The American Economic Review, Volume 97American Economic Association., 2007 Includes annual List of doctoral dissertations in political economy in progress in American universities and colleges; and the Hand book of the American Economic Association. |
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... seller who cannot commit to close a sale may also benefit from making it more costly for herself to add another round to negotiations . In this paper , we consider such a seller . If buyers anticipate that the seller may solicit another ...
... seller who cannot commit to close a sale may also benefit from making it more costly for herself to add another round to negotiations . In this paper , we consider such a seller . If buyers anticipate that the seller may solicit another ...
Página 262
... seller does . This allows the seller to commit to a nego- tiation protocol in which buyers will compete more aggressively with each other . Our work complements the existing literature on auction theory and mechanism design . Relative ...
... seller does . This allows the seller to commit to a nego- tiation protocol in which buyers will compete more aggressively with each other . Our work complements the existing literature on auction theory and mechanism design . Relative ...
Página 263
... seller has discretion regarding which offers to reveal , she chooses to reveal them all . 12 See the Appendix for details on the tie - breaking rule . 13 Of course , the seller could sell the object without delay if she could commit to ...
... seller has discretion regarding which offers to reveal , she chooses to reveal them all . 12 See the Appendix for details on the tie - breaking rule . 13 Of course , the seller could sell the object without delay if she could commit to ...
Índice
IRPS | 5 |
GEORGE A AKERLOF | 31 |
GIUSEPPE MOSCARINI | 37 |
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advertiser African American agents aggregate analysis asset assumption auction AUSTRALIAN OPEN average behavior benefits Besley bureaucrat buyer capital CB's central bank cities climate change conditional cash transfers constraint consumption growth cost crime currency decision denote distribution dynamics Econometrica employment share English auction envy-free equation equilibrium estimates example expected factor Figure fixed effects fraction function growth rate higher impact implies income increase individual industries inflation interest rate investment investors Journal liquidity trap litigation loss aversion lottery ment monetary nomic norms observed offer optimal output panel paper parameters payoff percent period portfolios predicted preferences probability of arrest productivity Qmax rational expectations regression revenues Ricardian equivalence risk sample Second Industrial Revolution Section sector seller shocks specification statistical Table technologies theory tion utility v₁ variables voting wage zero Zipf's law