but to the tragic fact that our citizens do not force the competitive struggle for votes into the higher planes of civic ideals and accomplishments. So long as impossible, hypocritical and conflicting promises will bring in a majority vote, there is little likelihood that practical politicians will find it either expedient or safe to carry the fight to higher planes of constructive statesmanship. It is quite common for politicians to desire so to do, but to be forced to a lower type of campaign performance in order to secure the necessary votes. Nothing will be accomplished in the way of permanent reform until we face these uncomplimentary but basic facts. To salve the popular conscience and provide the public with moral alibis for civic shortcomings by undiscriminating attacks upon politicians and parties is the most vicious type of demagoguery. For it prevents and postpones the only effective remedy, viz., a real civic awakening.

Nor is this all. As long as human nature and the laws of psychology remain substantially the same, popular government over areas as large as our states can be carried on only by political parties. So far as one can see, the civic activities of the voter will be confined to activities for party control within the party, and to his final choice at the polls between contending parties. No one yet, in any age, has found any better way of making the hopes and aspirations of the multitude become effective in the forms of political control. The inherent limitations on mass movements and public opinion are such, that, without some form of party government, democracy cannot exist. For the public to face these facts, to realize the tremendous mission

4 Viscount James Bryce, Modern Democracies, Vol. I, pp. 119, 122, n. 1. 2 vols. New York, 1921.

of the party, and to apply to the party in power the test of strict accountability for its stewardship, are the first steps in the improvement of our system of party responsibility, and in the intelligent approach to the solution of its problems.

THE DIRECT PRIMARY LAW

Having thus examined at some length the doctrine of party responsibility and its inherent place in the life of popular government, we are now ready to consider to what extent and in what way the functioning of this doctrine has been affected by the direct primary law in Wisconsin. This has been one of the hotly contested points in the whole discussion that was waged with some bitterness several years ago and that has not yet entirely abated.

It is significant to note that the importance and value of party responsibility has been admitted by both sides to this controversy.5

This leaves as the only matter of contention the question as to whether the direct primary law has in fact interfered with the normal and beneficent operation of the principle of party responsibility. This question will be discussed in connection with the arguments that have been made, to show the evil effects of the primary law upon party responsibilities and which seem to fall into four general propositions.

'EVIL EFFECTS OF PRIMARY LAW The first proposition is that the direct primary law has placed directly into the hands of the people certain functions, viz., the nomination of state officials, upon which a public opinion

Robert M. La Follette, Message to Wisconsin Legislature, January, 1903, quoted in Paul M. Reinsch, Readings on American State Government, p. 388. Boston, 1911.

Emanuel L. Philipp, assisted by Edgar T. Wheelock, Political Reform in Wisconsin p. 83. Milwaukee, 1909.

cannot exist except occasionally in the case of the candidate for governor. Where the governor, or a man otherwise equally well known, is a candidate for reëlection and there is only one other candidate, the people will frequently have sufficient information regarding the relative merits of the candidates so that the formation of a real opinion may be possible. But if neither of the candidates happens to be well known to the people, regardless of their ability or worth, or if there happens to be a large group of candidates, the possibility of the primary vote for governor registering a true opinion is extremely meager.

The chances of a real opinion are even more remote in the case of the candidate for other offices about whom the people are much less likely to be informed. The writer attempted to test this out by asking twenty-one audiences of about one thousand persons each in different parts of the state, how many of those present had any definite, authoritative information regarding the qualifications for candidates for state office at the last primary, not counting the candidates for governor or any candidate whose home might happen to be in that community. There were on the average of three to each audience, or one-third of one per cent. Surely no one would argue that such a vote could possibly represent true public opinion. What then, does the vote represent? Largely the factors of fancy, caprice, suggestion and the like. If unworthy candidates are selected, unless they are notorious, the public would not know until it was too late, and then there would be no one to be held accountable.

Under the convention system, these candidates would be nominated by a state convention, composed of delegates elected by the party voters. This convention would be composed mainly of

politicians, men who have made practical politics a subject of major interest, who make it a business to know the various candidates for office, and who are familiar with the type of men the offices demand. The state leaders would be there and this body of political experts for that is exactly what they are would confer, discuss, compromise, and vote until a majority or two-thirds had agreed upon a list of candidates. There is one thing upon which all practical politicians do agree, and that is the all importance of party success. Consequently, in selecting the list of candidates, the consideration of first importance is to secure a ticket that will win the public favor and give such an effective administration of public affairs as to insure the party's continuance in power two years hence.

