The American Economic Review, Volume 96American Economic Association., 2006 |
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Página 670
... bonus rate set by an exogenous manager . This bonus rate determines the frac- tion of the firm's profits transferred to the em- ployees and hence governs the benefit to the four employees of coordinating at a high effort level . Once ...
... bonus rate set by an exogenous manager . This bonus rate determines the frac- tion of the firm's profits transferred to the em- ployees and hence governs the benefit to the four employees of coordinating at a high effort level . Once ...
Página 673
... bonus rate changed in a pre- determined way . Other than the bonus rate , no detail of the experimental environment varied between rounds or between sessions . The bonus rate and resulting payoff matrices were an- nounced at the ...
... bonus rate changed in a pre- determined way . Other than the bonus rate , no detail of the experimental environment varied between rounds or between sessions . The bonus rate and resulting payoff matrices were an- nounced at the ...
Página 674
... Bonus - 10 -X - Bonus = Cell 4 Cell 5 Cell 6 Bonus rate , rounds 1-10 6 6 6 6 6 Bonus rate , rounds 11-20 Bonus rate , rounds 21-30 14 8 14 14 6 14 8 10 6 14 = the firms will have converged to an effort level of zero over the first ...
... Bonus - 10 -X - Bonus = Cell 4 Cell 5 Cell 6 Bonus rate , rounds 1-10 6 6 6 6 6 Bonus rate , rounds 11-20 Bonus rate , rounds 21-30 14 8 14 14 6 14 8 10 6 14 = the firms will have converged to an effort level of zero over the first ...
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Palavras e frases frequentes
agent analysis assumption auction average behavior bidder bonus rate buyer certifier choice choose coefficient column concave condition consumers consumption correlation cost cotinine countries demand denote distribution earnings effect efficient effort levels endogenous enrollment equation equilibrium estimates exchange rate expected Figure firm gamble GATT growth higher human capital impact implies incarceration income increase incumbent individual investment Jobs Journal of Economics Lemma March CPS marginal marginal cost match May/ORG measure ment mixed strategy monthly contract Nash equilibrium nomic observed optimal order flow outcomes p-value paper parameter payoff percent period players predictions preferences price vector profits Proposition quantiles regression relative supply residual residual variance risk aversion rounds sample Section skills smoking standard strategy subsidy Table tariff Theorem tion topcode users utility functions variables variance wage inequality Walrasian equilibrium welfare workers zero