Imagens das páginas
PDF
ePub

business which is to engage the session is introduced at the very first. Committees at once get busy and continue so in order that they may return their reports promptly. And finally, the houses continue in deliberation a sufficient length of time to insure that their work will be completed without confusion or disorder.

LEGISLATIVE LEADERSHIP

The constitutional fathers were so intent upon removing the legislature from executive control that the problem of legislative leadership seems never to have arisen in their minds, yet it has been the absence of responsible and definite direction within the body which has necessitated the development of leaders outside who, hidden from public view, have turned the opportunity into a source of private gain. Our state legislators are but human beings of little or no legislative experience, who are usually as amenable to good leadership as bad; but led they must be and the boss has filled a real need. The legislatures, moreover, have done nothing to develop from among themselves leaders who shall be responsible as such to the people, and the public is suffering from the resulting aimlessness of legislative activities. Members are as the blind leading the blind. Willing to follow, they can find no one to guide them.

A study of any of the journals discloses the fact that the bodies lack a consistent purpose. Members are not able to follow a constant policy, since they vote on many matters on which they have no opinion. This truth is illustrated in the number of actions which are reconsidered and, what is more noteworthy, in the number of definite decisions which are reversed. What leadership the houses enjoy is provided by the speaker and a few prominent committee chairmen, who stand forth partly because of their experience or force of personality, partly because of the position gained by them under the rules, and partly because of their position in the party hierarchy. Their control is often arbitrary and rarely systematically constructive. This latter quality has not been necessary because they have never been responsible to public opinion as recognized leaders.

THE SPEAKER

Remembering that discussion here must be confined to that phase of legislative leadership which is related to questions of procedure, we may note that the member standing out predominant

as the party chief is generally the speaker. The power which he derives from committee appointments and the reference of bills has been tampered with but little, as has been shown above. His powers through recognition of members wishing the floor are extensive since so large a volume of business is conducted by unanimous consent. Usually in refusing recognition therefor, aside from extreme cases of arbitrary and irregular conduct, he merely exercises the parliamentary right of any member to object to the suspension of the regular procedure by unanimous consent. But because of his position, the speaker can use this right to enforce discipline, when an obscure member would only incur the hostility of his colleagues.

Gavel rule, under which the speaker refuses to hear objections to unanimous consent or to recognize demands for roll calls, has probably been a subject of complaint at one time or another in all our states. In this the speaker is aided by the confusion generally prevailing on the floor at critical times. An example of extreme control is furnished by the fact that a statement reported to have been made by the speaker, that there would be no more roll calls on dry measures permitted in the House, was accepted as final by the Senate.20 A method of gavel rule requiring more finesse is to utilize a ruling on a point of order to bring about the desired result. The inexperience of the majority of members in parliamentary practice plus the element of party solidarity leads to general agreement

20 Illinois Senate Debates, 1915, p. 507. A typical case of gavel rule occurred ✔ in the Pennsylvania House of 1911 and is fully set forth in the Legislative Journal, p. 3028. A joint resolution was up to amend the Constitution to provide for the initiative and referendum. It failed on third reading by a close division without record of votes, the speaker not heeding the call for the ayes and noes, after which the following colloquy took place.

MR. KELLY (on a question of personal privilege): "Mr. Speaker, I called for the yeas and nays on House Bill No. 758 before House Bill No. 771 was taken up."

SPEAKER: "The gentleman was not then recognized. The gentleman's objection will be entered on the journal."

MR. BALDWIN: "Mr. Speaker, I rise to a question of personal privilege."

lege."

SPEAKER: "The gentleman will state his question of personal privi

MR. BALDWIN: "I desire to have it noted that when the gentleman from Allegheny (Mr. Kelly) called for the ayes and noes on agreeing to House Bill No. 758 on third reading, I seconded the call."

SPEAKER: "It will be so noted on the journal."

with the speaker's ruling. Thus a clever speaker can frequently avoid a direct vote upon a measure, which the organization wishes to kill, by skilful rulings on incidental motions or on points of order. Furthermore, by choosing the time at which to "hand down" for consideration matters which do not appear on the calendar, the speaker may secure the success of measures which would doubtless fail were the house warned beforehand. A prominent instance of the use of this means to defeat a measure occurred in the New York Assembly of 1912 when the speaker refused to hand down a resolution from the Senate requesting the return of a bill in order that a beneficial amendment might be incorporated. Through the action of the speaker the bill became law without the house having opportunity to act upon the amendment desired by the Senate and fathered by the Civil Service Commission.21 The power to appoint steering committees materially increases the centralization of control in the hands of the speaker. He may be ex officio chairman of this committee, as in New York where he reports the daily program.

