The American Economic Review, Volume 96American Economic Association., 2006 |
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Página 1073
... preferences evaluates risk using an expected utility function . Rabin's ( 2000 ) argument there- fore also applies to R - EU preferences : no utility function in this class is consistent with both conditions I and II . R - SORA ...
... preferences evaluates risk using an expected utility function . Rabin's ( 2000 ) argument there- fore also applies to R - EU preferences : no utility function in this class is consistent with both conditions I and II . R - SORA ...
Página 1117
Preference relations emerge straightforwardly from psychologies . We define Zu , the preferences induced by U , by x ≥u y↔ u ( x ) = u ( y ) for all u EU . We will refer interchangeably to u satisfying an assumption on preferences and ...
Preference relations emerge straightforwardly from psychologies . We define Zu , the preferences induced by U , by x ≥u y↔ u ( x ) = u ( y ) for all u EU . We will refer interchangeably to u satisfying an assumption on preferences and ...
Página 1131
... preference relations that imply the existence of an integral utility representation ( Grodal and Jean - François Mertens , 1968 ; Vind , 1969 ) — just as there are axioms on preferences over finite numbers of goods that imply that addi ...
... preference relations that imply the existence of an integral utility representation ( Grodal and Jean - François Mertens , 1968 ; Vind , 1969 ) — just as there are axioms on preferences over finite numbers of goods that imply that addi ...
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agent analysis assumption auction average behavior bidder bonus rate buyer certifier choice choose coefficient column concave condition consumers consumption correlation cost cotinine countries demand denote distribution earnings effect efficient effort levels endogenous enrollment equation equilibrium estimates exchange rate expected Figure firm gamble GATT growth higher human capital impact implies incarceration income increase incumbent individual investment Jobs Journal of Economics Lemma March CPS marginal marginal cost match May/ORG measure ment mixed strategy monthly contract Nash equilibrium nomic observed optimal order flow outcomes p-value paper parameter payoff percent period players predictions preferences price vector profits Proposition quantiles regression relative supply residual residual variance risk aversion rounds sample Section skills smoking standard strategy subsidy Table tariff Theorem tion topcode users utility functions variables variance wage inequality Walrasian equilibrium welfare workers zero