Why do the many obey the few? Hume's answer 2 Why should the many obey the few? This, the most important question which the political scientist has to answer, is perhaps the question that arises first in the minds of the masses of men. But it is the last question which the political scientist should undertake to answer. The data of political science are the acts of men. Until it is known how as a matter of fact men act, when they act politically, and why they act as they do, it is futile to consider whether or not they ought to act as they do. Assuming, then, that as a matter of fact the many generally obey the few, the first question to be considered is, Why do they act in this way? This question, though comparatively simple, is difficult enough. Why do men obey their rulers? Hume, who was at least a facile philosopher, was ready with an answer. "When we inquire," he continued, "by what means this wonder is effected, we shall find that, as force is always on the side of the governed, the governors have nothing to support them but opinion. It is, therefore, on opinion only that government is founded; and this maxim extends to the most despotic and military governments, as well as to the most free and most popular." For example, consider the authority of the Sultan of Turkey, let us say, at the height of his power. It appeared to rest on force. But, in fact, Hume would reply, he was dependent on the loyalty of his janissaries, without whose support he could do nothing. As they greatly outnumbered him, he could not compel them to obey, and the foundation of his authority was, therefore, their consent to his rule. Thus Hume, in order to give his paradox a consistent interpretation, renders it inadequate as an explanation of political obedience. For the facts to be explained include the obedience of subjects other than janissaries, and their submis siveness may well be the result of force, or of fear of the organized and therefore preponderant force which the Sultan at the head of his janissaries had at his command. One may say, if one pleases, that the authority of rulers, even the most arbitrary and despotic, rests upon the consent or opinion of the ruled, but such opinion is of many different kinds in accordance with the many different circumstances under which obedience may be required. of Hume's A political philosopher no less facile than Hume and Inadequacy possessed of a much firmer grasp on the realities of politics answer was Benjamin Disraeli, the celebrated British statesman. In the year 1852, during the reaction after the revolutions of 1848 and on the eve of the establishment of the Second Empire in France by Louis Napoleon, he wrote: "Let us not be deluded by forms of government. The word may be republic in France, constitutional monarchy in Prussia, absolute monarchy in Austria, but the thing is the same. Wherever there is a vast standing army, the government is the government of the sword. Half a million of armed men must either be, or be not, in a state of discipline. If they be not in a state of discipline, but follow different chiefs, it is not government, but anarchy; if they be in a state of discipline, they must obey one man, and that man is master." 1 One may say if one pleases that such a government is founded on opinion, but that opinion is of different kinds. Some of those who are "in a state of discipline" expect some advantage from submission; others obey because they fear the penalties of disobedience; while persons outside the military establishment may acknowledge the authority of the "master" for various reasons or for no reason whatever which they could explain. In a sense of the word all government is undoubt 1 Benjamin Disraeli, Life of George Bentinck, a Political Biography, Whibley's edition, pp. 358-359. Alexander answer (1) "Interest" edly founded on opinion, but the obedience of the governed may spring from opinion which is dispassionate and rational, from the crudest prejudices, or from the most abject fears. The question, why do men obey their rulers, may seem to be an academic inquiry, but it always has to be faced by the working politicians and statesmen. The art of government is the most difficult of all the practical arts. It constrains those who exercise authority in the name of the state to-accept responsibility for putting their measures into effect. Doubtless a well-organized state would run for some time under its own momentum, even if impractical men were at the helm. But sooner or later problems arise which compel rulers to consider how they shall contrive to get themselves obeyed by those whom they wish to rule, or whether they will be obeyed at all. The most conspicuous illustration of such a problem is that of the reformation of an old and unsatisfactory government or the creation of a new one. In America this problem in an acute form confronted the Federal Convention which framed the Constitution of 1787. The precise problem before the members of the Federal Convention was this: to frame a government which the American people would obey in all matters of national concern. in preference to the betterknown and longer-trusted governments of the several States. The first attempt to solve this problem, the Articles of Confederation, framed by the Continental Congress in 1777, was admittedly a failure. The members of the Convention were fully aware of the difficulty of their problem, and faced it boldly, none more boldly perhaps than the brilliant young. politician, Alexander Hamilton. Hamilton devoted one of the most striking passages of his greatest speech in the Convention to an analysis of the foundations of political obedience. The authority of rulers, he said, according to Madison's report,' rests in the first instance on the interest which the ruled have in supporting them. Those who would maintain themselves in power must not only consider, but be able to promote, the interests of all those whose support is essential to the stability of their position. The Federal Government therefore, he argued, should be so constituted and its officers equipped with such authority as would enable them to assure more adequate protection and encouragement to the interests of at least the strongest and preponderant elements among the people of the Union than could reasonably be expected under the existing conditions from the officers of the State governments. Otherwise those elements would look to the State governments rather than to that of the Union for the advancement of their interests, and the stability of the latter would be impaired. sonal ambi Secondly, it was necessary to frame a government which (2) Perwould provide careers for men of ambition and force. tion Government, he believed, was not an easy, but a difficult task. Only energetic and masterful men were capable of working successfully the institutions of a powerful state, even if those institutions were well-devised and firmly established. Such men must be enlisted in the service of the Union, if practical men were to be convinced of its necessity and general utility and to transfer to it a due measure of that ungrudging loyalty which had hitherto been claimed by the State governments. This could best be done by fortifying the principal offices with such powers and sustaining them by such emoluments as would attract strong and capable men. The innate love of power, which animates the natural rulers of men, could then be relied upon to seduce them from the service of the State governments, leaving the latter in the hands of inferior men, who 1 Max Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention, Vol. 1, pp. 284-285. (3) Habit (4) Fear and force ence" would lack either the interest or the ability to exalt them above the government of the Union. Wherever the strongest men are found, whether in the army or in the church, in the service of capitalistic business enterprise or of organized labor, thither political authority, whatever the formal constitution of the state, will tend to flow. If the formal constitution is to correspond to the realities of life, it must ensure a supply of men in public office capable of bearing the burden of power to be exercised by the government, or the power will go elsewhere and the formal government become a hollow sham or ignominiously fail. So Hamilton demanded for the proposed new and more perfect Union what people then used to call a "hightoned" government, an impressive, expensive, and powerful structure. Such a government, he believed, would eventually acquire the additional strength which springs from a longcontinued sense of obligation on the part of the people. Such a sense of obligation should culminate in an habitual attachment to the officers of the Union, whoever they might be, one of the most important, in his eyes, of the sources of the authority of rulers. Nor did he overlook the part to be played by fear and force, the fear of the law and, in the last extremity, the force of arms, in main(5) "Influ- taining their authority. Finally, he spoke of "influence," by which he meant the power of appointment to offices of honor and of profit, the power of the rulers to attach particular individuals to their personal fortunes through the shrewd dispensation of the public patronage. He urged that the patronage be concentrated in a comparatively few hands, and those the hands of the men designed to be otherwise the most influential in the government of the Union, in order that the whole authority of the government might be easily mobilized and wielded most effectively. In the constitutional arrangement of the powers |