tional views held and advocated by the party leaders? Beveridge of Indiana, Pinchot of Pennsylvania, LaFollette of Wisconsin and Brookhart of Iowa, while accepting the Republican name in aspiring to office, were to all intents and purposes independent of the Republican tradition and might have called themselves more accurately, leaders of a Liberal Party.

To what extent is the Republican Party, in any of the four states mentioned, responsible for the action of these men either in the chair of governor of a state or in the United States Senate? That is, after all, the question that requires an answer if party responsibility is to be properly estimated. The difficulty in answering this question will become more obvious if we remember that Brookhart of Iowa made his campaign for the Senate on three main issues: (1) the repeal of the Esch-Cummins Transportation Law; (2) an attack on the Federal Reserve Banking System which he blamed for many of the farmer's financial troubles, and (3) "for laws to encourage coöperative control of production, credit, marketing, and buying by organized agricultural and industrial labor." 1 Whatever the motives may have been that led the Iowa voters to cast 42 per cent of the total votes cast for six candidates at the primary for Colonel Brookhart, the cold fact remains that in his first mentioned issue he openly attacked a Republican measure; in his second, he scored an institution inaugurated by a Democratic administration now under Republican control; and in his third plank, he borrowed from the Non-Partisan League. All this in a state that had long been Republican and gave President Harding nearly 400,000 majority. Nor is Brookhart's case an isolated example where party organization and party allegiance were 1 Nation, Vol. 115: 466, Nov. 1, 1922.

disregarded by the successful candidate and an appeal made directly to the electorate. In municipal politics we already have a non-partisan system in both the primary and the general election, and in many states the primary laws have been modified to remove the candidates for judicial office from the party column.

TENDENCIES IN ENGLAND

That the tendency to revolt against the present party system as such, does not have its entire explanation in local or geographic areas but rather in the spirit and tendencies of the times, whatever the cause, is also seen in recent political theories which break sharply with traditional methods of political action. And in some countries practice has followed closely upon the heels of the theorist. Two years ago there was an attempt in England to return to the two-party system led by Asquith and the Cecils, but recent events in the United Kingdom give little evidence of a return to the party system of Gladstone and Salisbury. Who knows but that in the not distant future, at least in the two great democracies of the world-England and America-candidates will disavow party organization entirely, and on the basis of issues alone, will appeal to an enlightened plebiscite in utter disregard of the present party system? In America, however, that will be possible only when the complex encumbrance now called the primary is abolished or so modified as to enable the voter to distinguish through a long list of names, the vital issues which he seeks to impose upon those who govern.

PARTY SPIRIT IN AMERICA AND

ENGLAND COMPARED

At all events we need not consult election statistics to know that where primaries involve the nomination of

numerous non-political offices or of decisions which the masses are incapable of making, it will fail to increase party responsibility. It is a question, then, of whether the party system under American conditions is more effective as a means of registering the popular will, than an irresponsible combination of fortuitous circumstances, which place in nomination men whose chief claim to office is that they were the choice at the primary. Unfortunately, the significance of the party in America is so little understood by the average voter that the primary, which has done much to destroy party cohesion and party action, is extolled for the very qualities which should condemn it. It is still the fashion among a large number of the so-called "intellectuals" to stand aloof from party organization as something to be despised.

This attitude is due in part to a confusion of two separate and distinct ideas designated by terms, which, on account of the similarity of sound, are thought of as conveying similar ideas. The terms are party and partisan; and it is easy to ascribe to the party-man qualities of mind which permit his party to think for him, which he regards as aspersion upon his independence. This attitude of the American citizen toward the party stands in striking contrast to that of the English citizen, who is not ashamed to be identified with a party having able leaders. Nor are these two attitudes without reason. The English voter who follows a leader, usually follows an idea which may rise to the dignity of a philosophy of life as well as a real policy of state. If that leader be a Burke, a Cobden, or a Bright, adherence to his cause will be a mark of distinction capable of the best thought. We need only to reflect upon the history of the free trade movement in England to be

assured of this fact. The political apothegm "when in doubt, kick Cobden" had an entirely different significance in English political life than the accusations against Tammany Hall or the Philadelphia Gas Ring in America, while a membership in the Ku Klux Klan would scarcely have qualified one for membership in the Cobden Club.

Before any nominating system in America will enlist the interest of the average voter, the entire attitude toward parties as factors in government must be changed. No institution will command the obedience or respect of mankind that is not rooted in honorable traditions, or does not rest upon a recognized moral principle of high endeavor. However low the actual range of political action may be, however dark the current of its daily life, the average voter will hesitate to identify himself with an institution which he feels is not approved by the best thought.

ESSENTIALS TO RESPONSIBLE
GOVERNMENT

But aside from the complex organization and methods of nomination, and the general absence of a party spirit to supply the necessary cohesive force to maintain party discipline, and reform the party from within the organization, there is no clear conception among the majority of voters of the essentials necessary to a government responsible to a political party; and without a common or popular conception as to the meaning, purpose and function of political institutions, leadership and responsibility in the true sense becomes impossible. Before considering this phase of the question, however, it may be well to state in general terms what the essentials to responsible government are. They may be placed under three heads:

(1) There must be, under whatever name or form it may appear, a political party comprising a majority of the electorate; (2) there must be means or devices adequate to a free expression and registration of the popular will; and (3) there must also be, on the part of the voter, a knowledge and an intelligence equal to the service he is called upon to perform, whenever he exercises the right of franchise.

