The American Economic Review, Volume 96American Economic Association., 2006 |
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Página 1072
... utility functions can predict different attitudes to immediate and delayed gam- bles , people do not appear to treat the two kinds of bets very differently . Barberis et al . ( 2003 ) , for example , record very similar rejection rates ...
... utility functions can predict different attitudes to immediate and delayed gam- bles , people do not appear to treat the two kinds of bets very differently . Barberis et al . ( 2003 ) , for example , record very similar rejection rates ...
Página 1114
... utility functions as primitive , we define an ordering over assump- tions on utility functions that gauges their measurement requirements . Cardinal and ordinal assumptions constitute two levels of measurability , but other assumptions ...
... utility functions as primitive , we define an ordering over assump- tions on utility functions that gauges their measurement requirements . Cardinal and ordinal assumptions constitute two levels of measurability , but other assumptions ...
Página 1130
... utility functions , with a category of interpersonal comparability ( Amartya Sen , 1970 ; d'Aspremont and Gevers , 1977 ; Roberts , 1980b ; Walter Bossert and John A. Weymark , 1996 ) . Applying a smaller set of transforma- tions ...
... utility functions , with a category of interpersonal comparability ( Amartya Sen , 1970 ; d'Aspremont and Gevers , 1977 ; Roberts , 1980b ; Walter Bossert and John A. Weymark , 1996 ) . Applying a smaller set of transforma- tions ...
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agent analysis assumption auction average behavior bidder bonus rate buyer certifier choice choose coefficient column concave condition consumers consumption correlation cost cotinine countries demand denote distribution earnings effect efficient effort levels endogenous enrollment equation equilibrium estimates exchange rate expected Figure firm gamble GATT growth higher human capital impact implies incarceration income increase incumbent individual investment Jobs Journal of Economics Lemma March CPS marginal marginal cost match May/ORG measure ment mixed strategy monthly contract Nash equilibrium nomic observed optimal order flow outcomes p-value paper parameter payoff percent period players predictions preferences price vector profits Proposition quantiles regression relative supply residual residual variance risk aversion rounds sample Section skills smoking standard strategy subsidy Table tariff Theorem tion topcode users utility functions variables variance wage inequality Walrasian equilibrium welfare workers zero