 | John Mason Good - 1813 - 830 páginas
...one whereof appears better than the other, he cannot choose the worst. 2. Man is a neceslary agent, because all his actions have a beginning; for whatever has a beginning must nave a cause, and every cause is a necessary cause : and if any action whatsoever can be done without... | |
 | John Mason Good - 1819 - 788 páginas
...one whereof appears hetter than the other, he cannot choose llie worst. 2. Man is a neceslary agent, because all his actions have a beginning; for whatever has a beginning mii«t nave a cause, and every cause is a necessary cause : and if any action whatsoever can be done... | |
 | Dugald Stewart - 1829 - 510 páginas
...(Art. Spinoza.) Note (I i.) page 281. In proof of the impossibility of Liberty, Collins argues thus: " A second reason to prove man a necessary agent is,...cause ; and every cause is a necessary cause. " If any thing can have a beginning, which has no cause, then nothing can produce something. And if nothing... | |
 | Dugald Stewart - 1829 - 518 páginas
...(Art. Spinoza.) Note (I i.) page 281. In proof of the impossibility of Liberty, Collins argues thus : " A second reason to prove man a necessary agent is,...cause ; and every cause is a necessary cause. " If any thing can have a beginning, which has no cause, then nothing can produce something. And if nothing... | |
 | Dugald Stewart - 1829 - 518 páginas
...(Art. Spinosa.) Note (li.) page 281. In proof of the impossibility of Liberty, Collins argues thus : " A second reason to prove man a necessary agent is,...has a beginning must have a cause ; and every cause u a necessary cause. " If any thing can have a beginning, which hat no caute, 1ben nothing can produce... | |
 | 1846 - 512 páginas
...that Liberty is, in itself, an absolute impossibility. "All actions," he says, "have a beginning." "Whatever has a beginning must have a cause; and every cause is a necessary cause." "If any thing can have a beginning which has no cause, then nothing can produce something. And if nothing... | |
 | Robert Blakey - 1848 - 584 páginas
...itself. As a specimen of Collins's reasoning on the human will, we shall quote the following passages. "A second reason to prove man a necessary agent is,...might have had a beginning without a cause ; which is an absurdity not only charged on atheists, but is a real absurdity in itself. * * * Liberty, therefore,... | |
 | John Harris - 1849 - 526 páginas
...First Cause. Collins pretended a concern for the argument when he wrote, " Man is a necessary agent, because all his actions have a beginning. For whatever...necessary cause. If anything can have a beginning, which lias no cause, then nothing can produce something!"* "As to ah1 things that begin to be," says Edwards,... | |
 | Dugald Stewart - 1854 - 660 páginas
...Art. Spinoza. NOTE MM, p. 307. In proof of the impossibility of Liberty, Collins argues thus : — " A second reason to prove man a necessary agent is,...might have had a beginning without a cause ; which is an absurdity not only charged on atheists, but is a real absurdity in itself. . . . Liberty, therefore,... | |
 | Henry Philip Tappan - 1857 - 650 páginas
...like Edwards, from the nature of causality, in general. " Man is a necessary agent, because all hia actions have a beginning. For whatever has a beginning...have a cause ; and every cause is a necessary cause." — P. 52. See also pp. 16, 17. Like Edwards, too, he reasons from the divine prescience, as Hobbes... | |
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A second reason to prove man a necessary agent is, because all his actions have a beginning: for, whatever has a beginning must have a cause; and every cause is a necessary cause. 
