Decisions, Uncertainty, and the Brain: The Science of Neuroeconomics

Capa
MIT Press, 17/09/2004 - 400 páginas
In this provocative book, Paul Glimcher argues that economic theory may provide an alternative to the classical Cartesian model of the brain and behavior. Glimcher argues that Cartesian dualism operates from the false premise that the reflex is able to describe behavior in the real world that animals inhabit. A mathematically rich cognitive theory, he claims, could solve the most difficult problems that any environment could present, eliminating the need for dualism by eliminating the need for a reflex theory. Such a mathematically rigorous description of the neural processes that connect sensation and action, he explains, will have its roots in microeconomic theory. Economic theory allows physiologists to define both the optimal course of action that an animal might select and a mathematical route by which that optimal solution can be derived. Glimcher outlines what an economics-based cognitive model might look like and how one would begin to test it empirically. Along the way, he presents a fascinating history of neuroscience. He also discusses related questions about determinism, free will, and the stochastic nature of complex behavior.
 

Índice

Acknowledgments
René Descartes and the Birth of Neuroscience 3
Inventing the Reflex 33
Charles Sherrington and the Propositional Logic of Reflexes 55
Finding the Limits of the Sherringtonian Paradigm 77
Beyond Reflexology? 111
An Alternative to Sherrington? 131
Modularity and Evolution 145
Evolution Probability and Economics 205
A Case Study 225
Irreducible Uncertainty and the Theory of Games 271
Games and the Brain 299
Putting It All Together I Behavior and Physiology 319
Putting It All Together II Philosophical Implications 337
References 347
Index 355

Extending Marrs Approach 171

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Acerca do autor (2004)

Paul W. Glimcher is Associate Professor of Neural Science and Psychology at the Center for Neural Science, New York University.

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