Mr. BLACK. [continuing] Mind numbing. By far, the greatest
cause of losses have been these acquisition development construc-
tion loans that are really direct investments. Joe Selby can tell you
that in chapter and verse. We have at this date, after all of this
has happened, no case that has ever been litigated by the Office of
Enforcement that establishes that these kinds of ADC practices,
that's acquisition, development and construction lending practices,
are unsafe and unsound and they can be stopped, even if the losses
haven't already hit and even if there hasn't been an explicit viola-
tion of rule. That's one.

Second, there is something clearly special about the Lincoln case
that we have never seen-well, we virtually have never seen-and
that is this absolute refusal to take any depositions. It isn't unique.
There actually have been others like that, but it's by far the worst.
I mean we're now talking 1986 to 1989, and the first deposition
that they take, other than under the Ann Sobol era, occurred a
week ago or something because your hearings were about to occur.
The CHAIRMAN. That's right. I was going to ask- will you yield?
Mr. SCHUMER. I'd be happy to yield.

The CHAIRMAN. That nothing really had been done as far as en-
forcement until the recent deposition, and that was, as you say,
less than 2 weeks ago.

Mr. BLACK. Well, and it was expressly because they feared, and
they were telling us this, that they were going to be horribly em-
barrassed at the hearing, and that the contrast between them and
the aggressive investigation of the FDIC, was going to hold them
up to ridicule.

Mr. SCHUMER. Why is this though? I mean just why-I mean still
I think we've been here a long time and we've seen some of the
most terrible misdeeds done in the name of regulatory something
or other. Was this ideological? Was it pressure?

Mr. BLACK. Well, there certainly was on the part of Mr.
Hershkowitz, that was a very ideological statement. He thinks that
this institution, Lincoln, is doing the types of things that the Bank
Board wants institutions to be doing, wants to encourage it, so they
can make more profits.

Mr. SCHUMER. Was it fear of litigation?

Mr. BLACK. Well, there is-the top people at the Office of Enforcement are not litigators, and they have never

Mr. SCHUMER. They're afraid.

Mr. BLACK. They have never tried a case.
The CHAIRMAN. It could be incompetence.

Mr. BLACK. Well, there's something special in the case of Lincoln
and that is basically Rosemary Stewart bears very considerable
personal animus. She does so with regard to former Chairman
Gray, because former Chairman Gray was about to move her aside
on the grounds of what he perceived to be incompetence.

She does so with regard to the San Francisco folks because it is
the San Francisco folks who, with the Dallas folks and the Atlanta
folks, the three regions that have by far the most supervisory en-
forcement problems, recommended that there were huge problems
and that the Office of Enforcement--

Mr. SCHUMER. Isn't this turning the Office of Enforcement on its head? Instead of being the friend of the industry, they ought to be

the most tough. They ought to be the ones going hell bent after
these bad thrifts, and someone else ought to be saying oh whon,
wait a minute. But it's just the opposite.

Again, it's you know, it's like Alice in Wonderland. Here you
have the Office of Enforcement telling the regulators to slow down
and net enforce. Is that fair? Am I mischaracterizing anything?
Mr. BLACK. Let me give you for us the classic example. We agree
with you. Theoretically, the enforcement people are the junkyard
dogs, you know, that you have-

Mr. SCHUMER. Ms. Stewart seems to be a junkyard mouse.re
Mr. BLACK. That, you know, you'd better do reasonable things
and clean up your act, because if you don't clean up your act volun-
tarily we're going to sic Enforcement on you. We have recurrently
in our district, when we're dealing with institutions, the institu-
tions call up the Office of Enforcement and try to get them in-
volved in the case, frequently with the line that I know Rosemary
really well or I know Steve really well, da-da, da-da, da-da, and I'll
get them involved. Plainly, once you establish--

Mr. BLACK. [continuing] A principle that you can go over the
heads of the people in the field with impugnity, they will do so.
Why would anyone take a bad answer from the field when they
can go to Washington and get a good answer?

