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effort to extend a frontier; vast dominions have fallen asunder like a child's house built of blocks, because of the failure to prevent the violation of a frontier.

Now a frontier is a purely imaginary line. The soil on either side of this line is apt to be the same. In many instances the population is approximately the same. And yet to the traveler who knows history the crossing of a frontier is an act which appeals to the imagination. It is an act which evokes a vivid realization of a difference of ideals, of a diversity of aims, of a conflict of interests.

Wherein lies the magic meaning of this imaginary line? Why do

men die in hosts in an endeavor to preserve it? Why are the annals of the human race largely a record of the shifting of frontiers?

A man's identity is his most precious possession. An attempt to suppress that identity is an attempt to obliterate the personality which that identity represents. In defense of that identity a man will sacrifice life itself. The identity, the continuity of a nation is as enduring an instinct as the identity of an individual. The nation, like the individual, will offer the ultimate sacrifice on the altar of that identity.

The problem of frontiers is complicated by geographic, commercial, racial and military considerations. The original frontiers were those of race. It was natural that there should be a limitation of intercourse between peoples of differing speech; hence the line of contact between them also became a line of division. Then, in the course of time and the migration of peoples, a confusion of this simple and automatic demarcation arose. A con

flict developed between racial, geographic and strategic divisions. Because of this confusion Europe has weltered through centuries of international anarchy.

England has thrown her commercial and political frontiers far beyond her racial boundaries. Russia, by a series of absorptions, has flung her line across Europe and Asia to the Pacific. France, in the course of the past century, has shifted her boundaries southward across the Mediterranean into the heart of Africa.

Russia and France, like England, have spread out territorially far beyond the extent of their respective races. Russia, politically and commercially, has become largely an Asiatic power. France has become to a great extent an African power.

Of all the great powers of Europe, the political frontiers of Germany alone coincide to a marked degree with her racial boundaries. With a population of more than 65,000,000 and a growing birthrate, to Germany alone of all the great European states has been denied an adequate expansion overseas except in the least desirable part of Africa.

There is an inequity which history has bequeathed to Europe, and the struggle of to-day is the inexorable struggle for readjustment. Should Europe at the end of this war still deny to Germany a more approximately fair relation between her racial frontiers and her commercial and political boundaries, the signature of the treaty of peace will be only the portent of a still greater war to come. The history of Europe will continue to be the annals of a chronic conflict over imaginary lines.-May 12, 1916.

THE ANGLO-GERMAN

TREATY OF 1914

By S. S. McCLURE

On adjoining columns of this page I publish the terms of a treaty which, if consummated, would have removed the hostility between England and Germany. The other data and documents I publish are to be found in any well constructed history of the diplomacy of 1914.

I came across this treaty by chance. One of my fellow passengers on my journey to Constantinople was Dr. Jaeckh, an expert on European Turkey and Asia Minor, and he knew of this treaty because he had helped prepare it.

During my stay in Constantinople I spent one evening with the German ambassador, Count von Metternich, who had been the German ambassador in London for many years and had worked in hearty collaboration with Sir Edward Grey to remove the causes of friction between England and Germany. He confirmed the accuracy of the data I had secured from Dr. Jaeckh and expressed a very high opinion of Sir Edward Grey and his work to establish friendly relations between Germany and England.

On my return to Berlin, I at once took the document containing the terms of the treaty to the Foreign Office. I was anxious, first of all, to have it absolutely confirmed by the highest authority, and, secondly, to get permission to bring the material with me to America. I was successful in both respects.

I then showed the document to the American ambassador, Mr. Gerard, who deemed it of sufficient importance to have a copy made and sent to the State department at

Washington. This was particularly reassuring to me, as it might not be possible for me to get any papers past the British blockade.

So far as the authenticity of this document is concerned, I have the very highest German governmental authority. On the English side I quote from "The Diplomatic History of the War," by M. P. Price, of Trinity College, Cambridge, published in the autumn of 1914 (Charles Scribner's Sons).

