The American Economic Review, Volume 96American Economic Association., 2006 |
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... higher - order expectations on asset prices.34 We still assume that P = 0 . 35 Let 5 , denote the exchange rate that would prevail if the higher - order expectations in ( 7 ) are replaced by first - order expectations . In Bacchetta and ...
... higher - order expectations on asset prices.34 We still assume that P = 0 . 35 Let 5 , denote the exchange rate that would prevail if the higher - order expectations in ( 7 ) are replaced by first - order expectations . In Bacchetta and ...
Página 658
... higher - ranked firms make ( stochastically ) higher offers . n LEMMA 1 : If A , A , then , in equilibrium , firm n makes higher offers than firm m in the sense of first - order stochastic dominance ; for all p , G ( p ) ≤ Gm ( p ) ...
... higher - ranked firms make ( stochastically ) higher offers . n LEMMA 1 : If A , A , then , in equilibrium , firm n makes higher offers than firm m in the sense of first - order stochastic dominance ; for all p , G ( p ) ≤ Gm ( p ) ...
Página 960
... higher - education policies . The link between higher education and wage inequality is not unambiguous , as it can result from a combination of quantity , quality , and price effects . On the one hand , increasing the proportion of ...
... higher - education policies . The link between higher education and wage inequality is not unambiguous , as it can result from a combination of quantity , quality , and price effects . On the one hand , increasing the proportion of ...
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