Mr. SCHUMER. Well, I think it simply builds the chairman's case
and I haven't been so bold as he has, in terms of the leadership at
the Home Loan Bank Board, that these people are still there and
still doing just what they did in 1986 and 1987 and 1988. All I
would ask-my time has expired, Mr. Chairman-I think that Ms.
Stewart's role in the Lincoln situation in general deserves further
exploration by this committee, and I hope we will explore it at
length in a different hearing.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. We do intend to do so.
Given this situation, now I'm going to ask the opinion of the com-
mittee especially of my good friend, Mr. Wylie. These witnesses
have been more than patient. They've been here all day. It's about
10 minutes past 5. If you're in a position to continue, I would like
very much to implore that we continue. I know I have some ques
tions that I think should be on the record, rather than wait to
place them in writing and mail them to you.

But I don't want to impose. I mean I think there is a point
beyond which we enter into an abuse of witnesses that have been
so wonderful and so cooperative as you have. I'm sure some of the
other members will come back, because they may have some
follow-up questions.

So if you're in that situation, why don't we go and take this vote
and come back, unless Mr. Wylie, you have a better suggestion?

Mr. WYLIE. I think that's a good suggestion. Why don't we ask
the witnesses if any of them have some time constraints and would
like to be excused. If they do, we can ask them for the record. But
if they're all willing to come back, I'll be back with you.

The CHAIRMAN, ÖK. We'll go take this vote and come right back.
[Recess.]

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will resume, and the Chair recog nizes Mr. Leach.

Mr. LEACH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would first like to address several questions to Mr. Patriarca, and first by way of background, as I understand it and he can verify it, you were once a banking regulator; is that correct sir? Bank community regulator? Mr. PATRIARCA. Right.

Mr. LEACH. And again, the reason I raise that is that Bank of
America forthcomingly complied and in the hearings before this
committee, among other things, testified that they viewed the regu
lators as having been very helpful, and that this year Bank of
America is making record profits, having been forced to shrink and
also forced to raise capital; is that correct?

Mr. PATRIARCA. That's correct, although I have to tell you that at
the time they didn't think the regulators were so helpful.

Mr. LEACH. I can understand that. But the regulars were firm. and operated with will, even though they had lesser discretionary law behind them; would that not be fair to say?

Mr. LEACH. And again, the reason I raise this perspective is that
the same type of firmness of regulation in general in the thrift in-
dustry, as been applied to the most powerful political and economic
institution on the west coast, would have created less of a financial
burden for the American public today. Would you not--
Mr. PATRIARCA. I think you're right.

Mr. LEACH. Now again, having raised that and coming back to
some questions that have just been referenced, one of the questions
is why did the Bank Board capitulate and was it fear of suits, what
caused it? Now it's my understanding and with regard to regula-
tors and financial institutions, there are suits that are going on 365
days of the year; isn't that correct?

Mr. PATRIARCA. It's part of the deal.

Mr. LEACH. And therefore threat of a suit is not something that necessarily ene should quake at if one is a regulator?

Mr. PATRIARCA. Mr. Leach, I think Bill Black alluded to what coming from the bank regulatory system has struck me as the most significant shortcoming of the thrift regulators historically, and that is the enforcement program has been wholly inadequate. I don't know exactly what the reasons for it are, but there clearly is a timidity about acting aggressively to rein-in institutions and risk. Mr. LEACH. I just have a limited time. I mean I can acknowledge that completely, but I mean one of the questions is whether it's a suit that created the timidity or whether it was a suit that served as an excuse for caving to political pressure? Do you have a judg

ment on which seems to be the more likely circumstance in this case?

Mr. PATRIARCA. The facts of the case didn't change. Nevertheless, the opinion of the Office of Enforcement changed about what relief was available in this case.

Mr. LEACH. I see. In your judgment, do you have any sense in
what the size of the losses were in terms of extra losses based upon
not acting on your recommendations on a prompt basis?

Mr. PATRIARCA. It's very difficult for me to put a dollar amount
on it. With regard to the subordinated debtholders, I think had
that been stopped 2 years earlier, the losses-there was very little
comparative subordinated debt out there. Those losses would have
been vastly less. In addition to that, the savings and loan associn-
tion grew some-a couple of billion dollars in those last 2 years and
that's got to have some losses in that.

Mr. LEACH. One of the things that has just leaped out at me
about this memorandum of understanding the Bank Board negoti
ated was that it held Lincoln harmless from FSLIC and Federal
Home Loan Bank Board administrative enforcement proceedings
for everything covered by the 1986 examinations, and the negotia-
tions concerning it between Lincoln and ORPOS leading to this
memorandum itself, meaning up to the date of the memorandum,
up to May 1988.