The assassination of the crown prince of Austria-Hungary, the immovable and implacable stand of Austria-Hungary against Servia, as expressed in the note to Servia, the ensuing negotiations combined with mutual dread and distrust, resulting in war, prevented the signing of this treaty.

It is a fair deduction from the nature of the treaty, and from the success of the previous similar British treaties with France in 1904 and with Russia in 1907, that had no such serious event as the assassination of the crown prince occurred during 1914 there would be an entente among the nations now at war that would have rendered war unlikely for many generations.

The important thing is that early in 1914 there were no irreconcilable differences between England and Germany. The pacific tendencies of both governments are obvious. Von Bethmann-Hollweg is regarded in Germany as above all a pacifist.

Von Bethmann-Hollweg's strong desire for the maintenance of the peace is indicated by his notable speech in the Reichstag last Monday. The speech is thus referred to in a dispatch by the Associated Press:

Berlin, June 5, 1916.-One of the most stirring passages from the speech came when the chancellor replied to a pamphleteer's charge that in the opening days of the war he had believed England would have remained Germany's friend, or at least neutral, and that he had wasted three days parleying with England, three days which meant an enormous prolongation of the war because the first blow was not struck promptly enough.

"I know that my attempts at an understanding with England," said the chancellor, "are my capital offense, but what was Germany's position prior to the war? France and Russia were united in an indissoluble alliance. There was a strong anti-German party in Russia and an influential and growing section in France which was urging revenge and war. Russia could only be held in check if the hope of English aid was successfully taken from them. They would then have never ventured on war. If I wished to work against war I had to attempt to enter into relationship with England.

"I made this statement in the face of the development of an English policy which was hostile to Germany and of which I was entirely cognizant. I am not ashamed of my conduct, even though it proved abortive. He who on that account charges me with being the cause of the world catastrophe, with its hecatombs of human sacrifices, may make his accusation before God. I shall await God's judgment calmly."

This passage caused a tremendous sensation in the house and it was repeatedly interrupted by loud cheering.

All Germany regards Von Bethmann-Hollweg as a pacifist, and it is universally believed by his supporters and by his opponents in Germany that he postponed the declaration of war for two or three days, hoping with England's co-operation to prevent war.

In my interview with the chancellor he told of the overwhelming mass of evidence, official and private, in regard to the Russian armies that compelled him, in self-defense, to declare war.

Germany may have misinterpreted the acts of Russia. The government of Germany did not feel justified in taking the risk of a Russian offensive. I believe that in those hurried days the implacability of Austria-Hungary caused mutual fear in Europe and that this mutual fear or dread caused the war.

I publish above his defense before his opponents in the Reichstag, for endeavoring to preserve peace in July, 1914. He has been charged as in part responsible for the Russian invasion of East Prussia.-June 8, 1916.

THE IMPENDING

ENTENTE BETWEEN ENGLAND AND GERMANY, JUNE, 1914

By S. S. MCCLURE. Terms of the Treaty There were many indications of a growing friendliness and mutual confidence between England and Germany and Germany and France for a year or two prior to July, 1914.

In April, 1913, Von BethmannHollweg declared in the Reichstag:

"With England we are on the best footing, we have gone hand in hand

with her in the present crisis, and in spite of Great Britain's membership of the triple entente, it is very advisable to aim at a peaceful agreement with the British empire in the future. The language of the British statesmen is altogether conciliatory and peaceable.'

Sir Edward Grey, in a dispatch on July 30, 1914, to Sir E. Goschen, British ambassador at Berlin:

"And I will say this: If the peace of Europe can be preserved and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavor will be to promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia and ourselves, jointly or separately. I have desired this and worked for it, as far as I could, through the last Balkan crisis, and Germany having a corresponding object, our relations sensibly improved."

