When Opponents Cooperate: Great Power Conflict and Collaboration in World PoliticsUniversity of Michigan Press, 2002 - 368 páginas The bipolar structure of the Cold War allowed a certain stability in world politics that, with the demise of the Soviet Union, is now missing. Does this mean that we can expect greater instability because of this structural transition from bipolarity to multipolarity? Or should we feel reassured that changes on the state level such as democratization and the transition to market economies that are occurring in Latin America, Eastern Europe, and to some extent, in the Soviet successor states, are in effect promoting peace? When Opponents Cooperate resolves the issue by formulating a new theory of international relations that integrates state-level analyses. The key is to focus on intended and unintended outcomes of cooperation and conflict. The author argues that structural factors can account for the unintended crisis outcomes (inadvertent wars and tact-spontaneous cooperation in crisis management), but state-level factors explain intended outcomes (such as intentional cooperation in conflict resolution) during non-crisis times. He tests the validity of his theoretical model in a variety of situations, though he emphasizes recent postwar events in the Middle East. While his argument will appeal to international relations theorists, his in-depth accounts of great power crisis and cooperation in the Middle East will be of particular interest to security and foreign policy specialists. Benjamin Miller is Senior Lecturer of International Relations, Hebrew University of Jerusalem. |
Índice
Intended and Unintended Conflict and Cooperation under International Anarchy | 9 |
Explaining Great Power Cooperation in Conflict Management | 33 |
Polarity Nuclear Weapons and Major War | 57 |
Explaining the Emergence and the Form of Great Power Concerts | 89 |
The Superpowers and Middle East Crises during the Cold War Tacit Cooperation | 125 |
Explaining Superpower Diplomacy Attempts at USSoviet Collaboration in Resolving the ArabIsraeli Conflict | 173 |
Intended and Unintended ConsequencesPast and Future | 223 |
September 11 and the Great Powers | 253 |
Notes | 265 |
317 | |
349 | |
Outras edições - Ver tudo
When Opponents Cooperate: Great Power Conflict and Collaboration in World ... Benjamin Miller Pré-visualização limitada - 2002 |
When Opponents Cooperate: Great Power Conflict and Collaboration in World ... Benjamin Miller Visualização de excertos - 1995 |
Palavras e frases frequentes
administration allies American anarchy Arab Arab-Israeli conflict balance Ben-Zvi bipolarity Breslauer capabilities cease-fire chap chapter cited clients cognitive Cold Cold War collaboration Concert of Europe concerted diplomacy conflict resolution constraints contrast cooperation in conflict crises crisis management decision makers destabilizing détente diplomatic domestic politics effects Egypt emergence especially force foreign policy Garthoff George global Golan hegemon Holsti ideological inadvertent wars intended wars interests international politics international system intervention Israel Israeli Jervis joint Keohane Kissinger 1982 Kissinger's likelihood major Middle East military Moscow multilateral multipolarity Nixon noncrisis normal diplomacy nuclear weapons outcomes Pax Americana peace process post-Cold postwar potential power concert power cooperation Quandt regime regional conflicts relations relative resolve restraining role similarity and moderation Six-Day War Snyder and Diesing Soviet Union Spiegel stability status quo strategy structural theory Suez crisis superpower Syrian tacit rules Third World tion types U.S.-Soviet unilateral unintended unit-level factors United USSR Waltz