The American Economic Review, Volume 86American Economic Association., 1996 Includes papers and proceedings of the annual meeting of the American Economic Association. Covers all areas of economic research. |
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Página 479
... contract had been performed . This overcompensation drives the overinvestment problem that many in the law and economics literature cite as a feature of standard legal remedies ( see , for example , A. Mitchell Polinsky , 1989 p . 37 ) ...
... contract had been performed . This overcompensation drives the overinvestment problem that many in the law and economics literature cite as a feature of standard legal remedies ( see , for example , A. Mitchell Polinsky , 1989 p . 37 ) ...
Página 487
... contract . Either is free to breach the contract unilaterally , provided he pays the damages given by the expectation formula . Expectation damages are measured ex post and are calcu- lated to make the injured party exactly as well off ...
... contract . Either is free to breach the contract unilaterally , provided he pays the damages given by the expectation formula . Expectation damages are measured ex post and are calcu- lated to make the injured party exactly as well off ...
Página 491
... contract . We presented the balancing contract with an intermediate quantity because one of our goals has been to describe commonplace contracts . It may be that the prices we have considered in ( 1 ' ) share some of the faults of a ...
... contract . We presented the balancing contract with an intermediate quantity because one of our goals has been to describe commonplace contracts . It may be that the prices we have considered in ( 1 ' ) share some of the faults of a ...
Índice
Income Risk Borrowing Constraints and Portfolio Choice | 158 |
PAUL MILGROM AND JOHN ROBERTS | 173 |
JEREMY BULOW AND PAUL KLEMPERER | 180 |
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