The American Economic Review, Volume 96American Economic Association., 2006 |
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Página 597
... equilibrium if the people who buy information weakly prefer to do so ( B ( A ) ≥ 0 ) , and either A = 1 , or an ... equilibrium exists . If A is not an equi- librium , then it must be that B ( λ + ɛ ) > 0. By induction , if B ( λ ...
... equilibrium if the people who buy information weakly prefer to do so ( B ( A ) ≥ 0 ) , and either A = 1 , or an ... equilibrium exists . If A is not an equi- librium , then it must be that B ( λ + ɛ ) > 0. By induction , if B ( λ ...
Página 634
perimentation . " Our first notion of equilibrium , self - confirming equilibrium , corresponds to the case of myopic players who do no experimen- tation at all . Thus it imposes only the restriction that players learn what happens on ...
perimentation . " Our first notion of equilibrium , self - confirming equilibrium , corresponds to the case of myopic players who do no experimen- tation at all . Thus it imposes only the restriction that players learn what happens on ...
Página 650
... equilibrium we propose to study . Here players 1 , 2 , and 4 are playing the best response to the actual distribu- tion of opponent's play . Some player 3's drop and some pass , even though the payoff to pass is strictly higher ; this ...
... equilibrium we propose to study . Here players 1 , 2 , and 4 are playing the best response to the actual distribu- tion of opponent's play . Some player 3's drop and some pass , even though the payoff to pass is strictly higher ; this ...
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agent analysis assumption auction average behavior bidder bonus rate buyer certifier choice choose coefficient column concave condition consumers consumption correlation cost cotinine countries demand denote distribution earnings effect efficient effort levels endogenous enrollment equation equilibrium estimates exchange rate expected Figure firm gamble GATT growth higher human capital impact implies incarceration income increase incumbent individual investment Jobs Journal of Economics Lemma March CPS marginal marginal cost match May/ORG measure ment mixed strategy monthly contract Nash equilibrium nomic observed optimal order flow outcomes p-value paper parameter payoff percent period players predictions preferences price vector profits Proposition quantiles regression relative supply residual residual variance risk aversion rounds sample Section skills smoking standard strategy subsidy Table tariff Theorem tion topcode users utility functions variables variance wage inequality Walrasian equilibrium welfare workers zero