The American Economic Review, Volume 96American Economic Association., 2006 |
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Página 613
... strategy spaces ; for specificity , we will use the following : Piecewise Lipschitz - continuous functions . The strategy space of each player i is given by : Σ ; = { σ ,: [ 0 , ∞ ) x RX , such that σ , is a piecewise Lipschitz ...
... strategy spaces ; for specificity , we will use the following : Piecewise Lipschitz - continuous functions . The strategy space of each player i is given by : Σ ; = { σ ,: [ 0 , ∞ ) x RX , such that σ , is a piecewise Lipschitz ...
Página 633
... strategy profile is σ Ex¦ ± ¦A ( S ) . In addition to mixed strategies , we define behavior strategies . A be- havior strategy for player i , π ;, assigns infor- mation sets in X , a probability distribution over feasible actions , π ...
... strategy profile is σ Ex¦ ± ¦A ( S ) . In addition to mixed strategies , we define behavior strategies . A be- havior strategy for player i , π ;, assigns infor- mation sets in X , a probability distribution over feasible actions , π ...
Página 655
... strategies.10 If there were a pure strategy equilibrium , the mid- dle bidder would offer only a fraction of a penny above the low bidder , and the high bidder only a fraction of a penny above the medium bidder . But then the lower two ...
... strategies.10 If there were a pure strategy equilibrium , the mid- dle bidder would offer only a fraction of a penny above the low bidder , and the high bidder only a fraction of a penny above the medium bidder . But then the lower two ...
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agent analysis assumption auction average behavior bidder bonus rate buyer certifier choice choose coefficient column concave condition consumers consumption correlation cost cotinine countries demand denote distribution earnings effect efficient effort levels endogenous enrollment equation equilibrium estimates exchange rate expected Figure firm gamble GATT growth higher human capital impact implies incarceration income increase incumbent individual investment Jobs Journal of Economics Lemma March CPS marginal marginal cost match May/ORG measure ment mixed strategy monthly contract Nash equilibrium nomic observed optimal order flow outcomes p-value paper parameter payoff percent period players predictions preferences price vector profits Proposition quantiles regression relative supply residual residual variance risk aversion rounds sample Section skills smoking standard strategy subsidy Table tariff Theorem tion topcode users utility functions variables variance wage inequality Walrasian equilibrium welfare workers zero