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I am writing concerning my testimony before the Senate Ethics Committee on December 10, 1990. I have reviewed the videotape and feel a need to emphasize a few points to clarify the record.

During cross examination, I indicated that I had wished that I had written my letter dated October 26, 1990 differently. This has been misinterpreted in many press accounts, and I want to make sure the Committee under stands what I meant. What I was trying to say is that I wished that I had left my opinion out of the letter and restricted it to the facts and the analysis. It is the responsibility of the Committee to draw conclusions from the facts, not mine. Like any citizen, I have my own opinion, but I am not an investigator, a prosecutor, or an adjudicator.

The central facts stated in the letter which formed the basis for my conclusions have not been contradicted. These facts are summarized on the computer schedule labeled as Exhibit 597. Briefly stated, here are the applicable facts reflected on the exhibit and supporting documentation:

1. Mr McCain and his family took several flights on ACC corporate aircraft and chartered aircraft.

2. Prompt reimbursement was made for only one of the flights (August of 1986). The reimbursement check indicates payment for J. McCain. Mr. McCain's internal documentation indicates that the check "covers John's flight on the American Continental corporate plane" (see page 25 of the transcript of Chris Koch's testimony on November 20, 1990). Although family members were on that flight, there is no indication of any contemporaneous reimbursement for them.

3. Somewhat delayed reimbursement was made in February of 1986 with respect to two 1985 flights. Again, the checks indicate payment only "for John." Although Mrs. McCain wrote the checks and accompanied Mr. McCain on the flights (along with a babysitter), there is no indication of an effort at

4. No reimbursement was made for any of the other flights until after ACC filed for Chapter 11 and Lincoln was taken into conservatorship. This happened about three months after I first contacted someone who I considered to be an authorized representative of the Senator.

As for my original conversation with Mr. Smith, I wish that I could remember it verbatim. I do recall that I was frustrated because it appeared to me that I was not going to get any help from him on flights taken by family members. I did not understand exactly what his position was, but I expected him to make the appropriate contact with the Senator. By the time he responded in March, it was too late to change the outcome of the IRS audit. I noticed that a copy of the March 7, 1989 letter was sent to McCain's office. Since it was too late for my purposes and since my original goal was not necessarily to obtain reimbursement but to settle an IRS audit, I decided to let the matter drop unless they got back with me.

I am

By the way, the March 7, 1989 letter by Mr. Smith says "If there were other trips made by Senator McCain that not aware of..., I can assure you that our intention would be to arrange appropriate reimbursement. To me, that statement does not show an evidence of intent to reimburse for family members.

Once again, I have nothing to gain personally by making sure that you understand these facts. Nobody put me up to this. I was merely fulfilling a duty I thought I had as a citizen to share information aware of.

that I thought you should be

cc. Senator Warren Rudman

Mr. Robert Bennett

Sincerely,

Dand Mean

David E. Stevens

1091

1002

ANALYSIS BY WILLIAN K. BLACK OF THE

AGREEMENT AND MEMORANDUN OF UNDERSTANDING (HOU)
BETWEEN LINCOLN SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION ("LINCOLN")
AND THE FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK BOARD (BANK BOARD"}

Entering into a NOU was contrary to Bank Board policy set by its office of Enforcement ("OE"). MOU's are not even listed as either a formal or informal enforcement remedy under current enforcement policy. Appendix A. All the factors that indicate the appropriate severity of an enforcement remedy pursuant to that policy were present in the case of Lincoln. 14.

The Agreement and MOU Limited the Bank Board's Powers

First, the Agreement" apparently authorized what
otherwise would have been additional violations of the
direct investment rule by a thrift already over $600 million
in excess of the rule's limits. Appendix C, paragraph (b).
This provision allowed Lincoln to increase its direct
investments without limit on the massive inventory of raw
land it held. It could have spent billions of dollars on
such developments. The Agreement also gave Lincoln a
uniquely favorable grandfathering provision by allowing it

The NOU between Lincoln and the Bank Board is Appento this analysis. The Agreement between these parties on the same date as the NOU is Appendix C.

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to sell a project and purchase a "replacement" direct investment. (Lincoln achieved this result through subtle legal draftsmanship of paragraph 8(a) of the Agreement. The key clause is: "the dollar amount.") Every other thrift could only grandfather specific projects. If those projects were sold, the thrift could no longer claim grandfathering treatment for the dollar amount of the project sold. The Agreement also gave Lincoln the opportunity to seek a waiver of the rule so that it would not have to dispose of its more than $600 million in unlawful direct investments and could in fact increase its direct investments to over $2 billion dollars. Appendix C, paragraph 10. Another clause apparently barred the Bank Board from requiring Lincoln to increase its net worth due to the excessive risk of its direct investments. Id., paragraph 8(a).