One the things I'd like to ask you is what violations occurred
during that time period that now you presumably are by agree
ment unable to seek some sort of compensation for? I mean what
was it that you gave away? I don't mean you. What was it that the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board gave away?

Mr. BLACK. First, it gave away everything found in the exam
report itself.

Mr. LEACH. So it made your exam report dated by-this agree ment itself dated your exam report, as far as anything it could do for enforcement action?

Mr. BLACK. Didn't date it; it's like it was torn up. You could
not-it was vaporized. But it was worse than that. There is lan-
guage in it, as my analysis shows, that Lincoln certainly reads and
it has language that can be read that way, as saying not only is
whatever we found given up, but anything we ever looked at. The
Bank Board can't come back and independently say yes, there's a
huge loss at the Phoenician.

So they never reappraised the Phoenician, even though I think
our best judgment is you've got an $100 million plus loss and Bill
Crawford's shaking his head affirmatively.

Mr. LEACH. Fair enough. Well, Mr. Crawford, let me turn to you
briefly. One of the aspects of this whole thing is that when you
judge people running institutions that have Federal insurance,
there's a character aspect. Were you aware that Mr. Keating had
settled a civil case before the SEC at a prior time frame? p
Mr. CRAWFORD. Yes, in 1979.

Mr. LEACH. And in terms of that, as we look at this subordinated
debt that was sold, did you have the power to stop it if you wanted

Mr. CRAWFORD. Well, if-

Mr. LEACH. Did the Federal regulations-

Mr. CRAWFORD. If the corporation commissioner's were satisfied
that that presented a problem, but they were saying that they
didn't admit guilt and that they-they just signed it as--I don't
know what the settlement agreement said. I've never seen it.

Mr. LEACH. What I'm getting at, Mr. Davis testified earlier that
there were omissions in the prospectus, and so you guys must have
(a) thought there was something wrong. Did you report it to the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board? Did you report it to your State
authoritics?

Mr. DAVIS. We reported it to the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission.

Mr. LEACH. I see.

Mr. DAVIS. In fact, we sent an examiner back to the SEC Investi-
gation Division to reveal our findings and to assist them as we
could in getting to the bottom of it.

Mr. LEACH. What date was this? When was this?

Mr. DAVIS. This was probably May 1988.

Mr. LEACH. In this regard, I mean one of the things that we're
all so concerned about are the people that suddenly are left holding
the bag, with total losses. They are suggesting that there's govern-
mental accountability for improper regulation. How would you
defend yourself?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Well, I think that regulations should be tougher.
I think enforcement ought to be tougher, but the enforcement proc-
ess-well, I have five things. It should be firm, courteous, consist-
ent, systematic and progressively difficult. It's hard to see those
characteristics in the supervision of Lincoln Savings.

Mr. DAVIS. One of the things that we had a problem with is that
State law was not consistent with what the Federal law was. The
grounds that we had to take the appropriate conservatorship action
was for insolvency or threatened insolvency, or a violation of a
Commissioner's order. The reason that we supported so vigorously
the Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco's recommendation
was that that was going to be done on the basis of unsafe and un-
sound conditions and dissipation of assets. We were hopeful that
the Bank Board in Washington would have the courage to pursue
that. But it just didn't happen.

Mr. LEACH, Mr. Chairman, I have many further questions, but
time has expired, a vote is on, and I recognize the time has expired.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, the Chair intends to be liberal at this
point, but we do have another vote and I apologize again. I have
been assured that there was going to be not more debate before
this one. Hopefully this is the last vote on the conference disagree-
ment, points of disagreement.

I've just been informed that it will be at least the last vote until
1 hour or so from now. So we'll go take it and come back.
(Recess.]

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will please resume. Mr. Lehman,
I don't think you have had your opportunity on a second round
robin, so we'll recognize you.

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. Chairman, I've been informed that Mr. Kanjor[Laughter.) ski has a fundraiser to go to, and in light of its importance--

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you wish to yield to Mr. Kanjor
Mr. LEHMAN. Could I yield to him so he can get out of here?
Kanjorski.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, if you'll yield, I'll be glad to recognize Mr.

