reparation of Cape Coast Castle, on the invested in the company of merchants trading coast of Guines; a business for which parliato Africa, yet, in the year following (by the ment had several times granted an extraordi5th of George III. c. 44), not only Senegal nary sum of money. These bricks and stones, and its dependencies, but the whole coast, too, which had thus been sent upon so long a from the port of Sallee, in South Barbary, to voyage, were said to have been of so bad a Cape Rouge, was exempted from the jurisdic- quality, that it was necessary to rebuild, from tion of that company, was vested in the crown, the foundation, the walls which had been reard the trade to it declared free to all his ma- paired with them. The forts and garrisons jesty's subjects. The company had been sus- which lie north of Cape Rouge, are not only pected of restraining the trade and of estab-maintained at the expense of the state, but are lishing some sort of improper monopoly. It under the immediate government of the exeis not, however, very easy to conceive how, cutive power; and why those which lie south under the regulations of the 23d George II. of that cape, and which, too, are, in part at they could do so. In the printed debates of least, maintained at the expense of the state, the house of commons, not always the most should be under a different government, it authentic records of truth, I observe, how-seems not very easy even to imagine a good ever, that they have been accused of this. reason. The protection of the Mediterranean The members of the committee of nine being trade was the original purpose or pretence of all merchants, and the governors and factors the garrisons of Gibraltar and Minorca; and in their different forts and settlements being the maintenance and government of those garall dependent upon them, it is not unlikely risons have always been, very properly, comthat the latter might have given peculiar at-mitted, not to the Turkey company, but to tention to the consignments and commissions of the former, which would establish a real monopoly.

the executive power. In the extent of its dominion consists, in a great measure, the pride and dignity of that power; and it is not very For the second of these purposes, the main- likely to fail in attention to what is necessary tenance of the forts and garrisons, an annual for the defence of that dominion. The garrisum has been allotted to them by parliament, sons at Gibraltar and Minorca, accordingly, generally about L. 19,000. For the proper have never been neglected. Though Minorca application of this sum, the committee is has been twice taken, and is now probably obliged to account annually to the cursitor lost for ever, that disaster has never been imbaron of exchequer; which account is after-puted to any neglect in the executive power. wards to be laid before parliament. But par- I would not, however, be understood to insiliament, which gives so little attention to the nuate, that either of those expensive garrisons application of millions, is not likely to give was ever, even in the smallest degree, neces much to that of L. 13,000 a-year; and the sary for the purpose for which they were oricursitor baron of exchequer, from his profes-ginally dismembered from the Spanish mosion and education, is not likely to be pro-narchy. That dismemberment, perhaps, never foundly skilled in the proper expense of forts served any other real purpose than to alienate and garrisons. The captains of his majesty's navy, indeed, or any other commissioned of ficers, appointed by the board of admiralty, may inquire into the condition of the forts and garrisons, and report their observations to that board. But that board seems to have no direct jurisdiction over the committee, nor any authority to correct those whose conduct it may thus inquire into; and the captains of his majesty's navy, besides, are not supposed to be always deeply learned in the science of fortification. Removal from an office, which can be enjoyed only for the term of three years, and of which the lawful emoluments, even during that term, are so very small, seems to be the utmost punishment to which any committee-man is liable, for any fault, except direct malversation, or embezzlement, either of the public money, or of that of the

from England her natural ally the king of Spain, and to unite the two principal branches of the house of Bourbon in a much stricter and more permanent alliance than the ties of blood could ever have united them.

Joint-stock companies, established either by royal charter, or by act of parliament, are different in several respects, not only from re gulated companies, but from private copart neries.

Each

First, In a private copartnery, no partner without the consent of the company, car transfer his share to another person, or intro duce a new member into the company. member, however, may, upon proper warning, withdraw from the copartnery, and demand payment from them of his share of the common stock. In a joint-stock company, or the contrary, no member can demand pay