The American Economic Review, Volume 97American Economic Association., 2007 Includes annual List of doctoral dissertations in political economy in progress in American universities and colleges; and the Hand book of the American Economic Association. |
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... envy - free . " We then proceed to show that the set of locally envy - free equilibria contains an equi- librium in which the payoffs of the players are the same as in the dominant - strategy equilib- rium of the VCG auction , even ...
... envy - free . " We then proceed to show that the set of locally envy - free equilibria contains an equi- librium in which the payoffs of the players are the same as in the dominant - strategy equilib- rium of the VCG auction , even ...
Página 250
... envy - free equi- librium of the simultaneous - move game П in- duced by GSP . Consequently , we view a locally envy - free equilibrium I as a prediction regard- ing a rest point at which the vector of bids stabilizes . In this section ...
... envy - free equi- librium of the simultaneous - move game П in- duced by GSP . Consequently , we view a locally envy - free equilibrium I as a prediction regard- ing a rest point at which the vector of bids stabilizes . In this section ...
Página 254
... envy- free equilibrium , the resulting matching must be assortative , i.e. , for any i , the advertiser as- signed to position i has a higher per - click val- uation than the advertiser assigned to position i + 1 and , therefore , the ...
... envy- free equilibrium , the resulting matching must be assortative , i.e. , for any i , the advertiser as- signed to position i has a higher per - click val- uation than the advertiser assigned to position i + 1 and , therefore , the ...
Índice
IRPS | 5 |
GEORGE A AKERLOF | 31 |
GIUSEPPE MOSCARINI | 37 |
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advertiser African American agents aggregate analysis asset assumption auction AUSTRALIAN OPEN average behavior benefits Besley bureaucrat buyer capital CB's central bank cities climate change conditional cash transfers constraint consumption growth cost crime currency decision denote distribution dynamics Econometrica employment share English auction envy-free equation equilibrium estimates example expected factor Figure fixed effects fraction function growth rate higher impact implies income increase individual industries inflation interest rate investment investors Journal liquidity trap litigation loss aversion lottery ment monetary nomic norms observed offer optimal output panel paper parameters payoff percent period portfolios predicted preferences probability of arrest productivity Qmax rational expectations regression revenues Ricardian equivalence risk sample Second Industrial Revolution Section sector seller shocks specification statistical Table technologies theory tion utility v₁ variables voting wage zero Zipf's law