is. They are for the purpose of obstructing or annoying the progress of an enemy by land or water.

Batteries are formidable in defending narrow passes by land; such as the passage of a bridge, or of a road cut through a rough and craggy mountain that cannot be passed any where else. But they are not formidable in defending water-passes, because a ship with a brisk wind, tide, and running at the rate of ten miles an hour, will be out of the reach of the fire of the battery in fifteen or twenty minutes, and being a swift moving object all the time, it would be a mere chance that any shot struck her.

When the object of a ship is that of passing a battery for the purpose of attaining or attacking some other object, it is not customary with the ship to fire at the battery, lest it should disturb her course. Three or four men are kept on deck to attend the helm, and the rest, having nothing to do, go below. Duckworth, in passing the Dardanelles up to Constantinople, did not fire at the batteries.

When batteries for the defence of water-passes can be erected without any great expense, and the men not exposed to capture, it may be very proper to have them. They may keep off small piratical vessels, but they are not to be trusted to for defence.

Fortifications give, in general, a delusive idea of protection. All our principal losses in the revolutionary war were occasioned by trusting to fortifications. Fort Washington, with a garrison of 2500 men, was taken in less than four hours, and the men made prisoners of war. The same fate had befallen Fort Lee on the opposite shore, if General Lee had not moved hastily off and gained Hackensack bridge. General Lincoln fortified Charleston, S. C., and himself and his army were made prisoners of war. General Washington began fortifying New-York in 1776; General Howe passed up the East river, landed his army at Frog's Point, about twenty miles above the city, and marched down upon it, and had not General Washington stole silently and suddenly off on the North River side of York Island, himself and his army had also been prisoners. Trust not to fortifications, otherwise than as batteries that can be abandoned at discretion.

484

OF SHIPS OF WAR, GUN-BOATS, AND FORTIFICATIONS. The case however is, that batteries, as a water defence against the passage of ships, cannot do much. Were any given number of guns to be put in a battery for that purpose, and an equal number of the same weight of metal put in gun-boats for the same purpose, those in the boats would be more effectual than those in the battery. The reason for this is obvious. A battery is stationary. Its fire is limited to about two miles, and there its power ceases. But every gun-boat moved by oars is a moveable fortification that can follow up its fire, and change its place and its position as circumstances may require. And besides this, gun-boats in calms are the sovereigns of ships.

As this matter interests the public, and most probably will come before Congress at its next meeting, if the printers in any of the states, after publishing it in their newspapers, have a mind to publish it in a pamphlet form, together with my former piece on gun-boats, they have my consent freely. I take neither copy-right nor profit for any thing I publish.

New-York, July 21, 1807.

COMMON SENSE.

REMARKS

ON A STRING OF RESOLUTIONS OFFERED BY MR HALE, TO THE NEW-YORK HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AT ALBANY.

THESE resolutions have the appearance of being what is sometimes called an electioneering trick, similar to that about fortifications, practised at New-York when the election for charter officers was to come on. They are like baits thrown out to catch gudgeons. I will examine each of the resolutions separately, and show their defects.

First, "Resolved, if the honourable Senate concur herein, that in the present state of our national concerns, it becomes the duty of the people of this state, represented in Senate and Assembly, to express their sentiments on the important subject of fortifying the port and harbour of New-York, and of protecting the valuable and extensive commerce of the United States."

Remarks.-Is Mr. Hale acquainted with the subject he speaks upon? Does he know enough of the principles of fortification to explain to the house what is practicable, and what is impracticable? Did he ever see a fortified town, fortified, I mean, on the established principles of fortification? Does he know, scientifically or practically, what places can be fortified, and what cannot? If he does not know these things, he has waded out of his depth in making his resolves.

But

He speaks of the "port and harbour of New-York." what ideas does he affix to the terms "port and harbour?" If by port, he means the city of New-York, it proves he knows nothing of fortification; for the condition of New-York, as well by nature as by the irregularity of its outline, renders fortifying it impossible.

Again, if by the term harbour, he means the waters at the wharfs within the range of the harbour master, the case is, that to begin a fortification there, the ships must be sent up the East or North river, and the wharfs turned into parapet batteries with embrazures, and planted with cannon. Commerce and fortification cannot be in the same place.

But if by harbour, he means the bay between the city and the narrows, the most effectual defence would be by gun-boats, each carrying a twenty-pounder. A gun-boat being a moveable fortification has a large sphere to act in, and a battery on land a small one. A ship can always keep out of the reach of a land battery, or with a brisk wind and tide, can be out of the range of its shot in fifteen minutes, and being a moving object all the time, the chance is, that not a shot would strike her.

Before men assume to make motions, and resolve about fortifications, they should endeavour to understand them. The history of fortifications during the revolutionary war, is the history of traps. All our principal losses in that war were occasioned by trusting to fortifications. Fort Washington, with 2500 men, was taken in less than four hours, and the men made prisoners of war. The same would have befallen the garrison at Fort Lee, on the opposite shore, had not General Greene marched suddenly off and gained Hackensack bridge. In the spring and summer of 1776, General Washington had possession of New-York, and fortified it; General Howe passed up the East River, landed his troops about twenty miles above the city, and after taking possession of King's Bridge, marched down upon the city, and had not General Washington stole off on the North River side of York Island, he and the army with him had been prisoners. General Lincoln undertook to fortify Charleston, and he and the garrison were shut up in it by the enemy and made prisoners of war. It is an imposition on the public to hold up the idea of fortifications as places of safety. The open field is always the best. One of the principal cares of a general is to secure a retreat in case of a defeat, but there is no retreat for men besieged in a fortified town. I pass on to his second resolve.

"Resolved, That when this State, in acceding to the government of the United States, surrendered its valuable and in

creasing impost revenue for the general benefit of the union, it was done under a full conviction that it would then become the indispensable duty of the United States in return, to afford the capital, harbour, and commerce of this state, full and competent protection."

This resolve is founded in error, and every position it contains is fallacious.

The several states agreed to consolidate the impost revenue for the benefit of the whole. There was no surrender in the case. Every state did the same thing, because it was its duty to do it. This consolidation of the impost revenue was for the purpose of sinking the debt, as well foreign as domestic, incurred by the war, and also to defray the expense of the general government; and had it not been for the extravagance of former administrations, which increased the debt instead of diminishing it, the debt would have been sunk before this time. The present administration had a dead horse to pull out of the mire.

It is also to be observed, that the prosperity of New-York arises from the very circumstance of which this resolve complains. Had New-York not agreed to consolidate the impost revenue in common with the other states, she would have been excluded from the commerce and carrying trade of all the other states, and have sunk into solitary insignificance. Her wharfs would not have been crowded with ships as they

are now.

It is by consolidating the impost revenue into a whole, and thereby leaving every state to choose its port of export or import, cither in its own or in another state, that the commerce, or rather the carrying trade, of New-York, has of late years increased so much. Were New-York confined to the exports of her own state, and to import only for the consumption of her own state, she would not have more than a third of the commerce ard of the carrying trade she has now. The consolidation of the impost revenue has operated as a bounty to New-York, and this short-sighted legislator complains of it. But though men, as merchants, tied down to the study of their legers and cash-books, are in general but dull politicians, it is necessary for them to understand their own affairs, and the