approved by this court, is not the proper rule. It is said that when the result of the application of the rule is a sum of money in hand which will produce, if placed at interest at the legal rate, a yearly return equal to or greater than the amount of the estimated annual contribution, it is manifest that an incorrect result has been reached. As stated by the appellant:

"The judgment rendered would pay plaintiff more in interest than the amount of the contribution from her husband if living. She, if entitled to anything, is entitled to the amount of his contributions during the time the jury finds that he would have lived. The judgment as rendered gives her an income in perpetuity which is in excess of his contributions."

Counsel have presented a computation, which appears to be mathematically correct, showing that a principal sum of $5,566.40, placed at interest at 5 per cent. per annum, will yield sufficient to pay $330 annually for 38 years, at the end of which time the principal sum will be exhausted. It appears to be conceded that the jury estimated the annual contribution lost to plaintiff as equal to $330 and the decedent's expectancy of life as 38 years. The verdict returned was for $6,919.96. That this sum is the present worth of $330 for 38 years, if the computation follows the rule laid down by the court, cannot be doubted. We shall not restate the various arguments which have been made. The total of the contributions which in the case presented is lost to plaintiff is $12,540. It is convenience, and convenience only, which considers the contributions as annual. They would not have been made annually, but daily, and weekly. It is convenience, and convenience only, and an effort to ascertain and apply a rule which can be conveniently applied to the facts and result in substantial right, which considers the division of the total annual contribution for the first year by $1.05. The rule considers $1 in hand as worth $1.05 at the end of a year and, conversely, that $1.05 payable in one year may be presently paid with $1. The rule is simple, and, if

it is the true rule for one year, is the true rule for any number of years. With variations depending upon the interest rate, and upon whether simple or compound interest may be received, it is, so far as we are informed, the rule in common use for determining the sum of money required to secure a given annuity for any number of years, and the present worth of a sum payable in the future. Plaintiff, it is supposed, has lost by the conduct of defendant $12,540, which would have been paid to her from time to time during a period of 38 years. If defendant were now to assume to make the contributions, year by year, it would cost it $12,540 in the end; no less, no more. To presently compensate her for this loss, the present value of these contributions is to be estimated. This is the problem which is, in fact, presented. It is idle to argue, in support of a rule for such estimation, that it is such sum as, if presently placed at interest at 5 per cent. per annum, will yield her annually an amount equal to the estimated annual contribution and also exhaust the principal at the end of the period. Such a rule cannot in fact be applied to produce such a result. There are too many contingencies, in fact, the risk and cost of which neither plaintiff nor the fund should be charged with. By the rule adopted, and which we approve, plaintiff has discounted her demand, allowing defendant interest upon each installment at the rate of 5 per cent. per annum for the period which is anticipated. Whatever the result, it is, in our opinion, the correct result.

BIRD, HOOKER, MOORE, MCALVAY, BROOKE, BLAIR, and STONE, JJ., concurred.

INDEX.

ABATEMENT AND REVIVAL.

1. A right of action for personal injuries not resulting in the
death of the injured person, survives after his death, and a suit
for his damages, begun by him, may be continued by his per-
sonal representative after his death, with the same effect,
according to the same rules, and to recover the same damages,
as if he were living and prosecuting his action in person,
(8 Comp. Laws, § 10117.) Rouse v. Michigan United R.
Co., 475.

2. Neither the death act (3 Comp. Laws, § 10427) nor Act No. 89,
Pub. Acts 1905, affects such right of action or has any appli-
cation to the manner in which it shall be pursued. Id. 476.
ABUSE OF PROCESS.

1. The action for abuse of process lies for the wrongful use of
the process of a court after its issuance, not for maliciously
causing it to issue. Spear v. Pendill, 620.

2. Two elements are necessary to an action for the malicious
abuse of legal process: (1) The existence of an ulterior pur-
pose; (2) an act in the use of the process not proper in the
regular prosecution of the proceeding. But its regular and
legitimate use, though with a bad intention, is not a mali-
cious abuse thereof. Id.

3. It is not actionable abuse of criminal process to make com-
plaint against a person for keeping a bucket shop, to which
charge the respondent pleaded guilty and was fined, where
defendant had done no improper or irregular act in connec-
tion with the use of the process, and had no control over
the warrant or prosecution after making complaint. Id.
ACCEPTANCE-See CARRIERS (2); GIFTS (1, 4-6, 8, 10); SALES

(2).

ACCOUNTING.