The situation sometimes arising when the president of the senate is not a member of the majority party emphasizes the partisan nature of the presiding officer's position. The article in the Constitution of New York which empowers the president pro tem to act when the lieutenant-governor "shall refuse to act as president" was inserted because of an experience in which the lieutenantgovernor refused to put the question on seating a member. Only after much disorder did the president pro tem succeed in putting the question and was sustained by the majority.22 At the 1915 session of the Illinois Senate the lieutenant-governor aided and abetted a filibuster by refusing to recognize members other than those of the obstructing party and by refusal to hear demands of the majority for roll calls.23

THE FLOOR LEADER

The degree to which whatever guidance may exist is entrusted to the speaker is witnessed by the small place generally held by the recognized floor leader. Indeed, many legislatures do not recognize a floor leader other than informally. The chairman of a prom

21 Report of Committee of Citizens' Union, 1912.

22 For full account see Senate Journal, February 5, 1894. 23 See Illinois Senate Debates for March 11, 1915.

inent committee, such as judiciary or appropriations, may be the tacit leader, but his position depends largely upon the man, and he may see his leadership settle upon someone else with a stronger grasp of affairs. Occasionally the caucus will appoint a leader, although it may simply recognize the caucus chairman as such.24 But motions to establish a floor leader are infrequent. In Massachusetts the chairmen of the three most prominent committees are recognized by having special seats assigned to them by the rules, and one of the number, the chairman of the rules committee, is supposed to be the speaker's spokesman.

In any case the rank and file of members follow instinctively a few prominent men who hold chairmanships of important committees. They are the men who are most frequently granted unanimous consent to advance their measures out of order. The obscure member rarely asks for it, perhaps because it is difficult for him to secure it. At least the most numerous instances of refusal follow • requests by the rank and file. The point to be emphasized is that the men who direct the course of the deliberations receive but occasional and slight recognition from the rules and entirely escape public responsibility for the failures of the legislature.

New York is one state in which the floor leader is coming into a recognized position of power. Since 1915 the leaders of both parties have received the endorsement of law by acts appropriating money for their clerical and stenographic expenses.25 At that session the Senate caucus of the majority party, although the Senate is a small body of fifty-one members, early in March named a committee of seven to shape party policy without the action of the caucus. Four days later the chairman of this committee received authorization from the caucus to appoint sub-committees to prepare all important measures for final passage.26 He was likewise the president pro tem of the Senate, chairman of the rules committee which reported special orders at any time, ex officio member of the three leading committees, and possessed of the power to refer to the finance committee, of which he was a member, any money bill reported from another committee. It will be seen that, as far as the Senate was concerned, the majority leader was made dictator

24 For example, Kansas, Oklahoma and New Jersey.

25 For example, Chap. 726, Laws of 1915, granted the leaders each $2500 expense money.

26 New York Times, March 14, 17, 1915.

and the standing committees were virtually superseded by the small caucus sub-committees of his choosing.27

The majority leader of the lower house of New York also holds a well defined position sufficiently strong for him to take issue on occasion with the speaker. In the 1915 session he frankly accepted responsibility for the party's record, and in asking the caucus for a committee to advise and assist him in examining legislation which the party would sponsor, set forth his policy thus:

As majority leader in the Assembly it will be my best effort as far as possible to carry out the general principles of coöperation; to represent the sentiment of the majority of the Republicans in this legislature as expressed in conference, and to obtain such advice as may be gained from the speaker and from the other Republican members, whose suggestions I shall not only gladly receive, but gratefully solicit.

This is as near as any legislature has come to developing responsible leadership. The newspapers followed the actions of the leaders. closely and their movements were given wide publicity. To this extent only were they as leaders placed under any liability to the people at large.

EXECUTIVE LEADERSHIP

The legislatures have been even slower to grant the executive the function of leadership than to raise up responsible leaders among themselves, yet in many respects the governor is well fitted to lead. More than any member he represents the state as a whole; his outlook is state wide, and the popular mind is fast placing upon him accountability for the fulfilment of party pledges. Of late several governors have undertaken to maintain themselves as the recognized party leaders, but with varying degrees of success, and a reaction seems to be setting in against "executive usurpation." 28

27 The Senate of 1915 went further than usual in consolidating control in a leader, due probably to the presence of an obstructive minority. The majority party had just come into power and by a series of ripper bills were trying to ⚫ restore their control over government officers. For this reason the majority were willing to go far in sacrificing individuality to organization.

28 For example Governor Cox of Ohio was defeated by a platform which deprecated the governor's assumption of leadership in legislation. At the 1915 session Governor Willis carried out his promises of hands off and the legislature drifted. In this connection see article by J. W. Garner “Executive Participation in Legislation as a Means of Increasing Legislative Efficiency," Proceedings American Political Science Association 1913-14. References to numerous other articles on the subject are there given.

« AnteriorContinuar »