אוב say nothing of the confirmation of his appointments, upon legislators committed to nothing in particular in the way of principles and sharing no responsibility for the fulfillment of any promises or declarations he has made. In fact, there have been numerous instances in which members of the legislature have refused during the campaign to take any stand whatever upon the gubernatorial contest, and have only been aroused to the fact that the governor was a fellow partisan when questions of patronage have arisen. Thus, while the governor is being held increasingly responsible by the people for legislative results, the non-partisan legislative system tends, in the proportion to which the legislature is genuinely non-partisan, to render his power actually to assume that responsibility largely a matter of luck. (8) Responsibility in the Non-Partisan Legislature. From what has already been said it must be apparent that the effective enforcement of responsibility for legislation in Minnesota has been virtually destroyed by the non-partisan system. In no state is the enforcement of such responsibility an easy matter. In Minnesota, however, where policies and principles are practically ignored in the legislative campaigns; where effective party discipline has disappeared from the legislative halls; where permanent and recognized leadership is almost wholly lacking, responsibility rests not upon any group or party, but upon the individual members. In other words, legislative responsibility is almost exclusively personal in character, which means that for practical purposes it might as well not exist save in so far as the local interests of the individual legislative districts are concerned. There is plenty of evidence that the Minnesota legislators fully appreciate this situation. They are accountable to their particular constituents and to no one else. They need not concern themselves with the effect of their actions upon any party because they are not the spokesmen of any party. So long as he can secure a slice for his district, there is no effective political influence to restrain any member from participating in the excesses of pork-barrel legislation; and it has been a matter of general comment that non-partisan legislatures in Minnesota have more than once passed appropriation laws and imposed tax levies which no responsible party would have dared to enact.42 Many members of the legislature have themselves borne witness to the fact that there is a temptation and a tendency for the legislator to react in a more or less personal way to legislative problems. He feels inclined to avoid trouble and to keep his own political fences in repair. He can rest safely upon the assumption that his constituents will at most be familiar with only a very small part of his legislative record and that if the more conspicuous parts of that record pass muster, he need not worry about the rest. The writer does not wish to be understood as suggesting that members of the Minnesota legislature are lacking in patriotism or broadmindedness, but to emphasize that the non-partisan system tends to make personal and local interests overshadow state-wide interests and at the same time practically obliterates real responsibility for legislative results. IV. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS The net results of the foregoing study may be summarized as follows: First, in municipal and local government the non-partisan ballot has in general produced wholesome results. 42 This charge was widely made against the legislature elected in 1916. Second, the non-partisan judicial ballot has tended to accentuate rather than alleviate the evils incident to an elective judiciary. Third, the nonpartisan legislative ballot in Minnesota has produced results which are on the whole more unsatisfactory than otherwise, although those results are to some extent colored by the local political situation. It is possible, however, to go further and suggest certain general principles which seem to govern the degree of success with which the nonpartisan plan can be applied to various types of nominations and elections. These may be stated thus: (1) The Size of the Electoral Unit. The non-partisan plan works best where the electorate is small enough to make widespread acquaintance with the candidates possible. (2) The Length of the Ballot. Where a short ballot is being voted, electoral intelligence is higher and more general than where the ballot is long and complicated, and the absence of party designations from the ballot will prove a less serious handicap. In long ballot elections the non-partisan scheme leads to confusion worse confounded. (3) The Character of the Issues. The success of the non-partisan ballot will vary with the character of the issues involved in the election. Where the issues are primarily those of character or personality, the results will tend to be good. This would be the case in the choice of city commissioners and the like. Where the issues are largely issues of technical ability and expert knowledge, as in the case of all but the lowest grades of judicial office, popular election will never produce satisfactory results and those results