river in General Washington's barge, and this was the only vessel it ever struck.

When all the plans that can be devised for fortifying the Narrows are examined, for there is no fortifying the city, it will be found that half a dozen gun-boats carrying twenty-four pounders, will do it more effectually than can be done by any other method.

New-York, March 11, 1807.

COMMON SENSE.

OF THE

COMPARATIVE POWERS AND EXPENSE OF

SHIPS OF WAR, GUN-BOATS, AND

FORTIFICATIONS.

THE natural defence by men is common to all nations; but artificial defence as an auxiliary to human strength must be adapted to the local condition and circumstances of a country. What may be suitable to one country, or in one state of cir cumstances, may not be so in another.

The United States have a long line of coast of more than two thousand miles, every part of which requires defence, because every part is approachable by water.

The right principle for the United States to go upon as a water defence for the coast, is that of combining the greatest practical power with the least possible bulk, that the whole quantity of power may be better distributed through the several parts of such an extensive coast.

The power of a ship of war is altogether in the number and size of the guns she carries, for the ship, of itself, has no power. Ships cannot struggle with each other like animals; and besides this, as half her guns are on one side the ship and half on the other, and as she can use only the guns on one side at a time, her real power is only equal to half her number of guns. A seventy-four can use only thirty-seven guns. She must tack about to bring the other half into action, and while she is doing this she is defenceless and exposed.

As this is the case with ships of war, a question naturally arises therefrom, which is, whether seventy-four guns, or any other number, cannot be more effectually employed, and that with much less expense, than by putting them all into one ship

of such enormous bulk that it cannot approach a shore either to defend it or attack it; and though the ship can change its place, the whole number of gans can be only in one place at a time, and only half that number can be used at a time.

This is a true statement of the case between ships of war and gun-boats for the defence of a coast and of towns situated near a coast. But the case often is, that men are led away by the GREATNESS of an idea, and not by the JUSTNESS of it. This is always the case with those who are advocates for navies and large ships.

A gun-boat carrying as heavy metal as a ship of one hundred guns can carry, is a one gun ship of the line; and seventy-four of them, which would cost much less than a 74 gun ship would cost, would be able to blow a 74 gun ship out of the water. They have, in the use of their guns, double the power of the ship, that is, they have the use of their whole number of 74 to 37.

Having thus stated the general outlines of the subject, I come to particulars.

That I might have correct data to go upon with respect to the expense of ships and gun-boats, I wrote to the head of one of the departments at Washington for information on that subject.

The following is the answer I received:

66

Calculating the cost of a 74 or 100 gun ship, from the actual cost of the ship United States of 44 guns, built at Philadelphia, between the years 1795 and 1798, which amounted to 300,000 dollars, it may be presumed that a 74 gun ship would cost 500,000 dollars, and a 100 gun ship 700,000 dollars.

"Gun-boats calculated merely for the defence of harbours and rivers will, on an average, cost about 4000 dollars each, when fit to receive the crew and provisions."

On the data here given, I proceed to state comparative calculations respecting ships and gun-boats.

The ship, United States, cost 300,000 dollars. Gun-boats cost 4000 dollars each, consequently the 300,000 expended on the ship for the purpose of getting the use of 44 guns, and those not heavy metal, would have built seventy-five gun-boats, each carrying a cannon of the same weight of metal that a

ship of a hundred guns can carry. The difference therefore is, that the gun-boats give the use of 31 guns heavy metal more than can be obtained by the ship, and the expenses in both cases equal.

A 74 gun ship cost 500,000 dollars. This same money will build 125 gun-boats. The gain by gun-boats is the use of 51 guns more than can be obtained by expending the money on a ship of 74 guns.

This money

The cost of a 100 gun ship is 700,000 dollars. will build 175 gun-boats. The gain, therefore, by the boats, is the use of 75 gurs more than by the ship.

Though I had a general impression, ever since I had a knowledge of gun-boats, that any given sum of money would go farther in building gun-boats than in building ships of war, and that gun-boats were preferable to ships for home defence, I did not suppose the difference was so great as the calculations above given prove them to be, for it is almost double in favour of gun-boats. It is as 175 to 100. The cause of this difference is easily explained.

The fact is, that all that part of the expense in building a ship from the deck upward, including mast, yards, sails and rigging, is saved by building gun-boats, which are moved by oars, or a light sail occasionally.

The difference also in point of repairs between ships of war and gun-boats is not only great, but is greater in proportion than in their first cost. The repairs of ships of war is annually from 1-14 to 1-10 of their first cost. The annual expense

of the repairs of a ship that cost 300,000 dollars will be above 21,000 dollars; the greatest part of this expense is in her sails and rigging, which gun-boats are free from.

Gun

The difference also in point of duration is great. boats, when not in use, can be put under shelter and preserved from the weather, but ships cannot; or the boats can be sunk in the water or the mud. This is the way the nuts of cider mills for grinding apples are preserved. Were they to be exposed to the dry and hot air after coming wet from the mill, they would crack and split, and be good for nothing. But timber under water will continue sound for several hundred years, provided there be no worms.

Another advantage in favour of gun-boats, is the expedition with which a great number of them can be built at once. A hundred may be built as soon as one, if there are hands enough to set about them separately. They do not require the preparations for building them that ships require, nor deep water to launch them in. They can be built on the shore of shallow waters, or they might be framed in the woods or forests, and the parts brought separately down and put together on the shore. But ships take up a long time building. The ship United States took up two whole years, '96 and '97, and part of the years '95 and '98, and all this for the purpose of getting the use of 44 guns, and those not heavy metal. This foolish affair was not in the days of the present administration.

Ships and gun-boats are for different services. Ships are for distant expeditions; gun-boats for home defence. The one for the ocean; the other for the shore.

Gun-boats being moved by oars cannot be deprived of motion by calms, for the calmer the weather the better for the boat. But a hostile ship becalmed in any of our waters, can be taken by gun-boats moved by oars, let the rate of the ship be what it may. A 100 gun man of war becalmed, is like a giant in a dead palsy. Every little fellow can kick him.

The United States ought to have 500 gun-boats stationed in different parts of the coast, each carrying a thirty-two or thirtysix pounder. Hostile ships would not then venture to lay within our waters, were it only for the certainty of being sometimes becalmed. They would then become prizes, and the in sulting bullies on the ocean become prisoners in our own

waters.

Having thus stated the comparative powers and expense of ships of war and gun-boats, I come to speak of fortifications. Fortifications may be comprehended under two general

heads.

First, fortified towns; that is, towns enclosed within a fortified polygon, of which there are many on the continent of Europe, but not any in England.

Secondly, simple forts and batteries. These are not formed ne regular principles of fortification, that is, they are not fo ned for the purpose of standing a siege as a fortified polygon

or