The American Economic Review, Volume 96American Economic Association., 2006 |
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Página 758
... sections . A few notes , however , are in order here . In Section I , we investigate the re- sponse of profits and output to the dispersion of demand . Our notion of dispersion builds upon the classic work of Michael Rothschild and ...
... sections . A few notes , however , are in order here . In Section I , we investigate the re- sponse of profits and output to the dispersion of demand . Our notion of dispersion builds upon the classic work of Michael Rothschild and ...
Página 812
... Section I introduces the model . Section II summarizes the basic partial equilibrium trade- off between general and specific skills in a frictional labor market . Section III derives the labor market equilibrium and identifies the con ...
... Section I introduces the model . Section II summarizes the basic partial equilibrium trade- off between general and specific skills in a frictional labor market . Section III derives the labor market equilibrium and identifies the con ...
Página 1140
... Section I we present the static model . First we solve for the first - best outcome ( Section IA ) , then we characterize the equilibria of the one - shot game without enforcement ( Section IB ) , and finally we consider the one ...
... Section I we present the static model . First we solve for the first - best outcome ( Section IA ) , then we characterize the equilibria of the one - shot game without enforcement ( Section IB ) , and finally we consider the one ...
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agent analysis assumption auction average behavior bidder bonus rate buyer certifier choice choose coefficient column concave condition consumers consumption correlation cost cotinine countries demand denote distribution earnings effect efficient effort levels endogenous enrollment equation equilibrium estimates exchange rate expected Figure firm gamble GATT growth higher human capital impact implies incarceration income increase incumbent individual investment Jobs Journal of Economics Lemma March CPS marginal marginal cost match May/ORG measure ment mixed strategy monthly contract Nash equilibrium nomic observed optimal order flow outcomes p-value paper parameter payoff percent period players predictions preferences price vector profits Proposition quantiles regression relative supply residual residual variance risk aversion rounds sample Section skills smoking standard strategy subsidy Table tariff Theorem tion topcode users utility functions variables variance wage inequality Walrasian equilibrium welfare workers zero