LACK OF PARTY RESPONSIBILITY

Thus under the convention system party affairs are largely regulated by party experts, whom the people may hold to rigorous accountability for their conduct. A definite party responsibility is thus established, for the people always have it within their power to administer the stinging rebuke of political defeat, in case the party managers have abused their trust. But under the primary law no one is really responsible, for the work is not done by the group of party managers, but is attempted by the people themselves, who cannot be held to any effective responsibility, since it was a task for which less than one per cent were adequately prepared.

On matters of this kind, objective evidence is very meager, but we are not entirely without it. As is generally known, the main political fight in Wisconsin is not between the two great parties, but between the two factions. of the Republican Party. One faction

is generally spoken of as the LaFollette faction and the other as the Conservative group. (In the last two years this latter group has been dominated by men who have chosen the name of Progressive Republicans.) In the interests of administrative harmony all the chief executive officers of state should belong to one faction or the other, and then that one faction could be held responsible for the state administration. As a matter of fact, there has been but one election since the adoption of the direct primary in 1906 when the five chief e ecutive officers have been elected by the same faction, and that one time was in the La Follette landslide of 1922. Under such circumstances there is neither party nor factional responsibility. Moreover, experience has shown that it was too much to expect that the political antagonism between these officers would not find expression in many ways positively detrimental to the public service. Such phenomena have very rarely appeared under the convention system, for the interest of each officer is generally identified with the party destiny and it becomes the selfish interest of both the party and the candidate to prevent friction and to give an administration that will please the public.

Again, this same lack of party responsibility is evidenced to a more alarming extent in the failure to establish a political unity between the legislative and executive departments, which is usually indispensable to a constructive legislative program. During three administrations since the direct primary law was enacted, viz., 1909, 1913 and 1921, there has been a governor of one faction and a legislature of another. Where the hostility between the factions is as bitter as it is in Wisconsin, the evil consequences of such a situation are apparent. In

those years there was neither party nor factional responsibility for the control of government, and if there was really a popular government in Wisconsin it would have been difficult to locate. Except under extremely uncommon circumstances such a situation would be impossible under a convention system. The author has been unable to find anywhere a parallel under the convention method of nomination.

LACK OF FOCUS BETWEEN ESTABLISHED POLITICAL LEADERS

The second line of argument that has been suggested to show the evil effects of the direct primary upon party responsibility is that the direct primary tends to focus public attention upon contests between irresponsible factions or outstanding political leaders, rather than between established political parties with their continuing responsibility.

The first question presented here is the question of fact; has the effect of the direct primary law in Wisconsin been to center interest as above indicated? This question is complicated by the fact that the Democratic Party in Wisconsin is decidedly a minority party, and was so before the days of the direct primary. Since 1890 it has elected only two governors (in 1890 and 1892) although there were a number of fairly close contests up until 1906, and only one close contest since and that one in 1912. In the last two decades the Democrats have carried Wisconsin once for the Presidency (1912) and elected one United States senator (1914). With so few hotly contested campaigns between the two great parties, it would be an easy matter for a spectacular contest in the Republican Party to overshadow the final election. So far as one is able to judge by the popular interest as it is

manifested during the campaign, such seems to be the fact, especially in recent years.

But would it not have been the case likewise if the convention system had survived? There seems no way of obtaining objective evidence on this question. The evidence does tend to show that during the period before the primary law, there was relatively more interest in the election and less in the nominating contests than in the period following the abolition of the nominating convention. Moreover, some allowance must be made for the fact that the struggle for the direct primary was coincident with the struggle of Robert M. LaFollette for the mastery of the Republican Party. When a man of such tremendous popular appeal enters such a struggle, it is bound to attract an eager interest regardless of what nominating machinery he has to use.

