The American Economic Review, Volume 96American Economic Association., 2006 |
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Página 678
... Effort 40 30 20 10 10 11 12 13 14 15 Round 16 17 18 19 Bonus - 6 Note : Firm - level data . 20 20 = same for B 8 and B = 10 in rounds 16-20 . If anything , performance appears to be the best with B = 10 , given that this cell had the ...
... Effort 40 30 20 10 10 11 12 13 14 15 Round 16 17 18 19 Bonus - 6 Note : Firm - level data . 20 20 = same for B 8 and B = 10 in rounds 16-20 . If anything , performance appears to be the best with B = 10 , given that this cell had the ...
Página 679
... effort levels - the more employees who respond strongly to the bonus rate increase in round 11 , the higher the firm's minimum effort ( on average ) in round 20.17 This result seems unsurprising until one realizes that no similar ...
... effort levels - the more employees who respond strongly to the bonus rate increase in round 11 , the higher the firm's minimum effort ( on average ) in round 20.17 This result seems unsurprising until one realizes that no similar ...
Página 681
... effort levels . The relatively good per- formance of firms that have their bonus reduced back to B = 6 is almost entirely due to firms that didn't respond to the change - there were four firms in cell 5 that increased their minimum effort ...
... effort levels . The relatively good per- formance of firms that have their bonus reduced back to B = 6 is almost entirely due to firms that didn't respond to the change - there were four firms in cell 5 that increased their minimum effort ...
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agent analysis assumption auction average behavior bidder bonus rate buyer certifier choice choose coefficient column concave condition consumers consumption correlation cost cotinine countries demand denote distribution earnings effect efficient effort levels endogenous enrollment equation equilibrium estimates exchange rate expected Figure firm gamble GATT growth higher human capital impact implies incarceration income increase incumbent individual investment Jobs Journal of Economics Lemma March CPS marginal marginal cost match May/ORG measure ment mixed strategy monthly contract Nash equilibrium nomic observed optimal order flow outcomes p-value paper parameter payoff percent period players predictions preferences price vector profits Proposition quantiles regression relative supply residual residual variance risk aversion rounds sample Section skills smoking standard strategy subsidy Table tariff Theorem tion topcode users utility functions variables variance wage inequality Walrasian equilibrium welfare workers zero