The American Economic Review, Volume 96American Economic Association., 2006 |
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Página 1093
... users ; later on , the owner will also be a user . Users adopt the owner's property only if they perceive U to be positive . Certifiers . The owner chooses a certifier . Certifiers are characterized by their user- friendliness or , more ...
... users ; later on , the owner will also be a user . Users adopt the owner's property only if they perceive U to be positive . Certifiers . The owner chooses a certifier . Certifiers are characterized by their user- friendliness or , more ...
Página 1094
... users ' utility must be taken net of the opportunity cost of adopting this particular property . The " benefit " parameter b is unknown to both owner and users and reflects the unobserved qual- ity of the owner's property for the users ...
... users ' utility must be taken net of the opportunity cost of adopting this particular property . The " benefit " parameter b is unknown to both owner and users and reflects the unobserved qual- ity of the owner's property for the users ...
Página 1103
... users are different enough ( ан ≥ ан a fixing a1 ) and if p ≤ p * for some p * , generate a differentiated pattern of adop- tion under which skeptical users adopt only if b≥ b1 and eager users adopt more often , i.e. , if and only ...
... users are different enough ( ан ≥ ан a fixing a1 ) and if p ≤ p * for some p * , generate a differentiated pattern of adop- tion under which skeptical users adopt only if b≥ b1 and eager users adopt more often , i.e. , if and only ...
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agent analysis assumption auction average behavior bidder bonus rate buyer certifier choice choose coefficient column concave condition consumption correlation cost cotinine countries demand denote distribution earnings effect efficient effort levels endogenous enrollment equation equilibrium estimates exchange rate expected Figure firm gamble GATT growth higher human capital impact implies incarceration income increase incumbent investment Jobs Journal of Economics Lemma March CPS marginal marginal cost match May/ORG measure ment mixed strategy monthly contract Nash equilibrium nomic observed optimal order flow outcomes p-value paper parameter payoff percent period players predictions preferences price vector profits Proposition quantiles regression relative supply residual residual variance risk aversion rounds sample Section skills smoking standard strategy subsidy Table tariff Theorem tion topcode users utility functions variables variance wage inequality Walrasian equilibrium welfare workers x₁ zero