The American Economic Review, Volume 96American Economic Association., 2006 |
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Página 878
... GATT subsidy disciplines that might prevent governments from reaching the international efficiency frontier under GATT tariff negoti- ations , and then to gauge the degree to which WTO subsidy rules might be seen as marking an ...
... GATT subsidy disciplines that might prevent governments from reaching the international efficiency frontier under GATT tariff negoti- ations , and then to gauge the degree to which WTO subsidy rules might be seen as marking an ...
Página 882
... GATT sub- sidy rules prior to the advent of the WTO , but in effect governments remained essentially free under GATT to offer production subsidies to their producers as they wished ( possibly subject to some reporting requirements ) ...
... GATT sub- sidy rules prior to the advent of the WTO , but in effect governments remained essentially free under GATT to offer production subsidies to their producers as they wished ( possibly subject to some reporting requirements ) ...
Página 890
... GATT and WTO sub- sidy rules . A. GATT Subsidy Rules in a Limited- Instrument Environment We consider first the efficiency properties of the GATT Subsidy Game , concentrating on the case where NV is costly . When NV is costly , the ...
... GATT and WTO sub- sidy rules . A. GATT Subsidy Rules in a Limited- Instrument Environment We consider first the efficiency properties of the GATT Subsidy Game , concentrating on the case where NV is costly . When NV is costly , the ...
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agent analysis assumption auction average behavior bidder bonus rate buyer certifier choice choose coefficient column concave condition consumers consumption correlation cost cotinine countries demand denote distribution earnings effect efficient effort levels endogenous enrollment equation equilibrium estimates exchange rate expected Figure firm gamble GATT growth higher human capital impact implies incarceration income increase incumbent individual investment Jobs Journal of Economics Lemma March CPS marginal marginal cost match May/ORG measure ment mixed strategy monthly contract Nash equilibrium nomic observed optimal order flow outcomes p-value paper parameter payoff percent period players predictions preferences price vector profits Proposition quantiles regression relative supply residual residual variance risk aversion rounds sample Section skills smoking standard strategy subsidy Table tariff Theorem tion topcode users utility functions variables variance wage inequality Walrasian equilibrium welfare workers zero