The American Economic Review, Volume 96American Economic Association., 2006 |
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Página 661
... profits . Let П „ ( p ) denote firm n's expected profit if it offers p and other firms use their equilibrium strategies : ΣGP ) ] ΣG ( p ) - p . | - ] ПI , ( p ) = An 1 + Σ k + n 20 If firm n offers p , it expects to attract a worker ...
... profits . Let П „ ( p ) denote firm n's expected profit if it offers p and other firms use their equilibrium strategies : ΣGP ) ] ΣG ( p ) - p . | - ] ПI , ( p ) = An 1 + Σ k + n 20 If firm n offers p , it expects to attract a worker ...
Página 773
... profits of a monopolist selling a single product are either quasi - convex or convex in s . Similar results hold for a multiproduct monopolist . 55 PROPOSITION 6 : If P ̧ ( z ) is a convex function of s for each z E [ 0 , 1 ] , then profits ...
... profits of a monopolist selling a single product are either quasi - convex or convex in s . Similar results hold for a multiproduct monopolist . 55 PROPOSITION 6 : If P ̧ ( z ) is a convex function of s for each z E [ 0 , 1 ] , then profits ...
Página 775
... profits rise or fall . Un- der quantity competition , however , there is a further , strategic , effect : the change in s influ- ences opponents ' output , and therefore an indi- vidual firm's profits . Writing ( s ) for a firm's profits ...
... profits rise or fall . Un- der quantity competition , however , there is a further , strategic , effect : the change in s influ- ences opponents ' output , and therefore an indi- vidual firm's profits . Writing ( s ) for a firm's profits ...
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agent analysis assumption auction average behavior bidder bonus rate buyer certifier choice choose coefficient column concave condition consumers consumption correlation cost cotinine countries demand denote distribution earnings effect efficient effort levels endogenous enrollment equation equilibrium estimates exchange rate expected Figure firm gamble GATT growth higher human capital impact implies incarceration income increase incumbent individual investment Jobs Journal of Economics Lemma March CPS marginal marginal cost match May/ORG measure ment mixed strategy monthly contract Nash equilibrium nomic observed optimal order flow outcomes p-value paper parameter payoff percent period players predictions preferences price vector profits Proposition quantiles regression relative supply residual residual variance risk aversion rounds sample Section skills smoking standard strategy subsidy Table tariff Theorem tion topcode users utility functions variables variance wage inequality Walrasian equilibrium welfare workers zero