as they were not immediately connected with the subject of discussion, are omitted.]

That gentleman, (Mr. Gallatin,) prefaced his observations by declaring, that the amendment under consideration went no further than to reduce the salaries of certain ministers plenipotentiary, from nine thousand to four thousand, five hundred dollars; but unfortunately, he forgot his tenet before he arrived at the middle of his speech: for he soon confessed, that the object of the amendment was to restrain and control the executive in the exercise of the power of appointing foreign ministers, which is vested in it by the constitution; and having made this acknowledgment, so contradictory to his first position, the gentleman from Pennsylvania proceeded to show, by the utmost exertion of his powers, that it was right and proper for the House thus to interfere, thus to control the executive, and to use its power over appropriations for effecting that purpose. Indeed the gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. Nicholas,) at the outset of the business, expressly stated this to be the sole object of his amendment. With a candor and openness, characteristic of his usual conduct, he avowed that his object was not to save money, but to restrict the President in the exercise of this power. He told us, that the diplomatic corps had been improperly increased; that the number of ministers had been improperly extended; that there was danger of a further extension, by which a dangerous executive influence in the House was likely to be produced; and that it was right for the House to interfere, prevent this extension, and bring back the establishment to its original limits; and this he stated to be the object of his amendment. Hence then, Mr. Chairman, it is manifest, not only from the arguments of the gentleman from Pennsylvania, but from the express declaration of the mover of this amendment himself, that the question now agitated is a question of power, and not a question of money. It is manifestly not a question to know whether a minister plenipoten

tiary shall have this, that, or the other salary, but whether this House shall direct the President where he shall appoint ministers plenipotentiary, where ministers resident, and where no ministers at all. The question goes this whole length; for if the House can say, as the amendment declares it can and ought, that no minister plenipotentiary is necessary at Lisbon or Berlin, it can say with the same propriety and on the same principles, that no minister plenipotentiary is necessary at London, Paris, or Madrid, or that no minister is necessary any where.

That such is the object of the amendment, that the question between us is a question of power, and not of money, is further evident, from the mode of argument by which the amendment is supported. Gentlemen do not pretend that nine thousand dollars is too much for a minister plenipotentiary at Lisbon or Berlin; on that ground we should cheerfully meet them, and agree to a reduction of the salary, if it should appear to be too high but they tell us, and attempt to prove, that there is no need of a minister plenipotentiary at Lisbon or Berlin. In answer, we allege, that by the constitution, the President and senate are solely authorized to judge where ministers of this, that, or the other grade ought to be employed, and that this House has nothing to do with the business, but fix their salaries, which it is bound to do in a suitable manner. This gentlemen deny; and thus the question of power, the sole question which has been agitated, or is considered as of any importance, arises between us.

I say," the only question which is considered as important;" because the supporters of the amendment have laid no stress whatsoever on the question of expense. They have, on the contrary, shown themselves ready to abandon it, for the sake of gaining the least additional chance of support in the great question; the question of power. This is manifest from the motion of the gentleman from Maryland, (Mr. S. Smith,) which was immediately agreed to by the mover of the amend

ment. By the amendment, as first proposed, ministers plenipotentiary were to be allowed only at London and Paris. The gentleman from Maryland proposed to allow one at Madrid also, because he had observed that the impropriety of recalling our minister from that court had been particularly insisted on, by some who opposed the amendment. The gentleman from Virginia immediately consented to modify his amendment, so as to leave a minister plenipotentiary at Madrid. From which it would appear most evidently, if we did not know it before, that gentlemen care not how many ministers plenipotentiary there are, nor how much money is spent in maintaining them, provided the House of Representatives can obtain the power of controlling and directing the appointment. It is to obtain this power, and not to save public money, that gentlemen struggle; and provided the principle can but be established, they are content to have ministers plenipotentiary as many as any body pleases; for they know that the principle may be as completely established in the case of one minister, as by turning out the whole diplomatic corps.

And notwithstanding all this, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Gallatin,) tells us, that this is merely a question about salaries, a question of saving nine thousand dollars, and wonders how it could lead to a controversy, about the constitutional powers of the President and the House! This proves that the gentleman from Pennsylvania intended his speech for a concluding speech; or that he entertains a most contemptuous opinion of the understanding of the House.

I shall therefore, Mr. Chairman, consider this amendment as having for its object, and its sole object too, the establishment of this principle: "that the House of Representatives, by its power over appropriations, has a right to control and direct the executive, in the appointment of foreign ministers." I shall treat the question, which arises upon this amendment, as a question of power, between this House and the President

and senate, and I shall endeavor to show that the amendment, if carried, would be a direct breach of the constitution, an alarming usurpation by this branch, on the constitutional powers of the executive depart

ment.

The supporters of this amendment, avowing its object to be the establishment of a control over the appointment of foreign ministers, contend that this House have a right to exercise that control, and rely on that part of the constitution which provides, that "no money shall be issued from the treasury without an appropriation by law." As this House, say gentlemen, must concur in passing all laws, it follows that it may refuse its assent to appropriations. In judging whether it will give or refuse this assent, it must be guided solely by its own discretion, by its own opinion about the necessity or utility of the object, for which an appropriation is wanted. If it should think this object unnecessary, or hurtful, it is bound in duty to withhold the appropriation. Consequently, it may refuse to appropriate for a minister to Lisbon, Berlin, or any other place, if it should think such minister, though appointed by the President and senate, unnecessary or injurious. This I take to be a fair state of the argument.

But gentlemen, while they lay such stress upon this part of the constitution, seem entirely to forget another part, that part which provides, that the " President, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, shall appoint foreign ministers and consuls." It will, however, be admitted, that these two parts of the constitution are equally authoritative, and must both have effect; that the whole instrument, like all other instruments, must be taken together, and so construed, that none of its provisions may be defeated or rendered nugatory. These two powers, therefore, the power of appointment in the President and senate, and the power of appropriation in the House, must be reconciled to each other; must be made to act as mutual helps,

not as mutual obstructions. How is this to be done? Certainly not by admitting the doctrine of this amendment, which would utterly destroy one of the powers; would give the House an absolute control over the appointment of ministers, and reduce the President and senate to the mere power of making a nomination, which the House might refuse to agree to according to its good pleasure. This is the plain and necessary consequence of admitting the principle contended for in support of this amendment, that the House, when called on to appropriate for an officer, legally appointed, may in the first place inquire, whether the appointment is necessary.

Some other way of reconciling these powers must therefore be found out; and what is it? We contend, Mr. Chairman, that it is thus. An office must first be authorized by law: for nobody pretends that the President and senate can create offices. When the office is thus authorized, the President and senate exercise their power of appointment, and fill the office. The House of Representatives then exercises its constitutional power over appropriations, by providing an adequate compensation for the officer. In the exercise of this power they cannot inquire, whether the office was necessary or not; for that has already been determined by the law which authorized it. Neither can they inquire whether the office was properly filled; for that would be to invade the powers of the President and senate, to whom, by the constitution, the right of choosing the officer is exclusively referred. Into what then may they inquire? They may inquire what is a proper and adequate compensation for such an officer: they may fix the amount of his salary; and in fixing it they must be guided by a proper discretion, by a sense of duty, by the nature of the office, the circumstances of the country, and the public service. Thus the constitution would be reconciled, and each department would act within its proper sphere. The President and senate could make no appointment till