The American Economic Review, Volume 97American Economic Association., 2007 Includes annual List of doctoral dissertations in political economy in progress in American universities and colleges; and the Hand book of the American Economic Association. |
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Página 187
... agent's signal.12 Hence , p ( 0 ) = p * . As a result , the ability of clients to complain can lead to biased oversight . If this bias is sufficiently strong , the principal will respond by hiring agents who are hostile to their ...
... agent's signal.12 Hence , p ( 0 ) = p * . As a result , the ability of clients to complain can lead to biased oversight . If this bias is sufficiently strong , the principal will respond by hiring agents who are hostile to their ...
Página 195
... agent can trade it only when she finds a counterparty . Every agent finds a potential counterparty , selected randomly from the set of all agents , with intensity A , where > 0 is an exogenous parameter characterizing the mar- ket ...
... agent can trade it only when she finds a counterparty . Every agent finds a potential counterparty , selected randomly from the set of all agents , with intensity A , where > 0 is an exogenous parameter characterizing the mar- ket ...
Página 205
... agents meeting , at mean rate A , agents of type xy , converting the type y agent to one of type x . ( One could easily make the mistake of multiplying the second term by two to reflect that both agents in the pairing become type x ...
... agents meeting , at mean rate A , agents of type xy , converting the type y agent to one of type x . ( One could easily make the mistake of multiplying the second term by two to reflect that both agents in the pairing become type x ...
Índice
IRPS | 5 |
GEORGE A AKERLOF | 31 |
GIUSEPPE MOSCARINI | 37 |
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advertiser African American agents aggregate analysis asset assumption auction AUSTRALIAN OPEN average behavior benefits Besley bureaucrat buyer capital CB's central bank cities climate change conditional cash transfers constraint consumption growth cost crime currency decision denote distribution dynamics Econometrica employment share English auction envy-free equation equilibrium estimates example expected factor Figure fixed effects fraction function growth rate higher impact implies income increase individual industries inflation interest rate investment investors Journal liquidity trap litigation loss aversion lottery ment monetary nomic norms observed offer optimal output panel paper parameters payoff percent period portfolios predicted preferences probability of arrest productivity Qmax rational expectations regression revenues Ricardian equivalence risk sample Second Industrial Revolution Section sector seller shocks specification statistical Table technologies theory tion utility v₁ variables voting wage zero Zipf's law