Of these three essentials it must be admitted that the first obtains only partially; the second to a still less degree than the first; while the third essential, because of conditions imposed by the first two, is almost entirely negligible. There are, indeed, in addition to those here mentioned, other conditions necessary to a truly responsible party government; such as, for example, the complete absence of sinister exterior influences which tended to deflect the course to a free choice, and the presence of clearly defined issues. Passing over the minor conditions, however, and confining our attention to any one of the three major essentials mentioned above, we arrive at the conclusion that even the regular election, taken by itself, though usually less complicated than the primary, results in irresponsible government because of the confusion of issues with candidates; and the primary has aggravated the difficulty. It has raised high above the heads of the average voter a mechanism too difficult to comprehend and consequently too difficult to operate successfully. It has assumed the false premise that the problems of government depend for their solution upon a wider popular contact, rather than upon a deeper and higher intelligence. The cold fact that government is an extremely complex institution and that political intelligence is extremely simple, must ever remain as the anchor

of political reform; and progress towards good government must always be conditioned upon the fact that the electorate, though honest and of good intentions, can operate through the electoral franchise only the simplest forms of machinery.

THE BURDEN IMPOSED UPON THE
VOTER IN CALIFORNIA

Measured by these standards which express the theory of party responsibility, let us turn to the practical operation of these institutions which are to give us a government subject to popular control. Examples from two fairly typical states may serve as illustrations of the impossible burden we have placed upon the electorate. The general election laws of California comprise a volume of 283 pages of very fine type, and although intelligent voting does not require a thorough digest of the entire election code, the mere extent of the regulations from nomination to final election suggests the extent of the burden imposed upon the electorate. The arguments respecting the amendments to the state constitution and the proposed statutes submitted to a referendum of the electors at the election of November 7, 1922, form a pamphlet of 144 pages. The proposed amendments and statutes formed 30 separate propositions for the state at large, with four additional questions for the county of Los Angeles. These geles. These propositions appeared upon a single ballot, measuring twentytwo by twenty-eight inches, together with the names of forty-nine candidates seeking thirty-one offices. Nor was the difficulty confronting the voter fully expressed by the number of items to be voted upon. Many of the legal propositions supplemented or repealed former statutes and amendments, and an intelligent vote, therefore, implied a knowledge of law and conditions far

beyond the face of the ballot. Where or how was the voter to get this knowledge? If he depended upon newspapers, broadsides and pamphlets with which he was deluged, his conclusions were in danger of being purchased by the highest bidder rather than by a dispassionate process of reasoning and observing. The Los Angeles Evening Herald of November 6, 1922, contained three very large advertisements against the so-called "Lawyers Bill," and the bankers were said to have spent $150,000 to defeat the measure.

PRIMARY LAWS AND VOTING IN OHIO

The election laws of Ohio as compiled in 1920 make up a volume of 325 pages; and while here again intelligent voting does not require familiarity with the entire code, that part which in some form refers directly to the status and condition under which the right of franchise is exercised would by itself form about 100 pages. How intelligently this franchise was exercised at the last general election was shown in numerous instances; for the sake of brevity a single example must suffice. Of the three proposed amendments to the state constitution the one that attracted most attention, and the one upon which one would naturally expect the clearest expression of the popular will, was the liquor amendment, providing for the manufacture and sale of beverage containing 2.75 per cent alcohol by weight. The ballot was so worded, however, that many a stanch prohibitionist voted "wet"; and so far as I know, no one outside of a few tax experts is suspected of having cast a discriminating vote upon either of the other two proposed amendments, one referring to indebtedness and bond issues and the other to taxation.

The official figures for the last

(August 7, 1922) Ohio primary also form an interesting commentary upon this method of voting. While many states have apparently modified their primary laws upon the theory that direct nomination is least objectionable for county and local offices, the last Ohio primary election shows that in many cases county officials, to take a single example, were nominated by a large minority of the total votes cast. Thus in Lorain County, nine candidates running for the office of sheriff on the Republican ticket, received a total of 10,889 votes; but the successful candidate received only 3,064 votes, or about one-third of the total number of votes cast. Questions: Was he the choice of the party? Upon any conceivable theory of responsible government, what portion of the total voters of all parties in the county does he represent?

CONCLUSIONS

In conclusion I summarize the results of this study by saying that the direct primary has decreased party responsibility because:

1. It has tended to break down party organization and destroy united party action.

2. It has retained for popular nomination and election both administrative and policy-determining offices, thus creating a still longer and more incomprehensible ballot than we had under the old system.

3. By assuming that all public offices should be open to all citizens, it has encouraged the fallacy that all citizens are qualified; with the result that so many run for office that the average voter cannot detect who are not qualified.

4. It is illogical in that it accepts representative institutions and at the same time denies faith in them, by directing candidates elected to office,

5. It assumes that the function of the elector is to govern, rather than to see that good government is enacted, by changing government from a Republican to a Democratic form.

"The spirit of democracy is corrupted," says Montesquieu, "not only when the spirit of equality is extinct, but likewise when they fall into a

each citizen would fain be upon a level with those whom he has chosen to command him. Then the people, incapable of bearing the very power they have delegated, want to manage everything themselves, to debate for the Senate, to execute for the magistrate, and to decide for the judges. When this is the case, virtue can no longer subsist in the republic."