Thinking How to LiveHarvard University Press, 30/10/2003 - 302 páginas Philosophers have long suspected that thought and discourse about what we ought to do differ in some fundamental way from statements about what is. But the difference has proved elusive, in part because the two kinds of statement look alike. Focusing on judgments that express decisions—judgments about what is to be done, all things considered—Allan Gibbard offers a compelling argument for reconsidering, and reconfiguring, the distinctions between normative and descriptive discourse—between questions of “ought” and “is.” |
Índice
Introduction A Possibility Proof | 3 |
Intuitionism as Template Emending Moore | 21 |
THE THING TO DO | 39 |
Planning and Ruling Out The FregeGeach Problem | 41 |
Judgment Disagreement Negation | 60 |
Supervenience and Constitution | 88 |
Character and Import | 112 |
Normative Concepts | 135 |
What to Say about the Things to Do The Expressive Turn and What It Gains Us | 179 |
KNOWING WHAT TO DO | 197 |
Explaining with Plans | 199 |
Knowing What to Do | 221 |
Ideal Response Concepts | 236 |
Deep Vindication and Practical Confidence | 251 |
Impasse and Dissent | 268 |
References | 289 |
Ordinary Oughts Meaning and Motivation | 137 |
Normative Kinds Patterns of Engagement | 159 |
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Referências a este livro
Principled Ethics: Generalism as a Regulative Ideal Sean D. McKeever,Michael R. Ridge Pré-visualização indisponível - 2006 |