Knowledge, Belief, and Strategic Interaction

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Carol and Michael Lowenstein Endowed Term Chair Cristina Bicchieri, Cristina Bicchieri, Maria Luisa Dalla Chiara, Maria Luisa Dalla Chiara Scabia
Cambridge University Press, 28/08/1992 - 413 páginas
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In recent years there has been a great deal of interaction among game theorists, philosophers, and logicians in certain foundational problems concerning rationality, the formalization of knowledge and practical reasoning, and models of learning and deliberation. This unique volume brings together the work of some of the preeminent figures in their respective disciplines, all of whom are engaged in research at the forefront of their fields. Together they offer a conspectus of the interaction of game theory, logic, and epistemology in the formal models of knowledge, belief, deliberation, and learning and in the relationship between Bayesian decision theory and game theory, as well as between bounded rationality and computational complexity.
 

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Índice

Elicitation for games
21
Rational choice in the context of ideal games
47
Concept and resolutions
61
Equilibria and the dynamics of rational deliberation
93
Noncooperative normalform games
107
On consistency properties of some strongly implementable
127
Algorithmic knowledge and game theory
141
Possible worlds counterfactuals and epistemic operators
155
Abstract notions of simultaneous equilibrium
227
Introduction to metamoral
257
The logic of Ulams games with lies
275
Strategic behavior under
317
Common knowledge and games with perfect information
345
Foundations versus
377
Counterfactuals and a theory of equilibrium in games
397
Direitos de autor

Epistemic logic and game theory
197

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