Mr. KANJORSKI. Could I have the witnesses give me the addresses
[Laughter.]
of all these individuals that we've been talking about todny?

Thank you very much Mr. Lehman and Mr. Chairman. First and
foremost, let me direct something that I've been thinking about
this afternoon. You had the question posed to you today whether or
not you felt that you had some sort of pressure put on you by the
administration or your regulatory agency.

Do you feel you've been harassed by anyone else or are there any
other pressures put upon you on the outside of the Government.
tion as a result of this?
either Mr. Black or Mr. Patriarca? Are you involved in any litiga

Mr. PATRIARCA. Not yet. Well, I'm subject to three lawsuits by
Mr. Gaubert of Independent American, by the folks who ran Lin-
coln Savings and by another wonderful failed institution in Califor
nia. So if I go in and try to buy a house and get a loan, I have this
small little disclosure item about contingent liabilities of a half bil-
lion dollars. [Laughter.]

Mr. KANJORSKI. In the matter of those lawsuits, are you being
sued in your official capacity or personally?

Mr. PATRIARCA. Oh no, no. They seek maximum leverage, so they
sue you in your individual capacity.

Mr. KANJORSKI. Don't you feel some inhibition as a result of
official functions?
having personal lawsuits against your own personal assets for your

Mr. PATRIARCA. I don't feel inhibited. I don't feel warm, rosy. 1
mean it's a problem in getting people into supervision ranks. You
shouldn't come in if you expect a nice life."

Mr. KANJORSKI. Well, what I wanted to ask you in the defense of
those lawsuits personally, are you being provided with legal coun-
sel by your agency or the Government, or do you have to bear that
cost yourselves?

Mr. PATRIARCA. No; the Government bears the cost. The problem
obviously that they-and it goes back to the question about was it
threat of lawsuits that affected people. The problem obviously, look
at the resources, the eight pages of law firms and that's a partial
list. They, Lincoln and its parent, have estimated that they spent
the last 4 years, OK?
between $40 and $70 million in accountant and attorney fees over

We get, to defend us in our individual capacity, whoever the
draw is as an assistant U.S. attorney overburdened in some place,
or someone from the Torts Division. In fact, the person-the Torts
Division attorney who has been representing me is wonderful. The
Government is incredibly lucky to have her. Lots of folks aren't
that lucky. It is a random draw. It can be quite intimidating to
know that somebody who will be spending literally $2 million suing

you and you on the other hand have one incredibly overburdened and in some cases not very competent GS-11 attorney.

Mr. KANJORSKI. I think you can sympathize now with some Members of Congress. We seem to have the same problem. Anyway, Mr. Black, I wanted to get to a particular area. In earlier testimony. I had understood that there were approximately $30 million in loans out to Government aides or aides of the Senate or the Congress. I'm not sure how that was structured.

Mr. BLACK. Now one of the-at least one of the two used to be an
aide to Senator DeConcin Neither of them-my understanding is
that currently neither of them are on the Government payroll.

Mr. KANJORSKI. OK. When that loan was made, were they on the
Government payroll?

Mr. BLACK, I am not sure but I believe not.

Mr. KANJORSKI. Was it made before they came on the Government payroll or after they left?

Mr. BLACK. I believe, but I'm not certain, that it was made
after-while they were serving in capacities as fundraisers and
campaign managers.

Mr. KANJORSKI. But they were still associated in some respects?
Mr. BLACK. Oh, they're very close associates.

Mr. KANJORSKI. OK. Did they have assets to support the loans
that were made and did those-are those loans current or did they
default on those loans?

Mr. BLACK. At least one of those major loans is subject, spelled
out in the RICO suit. We believe it's a sham sale to non-creditwor
thy folks, where the money was really being funded by Lincoln to
do the purported down payment.

Mr. KANJORSKI. Have you done a thorough study of--
Mr. BLACK. And we expect a loss.

Mr. KANJORSKI. Have you done a thorough study of the loans
made by these institutions to determine whether there's any cross
reference to any individuals in official capacity or regulatory ca-
pacity?

Mr. BLACK. Well, clearly personally I have not done so. We have
not been permitted-we were not permitted to examine the institu
tion, as you know. So the examinations were done by the Federal
exam team.

