to be afflicted, has augmented that military force, and finally employed it in extending and confirming his own authority; or in states where no military chief of this description existed, popular leaders, possessed of talents, and actuated by an inordinate ambition, have formed a strong party among the people, have invaded and finally subverted the authority of the government, and erected to themselves an absolute dominion. Every state that has lost its liberty, since the foundation of the world, till the present day, except in cases of conquest by a foreign power, has lost it by one or the other of these two methods. The first is the natural death of free monarchies, the second, of free republics; and both ancient and modern history furnish many examples of both. It was by the first, that all the feudal states were converted into absolute monarchies, except England and Poland; the former of which was protected, by its insular situation, from the necessity and also from the consequences of a great military power in the hands of its chief, and thus preserved its liberties; while in the latter, powerful individuals retained the military force in their own hands, divided it among themselves, kept their chief in subjection, and at length, by their feuds and civil broils, destroyed the strength of the state, and delivered it over to be subdued and divided by the neighboring powers. It was by the concentration and exercise of military force, in the hands of an hereditary chief, that the Cortes of Spain were broken under Ximenes, and the states general of France, under Richlieu and Mazarine. It was thus the great princes of Germany became absolute, in their respective dominions; and that the Russian despotism was founded, on the ruins of feudal aristocracy.

This danger, however, does not exist in popular governments. They have no great military chief, of hereditary power, who, disposing absolutely of the public force, may use it for the extension of his own authority and of all republics that ever have existed,

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none ever was so little threatened with danger from that quarter as ours. It is needless to dwell on the reasons of this particular advantage; for they are obvious to every one. When republics fall, they fall by other means; by gradual inroads on the principles of their governments; by popular encroachments on regular authority; by the concentration of their ers in some popular body, where artful, able and aspiring demagogues obtain sway, and establish arbitrary power under the name of the people. This is the quarter from which all popular governments have been assailed, for the most part with success; and from which ours will be successfully assailed, should the principles of the gentleman from Pennsylvania ever be adopted. Thus fell Rome under the power of Cæsar; thus fell the republic of England under the power of Cromwell; and thus will fall the United States under some future Cæsar or Cromwell, unless a steady opposition be given to the system of the gentleman from Pennsylvania, of which this amendment, let it be repeated, forms a part.

When the examples of the ancient republics was adduced by my friend from Massachusetts, (Mr. Thatcher,) the gentleman from Pennsylvania denied it to be applicable, because the government of those republics was different from ours. I know, Mr. Chairman, that our government is different from that of Athens or Rome, and I wish it to keep so. That is the object of all my exertions, of all my zealous opposition, to motions like the present. To make our government like those of Athens or Rome, is, in my apprehension, the object and tendency of the system, advocated by the gentleman from Pennsylvania. How is this to be effected? By inducing this House, sometimes under this, and sometimes under that plausible pretence, to establish precedents of encroachment on the other departments; to practise on these precedents, and extend them further and further; until at length all pow

er shall be concentrated in this House, and exercised according to the good pleasure of those members, who can obtain influence here. In Athens all power was concentrated in the hands of one body, and it was abused at the pleasure of those, who, by their eloquence, their wealth, or by any other means, could obtain the confidence, and influence the determinations of that body. In Rome, the case was somewhat different; but even there, for want of a well fixed balance in her government, the mass of the people gradually usurped all power, and transferred it to their favorites or their purchasers. By pursuing the principles of the gentleman from Pennsylvania, the same effect must be produced here. This House first begins the attack on the President. It controls his appointments, directs his measures, gives him orders under the name of advice, and if he refuses to obey them, withholds all the supplies for the service of the government. All this is justified under the gentleman's doctrine of appropriations. A favorable moment is seized for laying the corner-stone, for fixing the principle, and plausible pretexts are adduced. A treaty is made, and a popular clamor is excited against it. Advantage is taken of this clamor, to refuse an appropriation for carrying the treaty into effect, and thus a precedent of interfering in treaties is attempted to be established. A foreign minister is appointed, the reasons for whose appointment are capable of being obscured or misrepresented. The occasion is seized to deny an appropriation; and, under the pretence of saving public money, and preventing the expense of an useless appointment, an attempt is made to acquire a control over the appointments of officers. These points being carried, the precedents are soon drawn into practice, and further enterprizes are undertaken in due season. Every success gives further strength and boldness for new assaults, the cannon of every bastion that is taken, is immediately turned on the remaining works: and

finally, the President is reduced to the condition of the chief officer of this House, and the heads of department become the first clerks of its committees.

The President being demolished, the party proceeds with new vigor, and greater forces, to attack the senate, which, deprived of the support of the executive, is speedily overthrown. The House says to the senate, "unless you conform to our will, we lay our hands on the purse strings, and stop the wheels of government. Should a contest ensue, we are sure to be uppermost; for we are the immediate representatives of the people. We adore the people; nay, we are the people themselves. Therefore beware of a contest in which you have every thing to lose, and we are certain of gaining."

The senate, enfeebled and dismayed, yields by degrees to these powerful arguments, and this House remains victorious, with all power in its hands. It proceeds to appoint a committee of exterior relations, a committee of interior relations, a committee of jus tice, a committee of finance, and so on, and a new French Convention arises to view, where principles are set at naught, caprice is law, and the whim of the moment disposes of all public and private rights. Then follow confiscations and banishments, and a long train of tyrannical excesses ever attendant on popular bodies, in whose hands the whole powers of government have been concentrated, from the Assemblies of people at Athens, and the Comitia at Rome, down to the Rump Parliament of England, and the French Convention. Then will the member who shall possess the most art, the greatest eloquence, and the most daring spirit of enterprize, speedily form a party, by means of which, he will enslave the House, and rule the country. Should there be several of equal, or nearly equal strength, they will first divide the power among themselves; but their union will be fallacious and short. They will be employed in attempting to circumvent or undermine each other; divisions will soon arise, and

mortal quarrels will ensue; till at length the rest will sink beneath the overbearing genius of one, and he will establish his dominion uncontrolled. This is the liberty which gentlemen, should their schemes succeed, will sooner or later bestow on the country; the liberty of a few bold, able, ambitious men, to do what they please, and of the rest of the community to obey them. This, Mr. Chairman, may be very pleasant liberty, for those who are to be possessed of power; but for me and the rest of the community it has no charms, and I shall, therefore, omit no opportunity of resisting its first and most distant approaches.

Should any one object, that this state of things must be extremely distant, I beg him to recollect how short a space intervened, between the throne of Louis the Sixteenth and the scaffold on which he bled; between the absolute power of Neckar, and the despotism of Marat; between the splendid fortune of so many distinguished families, and the dungeon or the guillotine. Governments like ours, Mr. Chairman, may be compared to the planetary system, whose preservation depends entirely on the exact preservation of its balance. The exact balance between the centrifugal force and the power of gravitation, retains the planets in their orbits; but should some angel of destruction push them out of those orbits, though in ever so small a degree, the balance is lost; one power gains what is taken from the other, and these immense bodies, whose beautiful and regular play furnishes the greatest wonder of creation, fly out and are lost in boundless space, or rush to the sun with increasing and incalculable velocity, and there are mingled in one mighty ruin. Should the gentleman from Pennsylvania succeed in his present attempt, he becomes the angel of destruction to our beautiful constitution. He destroys the happy balance of its powers; and the approximation of the different departments, though slow and gradual at first, would become more rapid as it advanced, and speedily produce that concentration of power in this