Finally in his statement to the Reichstag, August 3, 1914, just the day before England declared war, Von Bethmann-Hollweg said:

"Shoulder to shoulder with England, we labored incessantly and supported every proposal in Vienna from which we hoped to gain the possibility of a peaceable solution of the conflict. We even, as late as the 30th of July, forwarded the English proposal to Vienna, as basis for negotiations, that Austria-Hungary should dictate her conditions in Servia, i. e., after her march into Servia."

It will be remembered that the last interview between the British ambassador at Berlin and the imperial chancellor refers also to the improved conditions between England

and Germany. Sir E. Goschen, British ambassador in Berlin, writes to Sir Edward Grey on August 5, 1914:

"I found the chancellor very agitated. He said: 'All his efforts in that direction had been rendered useless by this last terrible step, and the policy to which, as I knew, he had devoted himself since his accession to office had tumbled down like a house of cards."

"As I was leaving he said that the blow of Great Britain joining Germany's enemies was all the greater that almost up to the last moment he and his government had been working with us and supporting our efforts to maintain peace between Austria and Russia. I said that this was part of the tragedy that saw the two nations fall apart just at the moment when the relations between them had been more friendly and cordial cordial than they had been for years."

A more definite statement as to the basis of good feeling between England and Germany is to be found on pages 44 and 45 of "The Diplomatic History of the War," by M. P. Price, M. A., Trinity College, Cambridge, published, 1914, by Charles Scribner's Sons:

"But in spite of the failure of the political and naval negotiations, in spite of the Morocco crisis and the ever increasing pressure of armaments, Anglo-German relations sensibly improved after the Balkan crisis of 1912, when the two countries co-operated for the settlement of the Albanian question. It appeared, in fact, about this time that a change in Anglo-German relations was about to take place on account of mutual interests in the near East. Indeed, an Anglo-German agree

ment over spheres of influence in Asia Minor and Mesopotamia was being prepared and was to have been signed in the autumn of 1914. Such an agreement would have settled all outstanding questions between the two countries in the East, it would have given Germany her place in the sun, and might have laid the seed of an understanding in Europe which would have included Germany in a European concert and put an end to the system of power-balances."

On March 2, 1916, during my journey to Constantinople, I learned the terms of the treaty referred to by M. P. Price. I submitted the data I had secured to the Foreign office in Berlin on my return to Germany early in April, and I print herewith the provisions of this treaty as finally given to me by the Foreign

office in Berlin and which Price states was to have been signed in the Autumn of 1914.

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5. The oil wells of the whole of Mesopotamia shall be developed by a British company, the capital of which shall be given at 50 per cent. by England, at 25 per cent. by the German Bank, at 25 per cent. by the "Royal Dutch Company" (a company which is Dutch, but closely connected with England). For the irrigation works there had been intended a similar understanding. The rights of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, in which, as is known, the English government is concerned, remained unaffected. This society exercises south of Basra, on the

The Anglo-German Agreement Schatel-Arabia, as well as in all

of 1914

Anglo-German agreement, June, 1914, which was drafted and already initialed by the members of the conference. It would have satisfied Germany for decades without endangering the British empire:

1. The Bagdad Railway from Constantinople to Basra is definitely left to German capital in co-operation with Turkey. In the territory of the Bagdad Railway German economical working will not be hindered by England.

2. Basra becomes sea harbor in the building of which German capital is concerned with 60 per cent. and English capital with 40 per cent. For the navigation from Basra

south and central Persia, a monopoly on the production and transport of oil.

6. A simultaneous German-French agreement leaves free hand to French capital for the construction of railways in southern Syria and Palestine

Besides this, there is an agreement, already made before, between Germany and England, concerning Africa, with the following repartition of their spheres of influence in Angola and Mozambique.

Finally there is to be mentioned the Morocco agreement, which established the political predominance of France in Morocco, but, on the other hand, stated the principle of "open door" as to the trade of all nations.

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