Mr. KANJORSKI. I would suspect that as you've indicated in your
testimony all afternoon, that there was this course of conduct to
see an auditor or someone in authority and immediately offer a
very high salaried job, somewhat beyond what one would expect for
that function, and they were apparently using positions to gain
favor with individuals.

If that were the case, it would seem to me much simpler for
them to use the loan process with people to gain favor, as being
more difficult to trace and much easier to control without too
much fear of it being reflected on many corporate books.

Mr. BLACK. Well certainly many institutions agree with your
judgment about the best way to provide the financial benefits.
Loans are frequently made on what's called the nonrecourse-that
means that the individual doesn't have to pay them back-basis,
and it is a way of transferring wealth to people, to pay off individ
uals.

Mr. KANJORSKI. Is it possible for the San Francisco Examiner's office to look into this question of loans by Lincoln, either to anyone in any official capacity?

Mr. BLACK. Yes, and now we restored to examination authority.
We are already looking into some things like that.

Mr. KANJORSKI. Could the committee be made aware if you dis
cover anyone on any of the staffs of either the House or Senate or
the regulatory agencies, or officials therein, and have that informa-
tion forwarded to the committee?

Mr. PATRIARCA. My initial impression, Mr. Kanjorski, is that the
question needs to be put to the agency head.

Mr. KANJORSKI. That can't be requested of you? We'd have to go to Mr. Wall? That could be a very difficult, persuasive task it seems to me.

Mr. PATRIARCA. Quite frankly, the information is that of the
agency's, since it's being derived in the-for use of the examination
authority, and we don't have the authority to release it.

Mr. KANJORSKI. OK. Have we subpoenaed all the documents of
Lincoln, and I'm just wondering whether in that, we could make
that type of a request and then whether it's responded to. The
other question that I had, you talked about funds flowing to the
various interest groups both in and out of Government.

Have you run across funds that were directly contributed by Lin-
coln or some other of their corporations in that link that founda
tions or what we call "soft money" to interested governmental offi.
cials?
Mr. BLACK. Yes.

Mr. KANJORSKI. And could you tell us roughly some of the names
of those officials and what was the nature of the institutional foun-
dation that was given them?

Mr. BLACK. Roughly $800,000 in contributions to two allegedly
nonpartisan voter registration efforts that people believed to be es
sentially Democratic Party registration efforts in California. That's
the one that Senator Cranston's son has the association with.
There was soft money to Florida, I think the Republican Party if
memory serves, and-

Mr. KANJORSKI. What amount was that?

Mr. BLACK. Hazy. I think it was in the $100,000-type range, and
there was another packet of soft money like that. I think there was
$200,000 in soft money that Senator Glenn had some connection
with.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was that? I didn't hear.
Mr. KANJORSKI. Senator Glenn.

The CHAIRMAN. What about the one in California? Who was that
run by?

Mr. BLACK. I don't remember. I believe that there was another
$100,000 to one of the-and I don't even remember which of the
two parties it was to in soft money.

Mr. KANJORSKI. Was there any money contributed to foundations
or institutions that public officials were interested in?

Mr. BLACK. Well, they used a number of groups that were useful
to them. I think we've already mentioned the Association of Thrift
Holding Companies. It essentially seemed to take its direction from
Lincoln Savings. The National Council of Savings Institutions

during the time period when Mr. Rousselot ran it, was largely a
spokesperson for Lincoln on direct investment-type matters.

It ran the full-page ads that had Dr. Benston's and Greenspan's
studies and said in really pretty vitriolic terms what a stupid rule
the direct investment was, and they were all signed National Coun.
cil of Savings Institution, John Rousselot. The trade press later re-
vealed that they were entirely composed by and paid for by Lincoln
Savings.

Mr. KANJORSKI. Was any money directed to any universities or
foundations?

Mr. BLACK. Yes. Well, there was the Garn Institute. It received

funding from them.

Mr. CRAWFORD. I don't think we got the complete information.m
Mr. BLACK. Yes. We think it's somewhere in that dollar amount,
and then there was the-what was then called the National Asso-
ciation of State Savings and Loan Supervisors?

Mr. CRAWFORD. It's called ACSSS now-American Council of
State Savings Supervisors.

