The American Economic Review, Volume 96American Economic Association., 2006 |
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... match . The salary differen- tial between two " adjacent " residents must lie between the extra amount that the lower and higher of the firms with which the residents will match would pay for the superior worker . So the surplus of the ...
... match . The salary differen- tial between two " adjacent " residents must lie between the extra amount that the lower and higher of the firms with which the residents will match would pay for the superior worker . So the surplus of the ...
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... matching process and the strategies of other firms . Note that each firm is implicitly required to rank all workers , so that every firm will match with a worker . This assumption is inconsequential in the multiplication game , but one ...
... matching process and the strategies of other firms . Note that each firm is implicitly required to rank all workers , so that every firm will match with a worker . This assumption is inconsequential in the multiplication game , but one ...
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TABLE 2 - ASYMMETRY AND NONDISCRIMINATION Symmetric firms Asymmetric firms Vickrey Match Vickrey Match < S Market surplus S S S Firm profits V V Worker salaries W W W Salary compression No Some No > V < W Yes outcomes . This situation ...
TABLE 2 - ASYMMETRY AND NONDISCRIMINATION Symmetric firms Asymmetric firms Vickrey Match Vickrey Match < S Market surplus S S S Firm profits V V Worker salaries W W W Salary compression No Some No > V < W Yes outcomes . This situation ...
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agent analysis assumption auction average behavior bidder bonus rate buyer certifier choice choose coefficient column concave condition consumers consumption correlation cost cotinine countries demand denote distribution earnings effect efficient effort levels endogenous enrollment equation equilibrium estimates exchange rate expected Figure firm gamble GATT growth higher human capital impact implies incarceration income increase incumbent individual investment Jobs Journal of Economics Lemma March CPS marginal marginal cost match May/ORG measure ment mixed strategy monthly contract Nash equilibrium nomic observed optimal order flow outcomes p-value paper parameter payoff percent period players predictions preferences price vector profits Proposition quantiles regression relative supply residual residual variance risk aversion rounds sample Section skills smoking standard strategy subsidy Table tariff Theorem tion topcode users utility functions variables variance wage inequality Walrasian equilibrium welfare workers zero