House, which seems to be the object of all that gentleman's labors and cares.

It is this view of the subject, Mr. Chairman, that stimulates me to oppose this amendment, with the utmost perseverance and zeal: not that I apprehend great mischief from this particular measure, could it be viewed singly and by itself; but that I regard it as a part of a system, wholly incompatible with the existence of this government, or the happiness of this country. I regard the gentleman from Pennsylvania and his friends, in the light of an enemy, who has commenced a siege against the fortress of the constitution. He proceeds at first by cautious steps, and endeavors to make a lodgment by surprise, in some strong and advantageous outwork, from whence he may direct a more efficacious attack against the citadel itself. On this advanced ground, in this outwork, I hold it wise to resist him; convinced that success here would be the prelude to a bolder and more dangerous assault, and that all the guns which he can now carry, will immediately be turned upon our remaining fortifications.

I must now be allowed, Mr. Chairman, to say a few words as to the expediency of this measure, as to the utility of foreign ministers. To one side of the House, to me and those with whom I usually act, it is sufficient to say, that the President has thought fit to appoint foreign ministers; for we are convinced, that the right of judging on this subject, has been given exclusively to him and the senate, by the people of this country, and that when he and the senate have thought fit to exercise this right, by appointing a minister to this or that place, or of this or that grade, nothing is left for this House, but to provide an adequate salary. But other gentlemen hold a different opinion, and contend, that we may not only inquire how much the salary ought to be, but also whether the appointment itself be necessary. To gentlemen who sincerely hold this opinion, I address my remaining observations.

The gentleman from Pennsylvania, (Mr. Gallatin,)

has asserted, that ministers have nothing to do with the interests of commerce, except to make commercial treaties; while the care of seeing those treaties duly executed, and the commercial rights of individuals properly protected, belongs to consuls. Hence he infers, that foreign ministers are useless; because, we have no need to form more commercial connexions, and ought to have no political connexions, with foreign nations. In order to prove that we ought to make no more commercial treaties, he contends, that we have received much more harm than good from those already made. This is the whole amount of this part of the gentleman's argument, which includes two thirds of his long and ingenious speech; and it is wholly built on the assertion, that "commercial interests are managed by consuls, while ministers have nothing to do with commerce, except the making of treaties for its regulation." This assertion has been already refuted, and the gentleman from Pennsylvania, though he has made it the groundwork of his whole reasoning, has not attempted to prove it. For this he had very good reasons; for he well knows it to be wholly unfounded; and therefore he has contented himself with asserting it, and taking it for granted. I say, he well knows it to be unfounded, because, that gentleman is well read in the law of nations, the writers on which, as well as its maxims and doctrines, we often see him adduce with much dexterity and learning, when they suit his purpose. Now, Mr. Chairman, I may, I think, venture to affirm, that there is no student in any college, who has read the indexes of some elementary books on the law of nations, but knows, that it is the peculiar business of ministers, not only to make commercial treaties, but to watch over their execution, and to take care that the commercial rights of their country, under the law of nations, as well as under treaties, are preserved inviolate. This is a business with which consuls never interfere, and to which they are wholly inadequate; not only from the na

ture and powers of their appointment, but also from their local circumstances and situation. All this the gentleman from Pennsylvania well knows; and yet he has asserted, that every thing respecting the interests of our commerce in foreign countries, except the formation of commercial treaties, can be and is transacted by consuls, without the interference of ministers. This assertion is the loose block on which, for want of a better foundation, he has rested the whole edifice of his reasonings; and this block I mean to knock away. A very slight stroke will be sufficient for the purpose.

In what manner, Mr. Chairman, is the observance of a treaty of commerce, with any country, to be enforced? In what manner are infractions of such a treaty, or of the laws of nations, to be prevented or redressed? Is it not by applications to the government of that country; by representations, by remonstrances, by negociations? The gentleman from Pennsylvania will not answer in the negative. I know he will not. By whom then and where are these applications to be made, these representations, these remonstrances, to be presented, these negociations to be carried on? Must it be at the seat of government, by agents residing there; or at the sea-ports of the countries where the consuls reside? If the former, these agents will be ministers. You may call them by a different name, but the thing will be the same; for a public agent of one country, charged with the management of its affairs, and residing at the seat of the government of another, is the very definition of a foreign minister, by whatever name you may think fit to call him. As these transactions are, from their very nature, to be with the government itself, let us see whether they could possibly be managed by consuls

In the first place, consuls, by the established law and usage of nations, have no public, official character, and cannot be admitted to any intercourse whatever, with the governments of the countries where they reside. We may, if we please, exclaim against this usage, and

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call it absurd or foolish; but it is the established usage of nations, and while it remains so, we must conform to it. Suppose, therefore, that any injury should be done to the commerce of our citizens, by French privateers for instance, or French municipalities, in contravention of our treaty, or against the law of nations, but under color of certain acts of the French government. Could redress be obtained by means of consuls? So far from it, that it could not even be applied for; since the consuls could have no access to the government. And yet the gentleman from Pennsylvania tells us, that the interests of our commerce in foreign countries can be managed by consuls!

In the next place, our consuls in foreign countries are, for the most part, natives of the countries where they reside; with very few exceptions, they are mere private merchants; and except, in the single case of the consuls to the Barbary powers, who, according to established usage, are a species of ministers, they receive no salaries. Are men of this description adequate to the protection of our commercial interests? Can they be expected to possess the requisite knowledge, for conducting affairs of this kind, or the requisite influence or weight of character? Will they abandon their own private affairs, to attend at a remote capital, and solicit the restitution of vessels, the revocation of injurious orders, or indemnification for improper seizures? If they were qualified for this business, and willing to undertake it, they certainly would not do so at their own expense. When our consul at Bourdeaux, Nantes or Marseilles, for instance, should be applied to on any business which would require an application to the French government, would he go to Paris, and remain there to finish the business, at his own expense? Certainly not. Certainly not. We must pay him, not only his expenses, but a compensation for his time and trouble. As these applications would frequently occur, he could not go specially for each one; but must remain always there; and we must give him

a salary sufficient to induce him to do so. He would then be a minister in fact, and in expense. He would want nothing of the character but the name, and the capacity of usefulness. This is the establishment which the gentleman from Pennsylvania wishes to substitute, in the place of our present diplomatic appointments. The consuls, in order to perform the duties which he says ought to be assigned to them, must be turned into ministers; equally expensive with the present corps, but far less efficacious.

In the third place, we should have a multitude of these new fashioned consul-ministers; for we have a variety of consuls, in each of the great maritime nations of Europe. There is one in every considerable trading town. In France, for instance, we have six or seven; perhaps a much greater number. Each of these, upon the plan of the gentleman from Pennsylvania, must reside at Paris; for it would be impossible for them to be perpetually running backward and forward, between their respective sea-ports and Paris, as often as any affair might occur requiring an application to the government. If any gentleman should doubt of this, let him look at the list now on the table, of between four and five hundred American vessels, carried into the different ports of France, or detained there contrary to the treaty, and redress for the capture and detention of which, must be obtained, if obtained at all, from the French government, by means either of a minister or of consuls. The consuls, therefore, if they are to do the business, must all reside at Paris; and instead of one minister, we should have nine or ten; perhaps a greater number. These observations will apply, with a greater or less degree of force, to every other country with which we have a considerable commerce. And yet the gentleman from Pennsylvania tells us, that our commercial relations ought to be left to consuls!

Having seen, Mr. Chairman, what the duty of consuls is not, let us now inquire, for a moment, what it is. We shall find them very necessary agents, though