as a purchaser as well as a seller, and that such an event would constitute a heavy blow to British trade in the period of commercial and economic reconstruction when Britain will stand in the greatest need of purchasers.

The entente plan of a Chinese wall of commerce is based upon the conviction that, whatever the outcome of the pending clash of arms, the struggle between the nations. now at war will be continued for many years to come. And this distressing point of view is as strongly held in Germany as in England and France. Friedrich Naumann, the eminent German thinker and publicist, presents his views of the future of Europe in the following lurid colors:

After the war fortifications along the frontiers will be erected wherever the possibilities of war may exist. New Roman walls will spring into existence; new Chinese walls, made of earth and steel and barbed wire. Europe will have two long walls from north to south-one from somewhere on the lower Rhine to the Alps and the other from Courland to either right or left of Roumania.

Side by side with this alignment of irreconcilable military forces, Mr. Naumann discusses the possibility of an Austro-German economic alliance, designed to give the Germanic race a dominant position in a hostile world. Both of his propositions assume a continuance, by arms or by commercial and industrial weapons, of the conflict which is now devastating Christendom.

Naumann's conception of the future of Europe is as appalling as that indicated by the activities of the Paris conference. For the sake of civilization it is to be hoped that the policy of neither alliance will

be governed by such a spirit of mutual hate and suspicion.-June 17, 1916.

ETERNAL WAR

Those who hope that this war will be the last war gaze with dismay at plans which lay the basis of certain wars in the future. The allies have declared economic war upon Germany, to be continued after the military conflict is ended. These plans contemplate the carrying into effect of the threat of Walter Runciman, president of the British Board of Trade, to so fix Germany that she will never lift her head again commercially.

Our country has just received a report of the economic programme adopted by the conference of the allies June 17. The allies agree, after the war, to give each other preferential trade favors and to prohibit or restrict trade with Germany. The plan generally talked of, and no doubt to be adopted as a specific measure putting into effect the adopted June 17, is for each of them general programme of the allies

to have a tariff with three scales of customs duties. Each of the present allied countries will charge the lowest scale of duty on goods imported from one of the others. The next imported from a country that has highest duty will be levied on goods

been a neutral in this war. The highest scale of duties, in some cases prohibitive, will be laid on imports from the central powers.

This means that Germany is now challenged to fight against a proposed starvation and destruction of half her people, after the war is over. These people lived on the

proceeds of Germany's exports. They must starve or leave Germany, for the markets where they earned their bread are to be denied them. It is a dark and desperate future, and Germany must fight till the last man falls, rather than accept it.

For belligerents who take these measures to say that they do not desire the destruction of Germany but only the destruction of "Prussian militarism" is to play with words. This programme proposes the complete destruction of Germany's economic life. It proposes a dismemberment of the German empire in a sense more complete than any military success could hope to attain. Germany now knows she must win the war or face a permanent crippling of her national life.

What of England's proud rejection of the imputation that she entered this war to destroy the commercial competition of Germany? How does this plan of economic destruction fit into Great Britain's defense of the German charge?

If the allies are able to put this programme into effect, the central powers will retaliate with a great customs union of their own. The world will be divided into two hostile armies, facing each other in their economic trenches.

The present neutrals of the world will be stranded in No Man's Land between the trenches, exposed to the cross fire of both sides and offered the protection of neither.

In dim outline we see arising a situation of international hate, war, revenge. The wisest statesmanship will be none too wise for Washington. Let us look to our defenses, military and industrial.-June 20, 1916.

TRADE KNOWS NO WAR PASSIONS

Never before in the history of the world has it been so futile to attempt to prophesy the developments of to-morrow. The relations of nations, their control over their own destiny as well as the destiny of other countries, are changing like a kaleidoscope and are affected by conditions which no one can foresee. The war has thrust the whole world into a fiery crucible, out of which almost anything may come in most surprising form.

Take our own future as a nation, for instance. It ought to be reasonably safe to forecast the course we are to follow the next six months, the conditions we are likely to face and the results to us as a nation. Yet no sane man would attempt to do so. Our relations with other nations are inextricably bound up in the decision now being fought out in Europe, and, in a lesser sense, in our difficulties with Mexico.

Nevertheless, conditions and prospects with us are more nearly normal than with any other nation. We have only to keep that fact in mind to realize how far out of balance the whole world is and how much like trying to measure eternity it is to attempt to define to-day the attitude of nations toward each other when peace shall once more reign.

Hence it seems to us that the gentlemen from many countries who have been conferring in Paris for the purpose of controlling the trade of the world in the interest of the allies, after war ceases, have a very flimsy basis on which to predicate their planning. It would be equally

absurd for Germany and her allies to attempt such a thing.

Trade knows no war animosities. It has a short memory for everything except a fixed purpose to do business. After war ends the pound sterling of an Englishman will look as good to a German tradesman, and vice versa, as the dollar of a Yankee. Both may have been glaring savagely at each other at rifle's length the past two years; but when the drum beat ceases English, German, French, Russian and Austrian will work out their industrial salvation on the old basis of skill, energy, organizing ability and salesmanship.

That is the history of all afterwar periods. It is conspicuously illustrated in the intimate relations of Russia and Japan to-day. It will be so, despite the conferences in Paris, after Europe settles down again to business.-June 22, 1916.

A LEAGUE OF NEUTRALS

There are only four possible ways in which the war can end: by an allied victory, by a Teutonic victory, by a partial victory of either the allies or the central powers, or by an absolute deadlock. Any one of these events would bring to the United States peace problems infinitely more serious than those which have confronted us during the war. The same problems will confront other neutral countries. It is high time for us to bind them to us in a league to protect our interests after the conflict.