will on the whole be rendered worse by a non-partisan ballot. Where the issues in the election are, or ought to be, issues of policy or principle, they will be obscured by the non-partisan plan with a consequent falling off in effective responsibility, and the results will tend to be increasingly unsatisfactory in accordance with the extent to which non-partisanship becomes a reality rather than a fiction. (4) The Need of Endorsements in Non-Partisan Elections. Finally, the writer ventures to suggest that except in the smallest political units, the non-partisan ballot would produce better results if some plan were evolved, in accordance with which individual candidates might have printed after their names on the ballot, the endorsements of political and non-political groups or organizations. Provision should of course be made to make sure that such groups were actual and responsible bodies. Such endorsements, and a candidate might receive several, would aid the voter materially in making his choice by indicating the kind of sponsorship back of the various contestants. Experience shows that just this process goes on unofficially at present; and there is reason to believe that if such endorsements were legally recognized and regulated, some of the more confusing and unsatisfactory elements in our own non-partisan elections might be eliminated. Pre-Primary Conventions By SCHUYLER C. WALLACE Instructor in Political Science, Columbia University OES pre-arrangement fatally compromise the idea of the direct primary? Almost from the inception of the movement there has been an important body of opinion (represented at an early day by the so-called Hughes plan) which has accepted the notion that normally the natural leadership of a party must prevail and which has accordingly advocated the direct primary as a corrective rather than as a source of constant popular initiative. On the other hand, it must be said that from the standpoint of the main body of agitation on behalf of the direct primary, and from the standpoint both of the spirit and of the letter of most direct primary laws, any element of pre-arrangement which tends to reduce to a mere formality the vote of the rank and file of the party members constitutes a fatal compromise. Preprimary conventions, more perhaps than any other tangible feature in the machinery of nominations, afford an opportunity for such pre-arrangement. The law and the practice regarding them are crucial factors in the operation of the direct primary. LEGAL PROVISIONS CONCERNING THE PRE-PRIMARY CONVENTION the prevention of the manipulation of a convention to the advantage of any dominant clique. Both purposes are accomplished by placing before the voters all candidates within the party who have sufficient strength to warrant consideration. The convention itself cannot nominate. Instead, one ballot is cast. All those who receive ten per cent or more of the convention vote upon this ballot are placed before the voters at the primary. The contest is transferred from the convention to the polls. The choice is virtually thrust upon the voters. An altogether different principle underlies the law of South Dakota. There, responsibility of leadership is recognized and the statute has been shaped accordingly. The pre-primary convention whose composition is regulated by law, is directed to select a list of candidates and present it to the voters at the primary. Provision is made for a dissenting proposal on the part of any five members of the convention. Only one such, however, may emanate from the convention, although independent candidates may secure admission to the primary ballot by means of a petition. A special effort is made to render effective the campaigns of any insurgent or independent aspirants for the party nomination through a ination through a series of joint debates which are mandatory upon the convention designee. To an even greater extent is the principle of party responsibility recognized in Minnesota. There, the convention is directed to endorse but one candidate for each office and submit the proposal to the voters at the pri mary. Independent nomination may of course be made, but not until after the convention has acted. 4 6 Maine, Nevada," and Wyoming, make legal provision for pre-primary conventions. The purpose of such conferences is not the proposal of names for ratification or selection at the primaries, but rather to accomplish those other functions which are thought to be essential to party unity—the formulation of party principles, the selection of party central committees, the nomination of delegates to the national conventions, etc. Twenty-five states" have deemed party conventions necessary for these purposes. Only the three named, however, have specified that they shall be held prior to the primary. Two other states, Maryland and Washington, have placed the matter entirely in the hands of the state central committee; whereas Louisiana, Oregon, and Pennsylvania make no mention of the subject in their election laws, but nevertheless hold pre-primary conferences. remaining states have created postprimary conventions. The 7 Arizona Election Laws 1921, sec. 639. strong probability