The American Economic Review, Volume 97American Economic Association., 2007 Includes annual List of doctoral dissertations in political economy in progress in American universities and colleges; and the Hand book of the American Economic Association. |
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... higher , the desired real price of the representative firm is higher for two reasons : on the demand side , be- cause the demand for its product is higher , and , on the cost side , because the bargained real wage is higher . That ...
... higher , the desired real price of the representative firm is higher for two reasons : on the demand side , be- cause the demand for its product is higher , and , on the cost side , because the bargained real wage is higher . That ...
Página 512
... higher AJ , i.e. , a higher pledgeability of the most produc- tive projects . What about a higher pledgeability of the other projects ? To answer this question , let us go back to the case where J 2. In particular , look at the case ...
... higher AJ , i.e. , a higher pledgeability of the most produc- tive projects . What about a higher pledgeability of the other projects ? To answer this question , let us go back to the case where J 2. In particular , look at the case ...
Página 95
... higher stable equilibria , as illustrated in Figure 1 . III . Comparative Statics Given that $ ( x ) = Σ¿P ( d ) H ° ( v ( d , x ) ) , and Proposition 1 , we can deduce much about changes in the structure of equilibria by consid- ering ...
... higher stable equilibria , as illustrated in Figure 1 . III . Comparative Statics Given that $ ( x ) = Σ¿P ( d ) H ° ( v ( d , x ) ) , and Proposition 1 , we can deduce much about changes in the structure of equilibria by consid- ering ...
Índice
IRPS | 5 |
GEORGE A AKERLOF | 31 |
GIUSEPPE MOSCARINI | 37 |
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advertiser African American agents aggregate analysis asset assumption auction AUSTRALIAN OPEN average behavior benefits Besley bureaucrat buyer capital CB's central bank cities climate change conditional cash transfers constraint consumption growth cost crime currency decision denote distribution dynamics Econometrica employment share English auction envy-free equation equilibrium estimates example expected factor Figure fixed effects fraction function growth rate higher impact implies income increase individual industries inflation interest rate investment investors Journal liquidity trap litigation loss aversion lottery ment monetary nomic norms observed offer optimal output panel paper parameters payoff percent period portfolios predicted preferences probability of arrest productivity Qmax rational expectations regression revenues Ricardian equivalence risk sample Second Industrial Revolution Section sector seller shocks specification statistical Table technologies theory tion utility v₁ variables voting wage zero Zipf's law