Men who have remained idle, enjoying leisure, may now go to work to carry on the war or to rebuild the city which has been partially destroyed. This objection is somewhat weak, however, because, in the first place, habits of sloth and idleness are much more difficult to overcome than habits of lavish consumption. The sheer inertia of the people makes it almost impossible to rouse them to extra exertions in time of crisis, whereas the people who have been exerting themselves strenuously in the production of articles of luxury may, with less difficulty, redirect their strenuous energy. In a sense the productive machinery of the community is already going. It can be kept going and its direction changed more easily than it can be started up.

In the second place, when a community takes its luxury in the form of idleness, it is certain to be ill equipped with the machinery of production as well as with the technical knowledge and skill which are necessary to efficient production. If it lacks machinery and technical knowledge and skill it will not be able to carry on a modern war successfully or to repair a local disaster, whereas a community that takes its luxury in the form of material goods will have learned in the process of production much technical skill and will have accumulated vast funds of machinery and tools. If there is anything that modern warfare has taught, it is the superiority in war of the nation that is thus equipped. The technical skill and the machinery which are accumulated for purposes of production may easily be turned to those of destruction, and in war the community that is best equipped for the work of destruction will win. A nation that habitually takes its luxury in the form of material goods and which builds up a vast and wellequipped industrial system, with a great deal of scientific knowledge and technical skill, has nothing to fear from a nation that takes its luxury in the form of leisure.

Reducing the rate of permanent construction. So far the argument seems conclusive in favor of material luxury as against immaterial luxury in the form of leisure and idleness. We are

far, however, from a complete justification of luxury in the ordinary sense. The community that is in the habit of investing its money for the future rather than of buying objects of immediate gratification will likewise have a fund of surplus energy at its disposal. All the energy which has been devoted to permanent construction for the future good of society may, in time of great national crisis or local disaster, be redirected toward meeting the crisis or repairing the local damage. The kind of skill which is necessary to permanent construction is of quite as high an order as the kind which is necessary to the production of ephemeral articles of consumption. All the advantages, in short, which a luxurious community possesses for the meeting of a great crisis are also possessed by the thrifty community which spends a good portion of its income in durable construction and in building for future generations. In the long run the nation that spends a large portion of its energy in permanent construction will have certain advantages over the one that consumes luxuriously. If every farmer, for example, should put back into his farm a part of his annual income, in the way of improvement of the soil, in ditching, draining, fencing, and building, he would be using up surplus energy just as truly as if he spent that amount of money in luxurious consumption. In time of national crisis he can suspend, for the time, further building and improvements on his farm and have energy to spare for the production of more food; or he can dispense with a certain amount of hired help, which will then be available for government purposes. After a few generations the nation whose farmers systematically put back into their farms a part of their incomes will have much better farms and much greater productive power than the nation which merely keeps its agricultural wealth intact and spends the surplus in luxurious consumption.

That which applies to farms applies also to factories, shops, and all other productive establishments. The community which is in the habit of adding to its accumulated wealth in each generation by investing a part of its income in tools and in

struments for future production will, after the lapse of a few generations, be vastly stronger than the community which merely keeps its productive power intact and consumes all its income. Thus we reach the conclusion that although the luxurious consumption of material articles may be very much better than the luxurious enjoyment of leisure, nevertheless thrift, forethought, and the investment of incomes in instruments for future production are better still. He who does less well than he can, does ill. Therefore he who consumes luxuriously when he might invest productively is doing badly.

CHAPTER XLIV

THE CONTROL OF CONSUMPTION

Sumptuary laws. Luxurious consumption can undoubtedly be condemned on economic grounds as being less desirable than frugality, forethought, and the investment of funds in productive industries and objects of durable satisfaction. Nevertheless it does not follow of necessity that the government should, through sumptuary laws, attempt to repress luxury. To prohibit the consumption of articles of luxury might very easily take away the motive to industry. If the people cannot have expensive commodities they may take their luxury in the form of leisure, idleness, and self-amusement. This, as we saw in the last chapter, is even less desirable than luxurious consumption. If we grant the argument used by Mill and others, to the effect that an increase of wants sometimes has the effect of overcoming the tendency to sloth and idleness, it would follow that if the government should make it impossible for men to gratify these increased wants, it would merely drive the people back into sloth and idleness. This could be counteracted only by other laws, compelling them to work, which would be a kind of slavery. Even the slogan "Necessaries for all before luxuries for any," while good enough in itself, would be a very difficult policy to enforce. It is quite possible that the many will secure more necessaries if the conspicuously capable producers are allowed some luxuries as a motive to production at their full capacity. In other words, if the most capable producers are limited by authority to the necessaries of life, which they could easily earn with a fraction of their time, they are likely to take their luxuries in the form of leisure, thus limiting their production of necessaries or their

performance of useful services. In this case the poor would have fewer necessaries than if the capable producer were allowed adequate motivation for working to his full capacity.

Legislative control not always effective. One of the last things that we learn regarding legislation is that it usually takes a large number of new legislative acts to correct or counteract the unlooked-for results of any legislative act. Another objection to legislative attempts to suppress luxurious consumption is the one pointed out by Adam Smith and others, to the effect that when their habits of life are fixed, men and women will frequently give up the necessaries of life before they will give up luxuries. This applies especially to the attempts to make luxuries expensive by taxing them. When they become very expensive some people will insist on having them even if it takes their whole income to buy them and leaves them little for the necessaries of life.

These arguments, it will be noticed, are based upon the inefficiency of sumptuary laws rather than upon any more fundamental objection to them. In general they seem to produce results which are worse than the thing they try to cure. Nothing whatever can be said, however, against a voluntary foregoing of luxuries and a rationalizing of standards of living on the part of the people themselves. It is one thing for the people to want the right things; it is quite a different thing to try to force them to consume the right things whether they want them or not. It is one thing for the people voluntarily to give up luxuries; it is quite a different thing to compel them by law to do so, whether they are willing or not.

Control of vice is "sumptuary legislation." In some extreme cases, however, a luxury becomes so extremely demoralizing and dangerous to society as to justify government regulation or suppression. There may be undesirable results of such legislation, there are pretty certain to be; but if these undesirable results are less undesirable than the thing which is suppressed, there is a net gain. Regulation or suppression of vice of all kinds is a kind of sumptuary legislation. If the vicious habit