The American Economic Review, Volume 96American Economic Association., 2006 |
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Página 657
... firm ex- ample , firm 1 would not bid against 2 and 3 because the implicit price of increasing its qual- ity was between 1 and 2 ( 1.2 ) . In a 100 - firm example , firm 100 competes only against firms 87 to 99 for the top worker ...
... firm ex- ample , firm 1 would not bid against 2 and 3 because the implicit price of increasing its qual- ity was between 1 and 2 ( 1.2 ) . In a 100 - firm example , firm 100 competes only against firms 87 to 99 for the top worker ...
Página 659
... firms compete head to head . LEMMA 2 : If firm m is the highest - ranked firm that offers p , then firms l ( m ) , ... , m all offer p , where : ( 2 ) l ( m ) = min { l : q , ( l , m ) > 0 } . So if firm m is the highest - ranked firm ...
... firms compete head to head . LEMMA 2 : If firm m is the highest - ranked firm that offers p , then firms l ( m ) , ... , m all offer p , where : ( 2 ) l ( m ) = min { l : q , ( l , m ) > 0 } . So if firm m is the highest - ranked firm ...
Página 664
... firm values are An 100n / N2 , where we multiply by 100 to avoid messy dec- imals . As the number of firms increases from 10 to 100 to 1,000 , the per - firm efficient surplus stays roughly constant ( 38.5 with 10 firms , 33.8 with 10 firms ...
... firm values are An 100n / N2 , where we multiply by 100 to avoid messy dec- imals . As the number of firms increases from 10 to 100 to 1,000 , the per - firm efficient surplus stays roughly constant ( 38.5 with 10 firms , 33.8 with 10 firms ...
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agent analysis assumption auction average behavior bidder bonus rate buyer certifier choice choose coefficient column concave condition consumers consumption correlation cost cotinine countries demand denote distribution earnings effect efficient effort levels endogenous enrollment equation equilibrium estimates exchange rate expected Figure firm gamble GATT growth higher human capital impact implies incarceration income increase incumbent individual investment Jobs Journal of Economics Lemma March CPS marginal marginal cost match May/ORG measure ment mixed strategy monthly contract Nash equilibrium nomic observed optimal order flow outcomes p-value paper parameter payoff percent period players predictions preferences price vector profits Proposition quantiles regression relative supply residual residual variance risk aversion rounds sample Section skills smoking standard strategy subsidy Table tariff Theorem tion topcode users utility functions variables variance wage inequality Walrasian equilibrium welfare workers zero