Consider the possibilities of an allied victory, and the effect upon our commercial future. The economic alliance agreed upon by the allies assures that our exports will

be discriminated against in England, France, Russia, Italy, Roumania, Serbia, the colonies and dominions of these countries, Japan, China (a dependency of Japan) and the territory which, in the case of victory, the allies would take away from the central powers as the result of the war. Whatever would be left of the central powers would probably be compelled to grant to the allies preferential treatment for goods coming from the allied countries. The very excellent prospect is that the only open markets left for this country would be European neutrals and the American continent, between the Rio Grande and the Cape Horn.

If the central powers should win an outright victory, the result would be in no way different. In that case it would be the enlarged territory of Germany, Austria, Bulgaria and Turkey which would be shutting us off from their trade and forcing the allied countries to grant them preferential treatment. In the case of a partial allied or Teutonic victory, we should have two great independent groups of countries engaged in discriminating against each other and against us in favor of the members of the group.

If the allies win, our wheat to England and France would have to pay a higher duty than wheat from Canada and Russia. Other neutral countries would be similarly affected. Brazilian and Dutch coffee would be discriminated against in favor of products from the allied countries. Argentine fodder would lose its British and European markets to fodder from allied sources, such as Japanese Manchuria. Mexican petroleum would be discriminated against in favor of the Rus

sian product, and Swedish lumber lose its markets in the allied countries to the Russian and Canadian product. Spanish would be discriminated against in favor of French wines.

The losses to all of these countries, at present neutral in this war, would be very great. The easiest way to protect themselves against such a policy is to unite. Neither of the groups of belligerents can, after this war, disregard us if we all act together. It is not at all impossible that by united effort we could force our way into the preferential treatment granted by each group to its own members. Thus we should become more favorably situated than the participants in either group. Not even the strongest of them could afford to disregard the markets of South and Central America, the United States, Spain, Switzerland, Holland, Scandinavia, if these countries jointly threaten both groups with retaliation for any discriminatory charge imposed against

us.

Even if the united strength of this neutral group was insufficient to wholly thwart the proposed exclusive tariff groups, the United States would have every advantage from forming and leading such a neutral customs union. Because we should be the strongest industrial member of it, we should have the sole ascendency in a group of markets not at all incomparable with the present warring groups.

It is time for the administration at Washington to cease its aloofness from the neutral countries of the world, and unite with them for the protection of our joint interests during the war and after it. The time to do this is now, before more

of us are driven, at the point of the bayonet, into the conflict, or else compelled to join one of the economic groups proposed by the belligerents.-Sept. 12, 1916.

THE END OF THE WAR

Whether the war is soon to end or not, men are actively speculating as to its outcome. There is a limited number of ways in which it can end, and, as all the present conditions are passed in review, the events which in each case could bring about the end stand out sharply defined.

First, the central powers may be beaten. This would be brought to pass by a crushing defeat in the Balkans and the Carpathians, with the resulting military collapse of Austria. Or the same result might come about through the economic starvation of the central powers with respect to some essential of industrial or military life. Such an outcome is by no means in immediate view, but there is no doubt that the majority of persons in this country think it more likely than any other result.

Second, the allies may be beaten. This would be brought to pass by the desertion of Russia from the allied ranks, by the financial collapse of England, or by the economic starvation of England through a successful submarine campaign. While at this moment these events seem less probable than similar disasters to the central powers, they are by no means beyond the realm of reason. If Russia were convinced that the allies could not win against the Germans, Petrograd would have everything to gain by throwing in its lot

with those whom its assistance could help to gain victory. In any case, Russia would probably have more to gain by participating in a Teutonic than in a British victory, for the Germans have no interests that would prevent the Russians from realizing their aims. The British have such interests in the Suez Canal, India and China.

As for finances, Great Britain is now bearing nearly the entire burden for the allied countries, and the continuance of financial support, both in British and foreign markets, is dependent upon continued military success. Finally, the submarine campaign. It must be kept in mind that a German submarine campaign, which torpedoed indiscriminately everything going in and out of England, would take a totally different toll of British food carriers than is taken by the present submarine operations, restrained by the exercise of the law of visit and search.

The other possible outcomes are a partial victory for one side or a deadlock. A partial victory for the allies could be won by driving Germany out of France and Belgium. Its fruit would probably be the annexation by France of German territory as far as the Rhine, the loss of the German colonies, an indemnity for Belgium, probably the loss of East Prussia to Russia, and large territorial concessions by Austria to Italy, Servia, Roumania and Russia. A partial victory for the central powers would be won if they could maintain the status quo and persuade their enemies that it could not be altered. By trading upon their present advantageous situation the central powers could probably include in their peace terms the re

covery of their colonies, an independent Poland, an open route to Constantinople, and the abolition of the intended economic trade war of the allies. A deadlock would mean a return to the status quo before the war.

Each one of these possible results presents to the United States severe problems after the conflict. It is time to get down to the facts of the case and consider our situation in each one of these events.-Sept. 13, 1916.

COMMERCIAL BOYCOTT OF THE UNITED STATES

It is difficult to diagnose the strange hypnosis that overcomes a part of our press when reading the diplomatic documents that grow out of our relations with Great Britain. Every new blow at our present and our future is construed into an act of almost royal benevolence.

If there is anything that we should be alarmed about, it is the proposed discrimination against our goods by the allies, in favor of each other's goods, after the war. If the same action is taken by the central powers-which is by no means impossible we shall be crippled in the leading markets of the world.