Nevertheless, when all these factors have been considered, it does seem that since the advent of the direct primary there has been a well-defined tendency for popular interest to shift from parties to factions and to personalities. This seems to be accounted for by two reasons. Under the direct primary, it must be the business of the candidate to arouse the interest of the people, for they alone are to judge his case. Publicity becomes the passion of the hour, for unless a man's name becomes known to the voters he cannot succeed. Under the convention system, however, attention is generally centered upon the delegates and party managers, and the public takes little active interest save in the ultimate results. The second reason is the feature of the open primary. The Wisconsin law makes it possible for any voter to vote in any primary regardless of what party he represents. Moreover, this

Wisconsin Statutes, 1921, Ch. 5, Sec. 5.13.

can be done without the knowledge of his party associates, since no one can know in what primary each voter cast his vote. This necessarily tends to arouse the voter's interest in the outstanding individual or factional struggle rather than in the control of his own party.

RESULTS

It is alleged in support of this argument, that this has three evil results: In the first place, factional responsibility is generally impossible to achieve, since under the direct primary it has so frequently happened that different departments of the government were controlled by different factions. This we have already found to be the case. In the second place, even though it is possible to establish factional or personal responsibility for the conduct of government, such responsibility is not organic or continuing, and does not have the momentum of organized responsibility which is essential to stable government and the working out of far-sighted reforms, and which is possessed by political parties under the convention system. Thirdly, when interest is focused on a factional fight in the dominant party, it tends to weaken the competing party until it is no longer an effective competitor, whereas real healthy competition between two contending parties is essential to the best conduct of government.

The first one of these three alleged evils we have already disposed of. The second alleged evil will now be considered. Where there are such well-defined factions as are found in Wisconsin, and when one of them is led by such a phenomenal political genius as Senator LaFollette, the question may well be asked: Why will not factional responsibility or the personal responsibility of the leader be sufficient to enable public opinion to func

tion through them in the control of government? (This is on the assumption that under the direct primary Senator LaFollette or his faction, or some opposing leader or faction, could always secure the control of all departments, something that has happened only once since 1906. It does look now, however, as if it might quite regularly in the near future.)

FACTIONAL VERSUS PARTY

RESPONSIBILITY

This squarely raises the issue of whether personal or factional responsibility, if possible, is as reliable a medium for public opinion to function through in the control of government, as party responsibility would be. Again it is difficult to find objective evidence that is relevant. There are, however, some facts of evidential value. In 1922 the faction opposed to LaFollette held a state convention in Milwaukee, adopted a ticket to support at the party primaries, went through the forms of setting up an organization and adjourned. Similar conventions have been held several times before on like occasions, but there has emerged from none of them a permanent political organization, capable of assuming the continuing responsibility of fighting for a program or of accepting the responsibility of one if entrusted with official power. Even when this group was successful in electing Governor E. L. Philipp to three successive terms, there was no definite organization to "carry on" when Governor Philipp declined to run again. They tried to nominate as his successor an outstanding and able man, but they could not succeed. Governor Philipp succeeded by virtue of his dominant personality and ability, and when the personality was removed, what was supposed to be an organized political movement disappeared be

cause there was no political organization able to carry on the policies for which he stood. The public opinion that approved of Governor Philipp's policies had no means of self-expression, for there was no organization identified with those policies which they could seek to place in power.

Suppose something had happened to Senator LaFollette at any time since 1906 up to 1920, were his policies and political activities so identified with a well-organized, well-disciplined political organization covering the whole state, that public opinion would have had an immediate organization through which they could have continued those policies in control? The writer does not believe there was any such organization prior to 1922. On the other hand, if Senator LaFollette had been working under a convention system, what would have been the probable results? He would have had to have controlled, organized, and worked through the regular Republican machine, which he undoubtedly would have done. He might have had to make concessions here and there to hold his convention and prevent a bolt as public men must occasionally do. But in the unhappy event of his demise, under these circumstances, his policies and ideals would have been so identified with the Republican state machine that they would have carried on of their own momentum, so long as public opinion might desire.

Senator La Follette has been so popular as a leader and so adroit as a politician that he has needed no organization for for his political success. But his followers will want to see his influence continue long after he has gone. It is not enough that the memories of his deeds will linger long in the hearts of his associates. If they are to become articulate in the control of government, there must be either some outstanding