The NOU gave up the Bank Board's authority to use any of the findings of the San Francisco district's 1906 examination to take "any administrative or enforcement" action against Lincoln, ACC, and all of their officers, directors, employees and agents (e.g., outside accountants). Appendix B, paragraph 2, and the final "Whereas" clause of the NOU. This grant of immunity was unprecedented. continues to prejudice OTS', and perhaps FDIC's efforts, to enforce the law. Compounding the problem is the fact that the NOU is so poorly drafted (from OTS' perspective, not

It

SPECIAL COUNSEL

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Lincoln's) that it covers not simply whatever is contained
in the 1996 examination report but also "transactions,
procedures or events covered by the 1986 Examination and the
negotiations concerning it between Lincoln and ORPOS leading
to the (HOU)." What is the extent of the immunity granted
to Lincoln through this language? Doubtless, Lincoln will
claim that almost everything we could ever take enforcement
action on relat (ed)" to something "covered by
the
negotiations."

Worse still, Lincoln claims that the Bank Board
gave up not only all the problems found by the San Francisco
district, but also gave up the ability for the Bank Board to
review independently the issue and determine, for example,
that there was a major loss to Lincoln on the Phoenician
Hotel. Lincoln cites two provisions of the NOU to support
its contention. Paragraph 1 of the NOU provides:

The new examination will not rehash the findings
in or transactions, procedures or events covered
by, the 1996 Examination and the negotiations
concerning it between Lincoln and ORPOS leading to
thie (HOU), but rather will focus on the current
situation at Lincoln and changes since the 1986
Examination. (mphasis added.)

Again, the language is sloppy at best. What did
the Bank Board commit to do when it agreed not to "rehash"
these vaguely described matters?

In addition to the rehash" language, however,
Lincoln also argues that the language of paragraphs 1, 2 and
3 of the MOU and the second "Whereas clause of the Agree-
ment bar any enforcement or administrative action based not
only on the 1986 examination findings, but also the underly-
ing "transactions, procedures or events." Thus, because the
Pontchartrain Hotel was a "transaction" covered by the 1986
examination, Lincoln argues that the Bank Board agreed that
it would not examine the transaction, and could not take any
action relating to that project even if it were to examine
the Pontchartrain Hotel in 1988 and 1989.

Another problem with the immunity granted is that
the phrase "administrative or enforcement proceedings" is
undefined. Appendix B, paragraph 2. Lincoln will certainly
claim a broad reading encompassing conservatorships and
receiverships.

The Bank Board's future ability to take prompt and
effective enforcement actions against unsafe practices was
also impaired by a clause that may have sounded innocuous to

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the Bank Board's negotiators (Ns. Stewart and Mr. Dochow).
Paragraph 5 of the NOU states:

The parties will make every effort in good faith
to promptly resolve any issues raised in the next
examination and will work together to discuss such
issues at the earliest possible time and develop
procedures to resolve them reasonably and expedi-
tiously.

Naturally, as the new examiners found probleme
Lincoln claimed this clause mandated "good faith" efforts by
the Bank Board to "resolve" such issues through (endless and
unproductive) "discuss[ions)" with Lincoln and its army of
accountants, attorneys and appraisers. Because the "proce-
dures for such "good faith" efforts were not specified,
they would have to be "develop[ed]." They never were
developed. Lincoln contends that this clause bars the Bank
Board from taking any action, including appointing a conser-
vator or receiver, until such procedures" are followed.

Each of the provisions described limiting the Bank
Board's powers was unprecedented. Collectively, the provi-
sions provide the heart of Lincoln's cases against the Bank
Board (now OTS) challenging its conservatorship and
receivership actions, and the provisions were cited by the

Bank Board's attorneys (08 and Office of General Counsel) as
the primary factors preventing or delaying enforcement
action or appointment of a conservator for Lincoln.

The NOU also placed an unprecedented limit on the
1900 examination of Lincoln that reduced the effectiveness
of the exam. Paragraph 1 of the NOU provided that "This
examination will be performed by an examination team with no
examiners from FHLBank--8.5.* Never before, or thankfully,
since, has a financial regulator given a regulates such veto
authority over its examiners. This clause removed the
examiners most knowledgeable about Lincoln from the new exam
and required ORPOS to direct an examination from 3,000 miles
away. The Bank Board had twelve districts under its juris-
diction. ORPOS now gave birth to the 13th district. At
Mr. Dochov's direction, this problem was made worse by
ordering the examiners who went into Lincoln not to have any
communications with this district concerning Lincoln.
They
were not even permitted to ask us factual questions. The
NOU, in paragraph 1, also contained an unprecedented
restriction on the length of the new examination. Inevita-
bly, the 1980 exam suffered from these restrictions.

The final restriction on the Bank Board is in the accompanying side letter from Ma. Stewart to Lincoln. Appendix D. This, too, was unprecedented in informing

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