ROLL CALL 9/17/90 Guest Observer By Former Sen. William Proxmire Take the Pledge: I recently suggested to a group of Members of Congress that they refuse campaign contributions that come from the special interests over which their committees have jurisdiction. Now keep in mind that because of their committee membership, these legislators have unique power to push legislation through Congress that will bring, for example, millions of dollars of benefits to banks, savings and loins, real estate firms, and housing developers. These legislators are not evil. They are not crooks. They are among the most ethical and honorable people in public life. They are, like the great majority of Members of Congress, people I would trust to protect my family or my worldly goods. So what was their reaction? You would think I had just insulted their mothers. It was "What do you take us for?" and "Do you think I would sel out my office for a lousy $1,000 contribution or even to some guy who could deliver $100,000 by raising money from his industry?" The legislators said I was playing to the wild public prejudice that all Members of Congress are on the take. Was I serious? I am convinced that good moral people are sincerely, honestly hypnotized by n system of thinly concealed bribery. I am also convinced they are sincerely, honestly hypnotized by a system of thinly concealed bribery the not only buys their "Attention but frequently buys their vote. . The special interests that make these contributions know exactly what they are doing. They know just what changes they wam w uidke, for cample, free shem from restrictions designed to keep ir sured bank deposits from being used for risky investment. A little change can make it possible for them to make or lone millions while the Laxpayers make nothing but can kane bilTions The S&L and bank lobbyists know that. Here is precisely why they raise millions of dollars for campaign contributions. Any Senators or House Members who believe they are getting this big money because the lobbyist admires their character or personality are kidding themselves. These contributions to members of comminges with jurisdiction over the Contributor's industry are bribes, pure and simp Keep in mind I did not ask Members of Congress to give up all campaign contributions. They could still accept contributions from persons who did not work in industries over which the Members' committee assignment had given them special power. Why can't intelligent, moral Members of Congress understand how wrong it is to accept many contributions? Imagine that you're watching a World Series baseball game. The pitcher walks over to the umpire before the game begins. The pitcher pulls a wad of $100 bills out of his pocket and counts out 100 of them, $10,000, and hands the whole fat wad to the plate umpire. The ampire jams the bills imo his pocket, warmly thanks the pitcher and settles down to call that same pitcher's bulis and strikes. What would be the reaction of the other team? Of the fans? The media? All would be furious. The game had obviously been fixed. Far fetched? Not a bit. How does this differ from what the lobbyists for banks, realtors, S&Ls, and security dealers do when they contribute mega dollars to the Members of Congress who have prime power to call the balls and strikes in their industry? Yes, the game is fixed. Here is why you as a consumer or taxpayer don't have a chance. What can we do about it? Plenty. I am convinced that if enough voters became aware of this system and let their Senators and Representatives know they wouldn't stand for it, we could stop it. But isn't Congressional campaign reform proceeding? Sure it is. Honoraria have already been banned for House Members and in two or three years will be on the way out in the Seriate. Political action committees (PACs) may also be diminished. But as long as Members of Congress feel free to accept contributions from those who have a direct, material interest in the committee on which those Members serve, special interests will continue to bribe their way to public rip-offs. I am convinced that you and I as voters tant this (ampaign'sy simply challenging our own Senators and Representatives to take the pledge: "I will accept no contributions from an individual or group with a material interest in the legislation that comes before the committees of Congress on which I serve." Let's get started. Former Sen. William Promiro (D-Wis) served as chairman of the Senate Banking Committee from 1975 to 1980, and from 1987 to 1988. Copyright 1990, United For ture Syndicate, Inc. Gray Exhibit 2 UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ETHICS In the Matter of the AFFIDAVIT OF EDWIN J. GRAY I, Edwin J. Gray, being duly sworn, hereby depose and say: 1. I have testified previously in this matter by deposition and during the public hearings on November 26 through 29, 1990. Since I was excused as a witness, I have tried to keep informed about the proceedings by watching them on videotapes recorded from C-Span. I know the Committee has a large body of evidence, and I regret adding further to it. But I strongly believe the record of these proceedings should not be closed with any possibility of confusion on the points discussed below, and therefore I respectfully request that this affidavit be made a part of that record. 2. On January 14, 1991, I sent the Committee's Chairman and Vice Chairman a letter to clear up any misimpressions that might have been created by Senator Riegle's testimony concerning my contacts with him after April 9, 1987. (The point of the letter was to make clear that I had no knowledge of Senator Riegle's relationship with Charles Keating or his companies until the last week in February, 1988 when so informed by a reporter.) 38-020 - 91 - 37 3. I wish to further supplement the record before the Committee after having reviewed Senator DeConcini's recent testimony. Although I strongly disagree with the accuracy of a great deal of Senator DeConcini's testimony, I limit myself to three specific statements he made to the Committee. 4. First, and most important, Senator DeConcini testi fied that he now recalls speaking with me by telephone before the April 2, 1987 meeting. According to Senator DeConcini, he telephoned me at the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, spoke with me personally, and offered to come (apparently, though this is not clear, with three other senators) to the Bank Board to speak with me. Under this reconstruction of events, I am supposed to have graciously counterproposed that I travel to the Hill to meet with the senators. Also, according to Senator DeConcini, no one told me not to bring aides. 5. No such conversation ever occurred. I not only do not recall Senator DeConcini's telephoning me and speaking with me personally before the April 2 meeting, I am positive I would have recalled any conversation similar to the one he describes. Moreover, his account is utterly inconsistent with my state of mind before, during, and after the April 2 meeting. It also clashes with my clear recollection, and that of my staff, that I was instructed not to bring aides. Indeed, it is completely at odds with my contemporaneous reporting of the meeting, and the circumstances surrounding it, to my staff at the Bank Board both before and after the meeting. 6. Second, Senator DeConcini has stated he is angry that I supposedly concealed at the April 2 meeting that there was going to be a criminal referral with respect to Lincoln Savings. He stated that I knew the Bank Board was pursuing possible criminal referrals regarding Lincoln Savings in December, 1986. The truth is I did not know then, or even on April 2, 1987, that a criminal referral was either being pursued or that there would even be a criminal referral. And, as I recall the testimony of Mr. Black and Mr. Patriarca, they did not even decide to make such a referral until April 9. 7. Third, Senator DeConcini suggested in his testimony that I had no reason to feel pressured from the senators on April 2 since the Senate had already passed a FSLIC recapitalization bill by the date of the meeting. This suggestion completely ignores the reality of my efforts throughout this period with respect to FSLIC recapitalization. To be sure, the Senate (but not the House) had passed a 7.5 billion dollar measure before the April 2 meeting, but it was my emphatic public position (and the Bank Board's) that this amount was grossly inadequate, and we were lobbying vigorously to increase it to the 15 billion dollars we had requested. (Our continued lobbying did ultimately produce a I very much needed the senators' support, and I certainly believed I could not afford to alienate them, under these circumstances. 8. Senator DeConcini denied that I and my regulatory colleagues were pressured at the April 2 and 9 meetings. This contrasts sharply with Senator DeConcini's views of a year earlier when, at a press conference he called in Phoenix on January 5, 1990, he freely admitted that we, the regulators, were "pressured" in the April 2 and 9 meetings. (I submitted the full text of that press conference to the Committee last February). |