The American Economic Review, Volume 86American Economic Association., 1996 Includes papers and proceedings of the annual meeting of the American Economic Association. Covers all areas of economic research. |
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Página 413
... strategy . This is the swing voter's curse . It is often thought that strategic voting requires complicated mental gymnastics . The follow- ing proposition provides advice that is easy for the uninformed indifferent voter to swallow ...
... strategy . This is the swing voter's curse . It is often thought that strategic voting requires complicated mental gymnastics . The follow- ing proposition provides advice that is easy for the uninformed indifferent voter to swallow ...
Página 414
... strategy equilibria or mixed strategy equilibria in which UIAS mix between ab- stention and voting for a single candidate . V. Voting and Participation in Large Elections N = 0 . In the previous section we demonstrated the existence of ...
... strategy equilibria or mixed strategy equilibria in which UIAS mix between ab- stention and voting for a single candidate . V. Voting and Participation in Large Elections N = 0 . In the previous section we demonstrated the existence of ...
Página 459
... strategy does not destroy the signal- averaging strategy , to which there are several possible answers . The most likely one is that the signal - jamming option ( i ) is not transpar- ent and ( ii ) given the noise in applying the ...
... strategy does not destroy the signal- averaging strategy , to which there are several possible answers . The most likely one is that the signal - jamming option ( i ) is not transpar- ent and ( ii ) given the noise in applying the ...
Índice
Income Risk Borrowing Constraints and Portfolio Choice | 158 |
PAUL MILGROM AND JOHN ROBERTS | 173 |
JEREMY BULOW AND PAUL KLEMPERER | 180 |
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