The American Economic Review, Volume 96American Economic Association., 2006 |
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... Equation ( 10 ) shows that the overall change in the residual variance can be decomposed into two terms . The first term on the right - hand side of equation ( 10 ) , Σ ; θjs ( Vit - Vis ) , is a weighted average of changes in the ...
... Equation ( 10 ) shows that the overall change in the residual variance can be decomposed into two terms . The first term on the right - hand side of equation ( 10 ) , Σ ; θjs ( Vit - Vis ) , is a weighted average of changes in the ...
Página 610
... equation ( 4 ) , we have : dC1 ( t ) = { 0 ; if t = 65 , 75 , or 85 , 10 , otherwise . Thus , the Stieltjes integral ... equation ( 5 ) is then that , at every time t when it becomes inevitable that a bidder wins additional units ...
... equation ( 4 ) , we have : dC1 ( t ) = { 0 ; if t = 65 , 75 , or 85 , 10 , otherwise . Thus , the Stieltjes integral ... equation ( 5 ) is then that , at every time t when it becomes inevitable that a bidder wins additional units ...
Página 622
... equation ( 13 ) may be rewritten as the line integral sr x1 dp . ( For a formal definition of the line integral , see Apostol , 1957 , Definition 10-32 . ) Since V , ( · ) is a convex function and -x ( ) is a measurable selection from ...
... equation ( 13 ) may be rewritten as the line integral sr x1 dp . ( For a formal definition of the line integral , see Apostol , 1957 , Definition 10-32 . ) Since V , ( · ) is a convex function and -x ( ) is a measurable selection from ...
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agent analysis assumption auction average behavior bidder bonus rate buyer certifier choice choose coefficient column concave condition consumption correlation cost cotinine countries demand denote distribution earnings effect efficient effort levels endogenous enrollment equation equilibrium estimates exchange rate expected Figure firm gamble GATT growth higher human capital impact implies incarceration income increase incumbent investment Jobs Journal of Economics Lemma March CPS marginal marginal cost match May/ORG measure ment mixed strategy monthly contract Nash equilibrium nomic observed optimal order flow outcomes p-value paper parameter payoff percent period players predictions preferences price vector profits Proposition quantiles regression relative supply residual residual variance risk aversion rounds sample Section skills smoking standard strategy subsidy Table tariff Theorem tion topcode users utility functions variables variance wage inequality Walrasian equilibrium welfare workers x₁ zero