Mr. BLACK. Now ACSSS; then NASSLS, which will-

Mr. CRAWFORD. I don't know how much they gave to them.
Mr. BLACK. But they provided the parties and things like that.
Mr. CRAWFORD. Right. Oh yes. They would provide the evening
entertainment and refreshments.

Mr. KANJORSKI. I see my time has expired, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BLACK. What NASLS did was it was going to file an amicus
curiae brief, a friend of the court brief, in support of Lincoln's law-
suit trying to strike down the direct investment rule. It looked like
it was going to have one negative vote at the NASLS level.

Mr. CRAWFORD. I was on the Board of Directors. I was the nega-
tive vote, and about 6 weeks later we get a phone call and there's
six of these supervisors on the phone that are on the Board of Di-
rectors and they want to change their vote. It seems Charlie made
a speech at some club in Phoenix, and he said there wasn't a regu-
lator in the country that knew what they were doing. So they
didn't like that, so they switched. So we really didn't file it, but I
think it was being prepared.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Crawford, could I ask you if in the course of
your examination of Lincoln and Keating's activities, did you ever
find any documentation showing his contribution to the Garn Insti-
tute?

Mr. CRAWFORD, I have never gotten into that, no. You see, he
had 54 corporations. He could make it at any level and I doubt that
he would have made in the savings and loan association. I've never
seen anything like that.

Mr. BLACK. I don't think we've seen the records. Remember, if
you give the individuals high salaries, and the individuals make
the donations, it never shows up on the corporation's books. Re-
member also that the holding company is something that even to
this day, despite a court order allowing us to examine the institu-

tion, we have not been permitted to examine. That was since the
April 14 conservatorship. So we don't know what's up there. jou
The CHAIRMAN. That's through court order? foco d
Mr. BLACK. We had to go to court because they absolutely re-
fused to allow us to examine the institution. By the way, this was-
Chairman Seidman explained to you some of the negative conse
quences of the bankruptcy filing. This is another major negative
consequence of letting them file for bankruptcy before you take
action, because they then argue that something called the automat-
ic stay of the bankruptcy laws prohibited us from examining them,
and it took a court decision to get a favorable ruling to the con-
trary.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. So the bankruptcy law is really being ap
pealed to, even in the bank's case in Texas, where we have a very
serious situation, legally speaking.

Mr. LEHMAN. Thank you, Mr. Kanjorski. Thank you, Mr. Chair

Mr. LEHMAN. At the hearing in San Francisco, Mr. Kanjorski got
into questioning of Mr. Cirona, and that's when I initially heard.
about the issue of this file that they had, and I went back and read
Mr. Cirona's testimony and he says that Martin approached him,
or told him about the existence of this file in Lincoln's hands that
had been made available to him. I guess they told him about it, I
guess, and when Mr. Martin testifies we'll learn a good deal more
about this.

He asked him to share it with me, Mr. Cirona says. He did not
share it with him. I read your testimony earlier. You had a sepa
rate incident with Mr. Martin regarding this file than Mr. Cirona?
Mr. BLACK. Not with Mr. Martin. We had--

Mr. BLACK. [continuing] Three conversations at least involving it.
The first one with Dochow, then a meeting in Board member
White's office, at which Dochow agreed to give us the file under
prompting from Board member White. Then at least one phone call
by me and I think--

Mr. LEIMAN. Prompting by Board member White or Board
member Martin? OX

Mr. BLACK. We were in Board member White's office when we
said and we hear there is-Darrell has just told us there is the
secret file, and he has said when we ask for it, since he said it's a
criticism of us, he said he wasn't sure whether he could give it to
us. We think, and so forth, that we ought to and Board member
White indicated to Darrell Dochow that obviously the file had to be
given to us and Darrell Dochow at that point agreed to give it to
us, at that meeting that just happened to be taking place in Board
member White's office.

Mr. LEHMAN. So what happens here is that Lincoln develops a
file on its examiners. Let's just assume they did that, and then-
with information of whatever character-and then goes to their
friends at the Bank Board and says we have this damaging file on
these regulators. Then these-your supervisors on the Board go to
you and say we've seen a damaging file that Lincoln has on you, in
the context of these discussions over what to do with Lincoln?