that some actionformal or tacit-will be taken with reference to party nominees. The state laws may provide, as the laws of Main and Nebraska do provide, that no formal action may be taken, but needless to say no method has been devised of preventing the formulation of a party slate by tacit understanding. The convention, called it is true for another purpose, must of necessity facilitate such understandings. The legislatures in a majority of the states may well have been of this opinion, for in them the excuse of platform formulation has been taken away from the organization leaders by the fact that platform drafting is lodged with a postprimary convention. THE ACTUAL PRACTICE OF THE PREPRIMARY CONVENTION To what extent the law and the practice of holding pre-primary conventions diverge it is difficult to determine. In the three states wherein it is mandatory upon the parties to hold conventions for nominating purposes, conventions belong to the normal course of events. In Colorado, one of Missouri Election Laws 1922, sec. 4850. Montana Election Laws 1921, sec. 639. Massachusetts Election Laws 1921, ch. 53, sec. 54. New Jersey Election Laws 1922, sec. 49. North Dakota Election Laws 1921, sec. 890. Ohio Election Laws 1920, sec. 4991-1. Nevada Election Laws 1922, sec. 24. New Hampshire Election Laws 1920, sec. 20. South Dakota Election Laws 1919, sec. 7108. Vermont Election Laws 1920, sec. 131. Washington Election Laws 1921, sec. 59. West Virginia Primary Election Laws 1922, sec. 3. Wisconsin Primary Election Laws 1921, sec. 5.20. Wyoming Primary Election Laws 1922, sec. 2521. 8 Ariz., Cal., Col., Ill., Ind., Iowa, Kan., Mass., Mich., Mo., Mont., N. H., N. J., N. D., Ohio, Vt., West Va., Wis. 7 the states having a mandatory law, the convention has succeeded in eliminating from the ticket all but the strong candidates, for despite the provision that all those who receive ten per cent or more shall be put upon the ballot, most of those who find the convention overwhelmingly against them drop out of the contest. Yet the fact that the convention cannot declare anyone nominated largely eliminates the opportunity for machine control. It has often occurred that the person obtaining the largest vote in the convention has been voted down at the primaries, and a seemingly weaker man been chosen nominee. The present governor of the state is an example of this. William C. Sweet was third in the Democratic convention, but first in the Democratic primary. The systems in operation in both South Dakota and Minnesota are especially interesting and have been treated with some detail elsewhere in this volume. No formal action is taken in any of the states in which it is mandatory to hold a pre-primary convention for the formulation of the party platform. The extent to which informal dickers take place it is impossible to tell. Both major parties in Washington, where the power of calling conventions at any time is definitely lodged with the state committees, hold pre-primary conventions. The work of their convention, according to the publicity department of the Republican Party, has been confined to platform making, and the selection of presidential electors and delegates to national nominating conventions. Without doubt tacit understandings are arrived at here, just as in the Democratic Party in the state, which, according to party officials, holds conventions that are both frequent and effective. In Louisiana, where the law does not mention the subject, conventions are sometimes held, although not as a regular practice. One was held in 1911 and one in 1919, but no formal action was taken during the intervening years. In each case the work of the convention proved effective. It is interesting to note the attempt of the Democrats this year to institute the practice in Pennsylvania where the law likewise makes no mention of the subject. The recommendation of the organization was followed by the voters in the case of the governor, but not in the case of the lieutenant-gov ernor. Despite the provision in the laws of eighteen of the states for postprimary convention, pre-primary nominating conventions are held in at least ten. In Iowa, North Dakota, Vermont and Wisconsin, it is the regular practice to hold such conventions in one or another of the major parties, and probably in both. In the remaining states, Arizona, California, Illinois, Michigan, New Jersey and New Hampshire, such conferences are held at least occasionally. The four states aforementioned maintain their practice of holding preliminary conventions for the endorsement of candidates, "so that" (in the words of one of the state chairmen) "the vote may not be fatally scattered or divided." In Iowa and Vermont, according to the statement of party officials, the action of the convention is equivalent to nomination. Wisconsin could be included in the same category except that upon certain issues it has been the practice to pass the decision on to the party membership. This was done in 1922 when the Democratic conference endorsed two candidates for governor, Bentley, a "wet," and Malthie, a "dry." The contest was decided on primary day. In North Dakota the situation has been somewhat anoma |