In a suit by the administrator of one deceased partner for an
accounting against the other partner, who acted as attorney
for certain Indians having claims against the United States,
and who secured an appropriation by congress, after consid-
erable litigation, by which the claims were paid,-under evi-
dence showing that the Indians who shared in the fund ap-
propriated were in part identical with those who engaged de-

ACCOUNTING-Continued.

fendant as attorney for a commission, an accounting is
required, on appeal, of the share of complainant as agreed
between the partners, based upon the total amount collected,
instead of the amount which defendant claimed was actually
paid to the portion of Indian claimants who first employed
him. Cowham v. Shipman, 419.

See EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS (3); PARTNERSHIP (1);
TRUSTS (10); WITNESSES (1).

ACQUIESCENCE OF BENEFICIARY IN ACTS OF TRUSTEE
See TRUSTS (9).

ACTION—See ABATEMENT And Revival (1); Abuse of PROCESS;
HUSBAND AND WIFE (10-13); JOINT STOCK COMPANIES.

ACTION IN REM-See EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS (1).
ADEQUATE REMEDY AT LAW-See MANDAMUS (2, 3); QUIET-
ING TITLE.

ADJACENT PROPERTY-See NEGLIGENCE (2).

ADMISSIONS-See CRIMINAL LAW (2); GIFTS (13).

ADRIAN CHARTER-See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (2).
ADULTERY-See HUSBAND and Wife (1).

ADVERSE POSSESSION.

1. Possession by the father of realty belonging to children who
are of age and on unfriendly terms with their father, is not
presumed to be in subordination to their title. Tyler v.
Wright, 606.

2. Although self-serving declarations contained in a will are not
competent evidence to support testator's title to real property
by adverse possession, other statements contained in the in-
strument apparently disparaging his title must be construed
in connection with the more favorable ones and with the fact
that he assumed to have title by attempting to devise the
property. Id.

3. Where a father occupied a store building and lot, for more
than fifteen years after the death of his wife who had owned
the property, and whose children obtained title by descent
at her decease, being of full age and married, and where
the father built at his own expense a building on the prem-
ises, and after his wife's death attempted to convey the
property by a life lease, and to dispose of it by his will, it
was a question of fact whether his occupancy was adverse.
Id.

AFFIDAVITS-See INTOXICATING LIQUORS (13); RECEIVERS (2).
AGENCY-See PARTNERSHIP (6); PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.

ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES-See INTOXICATING LIQUORS (6-8).
ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS-See HUSBAND AND Wife (1-5)

ALIMONY-See DIVORCE (1).

AMENDED RETURN-See JUSTICES OF THE PEACE (2).

AMENDMENTS.

An amendment of the declaration permitted at the trial with-
out imposing terms, in relation to a matter which was trivial
and could not have taken the defendant by surprise, was a
proper exercise of the court's discretion. Painter v. Lebanon
Land Co., 260.

See APPEAL AND ERROR (5); CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (8); CRIM-
INAL LAW (13); MANDAMUS (4); MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
(1, 2); NAVIGABLE WATERS (6).

AMOUNT IN CONTROVERSY-See INJUNCTION (4).
ANIMALS-See AUTOMOBILES.

ANSWER-See MANDAMUS (8).

APPEAL AND ERROR.

1. On a record showing only detached portions of argument to
which exception was taken in the trial court, and which the
court rebuked, where the record did not disclose whether or
not the improper argument was called out by remarks of op-
posing counsel, prejudicial error was not shown. In re Du
Bois' Estate, 9.

2. The direction of a verdict, upon the opening statement of plain-
tiff's attorney, will not be reversed, on error, if no protest
against the action of the court was made at the trial, and the
attorney does not claim that he could make a stronger case
by his evidence than he presented in the opening, which was
insufficient to take the case out of the statute of limitations.
May v. Wilson, 26.

3. The attorneys of the respective parties may stipulate to extend
the time for settling a record on case-made. Hartley v. Mil-
ler, 47.

4. A motion to dismiss a case-made, which was settled in accord-
ance with stipulations of the attorneys extending the time,
and was filed with the clerk of the circuit court to be returned
to the Supreme Court on the last day of the year allowed by
3 Comp. Laws, §10492, will not be dismissed, although the
clerk did not make the usual entry and indorsement until the
following day. Id.

5. A motion to remand the record to the trial judge for an ex-
tension of time to settle a bill of exceptions having been
granted by the Supreme Court, the time was extended to No-
vember 18th, on which date plaintiff presented to the court
amendments to the proposed bill of exceptions, but discov-
ered that the same had been settled on November 15th, ac-
cording to notice duly given, and the record had been re-
turned to this court on November 17th. Plaintiff's attorney
served a copy of the amendments upon defendant's attorney,
and asked the court to consider them. Upon objection, the
court, for want of jurisdiction, refused to do so, but certified