 | United States. Congress. Senate. Appropriations Committee - 1940 - 296 páginas
...enactment may not be set out in terms, but it is not an adequate discharge of duty for courts to say : 'We see what you are driving at but you have not said it, and therefore we shall go on as before.' " See also United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co. (259 US 344, 385-389; 1922) ; Funk v. United States... | |
 | United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Interstate Commerce - 1942 - 118 páginas
...enactment, may not be set out in terms, but it is not an adequate discharge of duty for the courts to say : We see what you are driving at, but you have not said it, and therefore we shall go on as before." Johnson v. United States, 163 Fed. 30, 32. The relation of the Norris-LaGuardia Act to the Clayton... | |
 | 1943 - 580 páginas
...enactment, may not be set out in terms, but it is not an adequate discharge of duty for courts to say: We see what you are driving at, but you have not said it, and therefore we shall go on as before." Johnson v. United States, 168 Fed. 30, 32 ; and in Van Beeck v. Sattne Towiny Co., 300 US 342, 350,... | |
 | United States. Supreme Court, John Chandler Bancroft Davis, Henry Putzel, Henry C. Lind, Frank D. Wagner - 1949 - 1012 páginas
...exclude leased areas, such as the Bermuda base, in the word "possession" appears. We cannot even say, "We see what you are driving at, but you have not said it, and therefore we shall go on as before." " Under such circumstances, our duty as a Court is to construe the word "possession" as our judgment... | |
 | United States. Congress. House. Committee on Agriculture - 1949 - 1434 páginas
...enactment, may not be set out in terms, but it is not an a'lpquate discharge of duty for courts to say : We see what you are driving at, but you have not said it, and therefore we shall go on as before' Johnson v. United States ( (CCA 1st) 163 F. 30, 32, 18 LBA (NS) 1104, 2 Am. Bank. Bep. 724)." In the... | |
 | United States. Congress. House. Committee on Agriculture - 1949 - 262 páginas
...enactment, may not be set out in terms, but it is not an adequate discharge of duty for courts to say : We see what you are driving at, but you have not said it, and therefore we shall go on as before' Johnson, v. United States ( (CCA 1st) 163 F. 30, 32, 18 LRA (NS) 1194, 2 Am. Bank. Rep. 724)." In the... | |
 | United States. Congress. House. Committee on Agriculture - 1949 - 514 páginas
...enactment, may not be set out in terms, but it is not an adequate discharge of duty for courts to say : 'We see what you are driving at, but you have not said it, and therefore we shall go on as before.' Johnson v. United States ((COA 1st) 163 F. 30, 32, 18 LEA (NS) 1194, 2 Am. Bank. Rep. 724)." While... | |
 | United States. Congress. House. Committee on Agriculture - 1949 - 1378 páginas
...enactment, may not be set out in terms, but it is not an adequate discharge of duty for courts to say: We see what you are driving at, but you have not said it, and therefore we shall go on as More.' Johnson v. United States ( (CCA 1st) 163 F. 30, 32, 18 LRA (NS) 1194, 2 Am. Bank. Rep. 7:>4)."... | |
 | United States. Congress. House. Foreign Affairs Committee - 1955 - 1098 páginas
...answered such an argument when he said "it is not an adequate discharge of duty for courts to say : We see what you are driving at, but you have not said it, and therefore we shall go on as before." Johnson v. United States, 163 Fed. 30, 32 (CA 1). Here, Congress has plainly "said it" and there is... | |
 | United States. Congress. House. Committee on Education and Labor - 1956 - 418 páginas
...exclude leased areas, such as the Bermuda base, in the word "possession" appears. We cannot even say, "We see what you are driving at, but you have not said it, and therefore we shall go on as before." " Under such circumstances, our duty as a Court is to construe the word "possession" as our judgment... | |
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... and if it has intimated its will, however indirectly, that will should be recognized and obeyed. The major premise of the conclusion expressed in a statute, the change of policy that induces the enactment, may not be set out in terms, but it is not... 
