The American Economic Review, Volume 97American Economic Association., 2007 |
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Página 830
... patient does not have . Thus , patients with blood - type O can receive a kidney only from an O donor , type A patients can receive A or O kidneys , B patients B or O kidneys , and AB patients can receive a kidney from a donor of any ...
... patient does not have . Thus , patients with blood - type O can receive a kidney only from an O donor , type A patients can receive A or O kidneys , B patients B or O kidneys , and AB patients can receive a kidney from a donor of any ...
Página 831
... patients and donors other than their own will allow us to establish an upper bound on the number of exchanges that are possible , since the presence of positive crossmatches can only reduce the set of feasible exchanges . II . A Model ...
... patients and donors other than their own will allow us to establish an upper bound on the number of exchanges that are possible , since the presence of positive crossmatches can only reduce the set of feasible exchanges . II . A Model ...
Página 835
... patients on the long side . In case four - way exchanges are allowed and if three - way exchanges cannot handle the entire difference between types A - B and B - A , a type AB - O patient can be matched with three patients on the long ...
... patients on the long side . In case four - way exchanges are allowed and if three - way exchanges cannot handle the entire difference between types A - B and B - A , a type AB - O patient can be matched with three patients on the long ...
Índice
MATTHEW GENTZKOW | 713 |
ALMA COHEN AND LIRAN EINAV | 745 |
MARIA MARTA FERREYRA | 789 |
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agents aggregate analysis assume assumption average behavior benchmark Beveridge curve business cycles capital changes choice choose clustering coefficient coefficient cohorts consumer consumption contracts correlation cost of business deductible degree distributions durables effect elasticity empirical equation equilibrium estimated exchange expected Figure firm fraction function HIP model households implies impulse responses income increase individuals inflation interest rate investment rate Istat Journal of Economics labor market marginal likelihood matching ment monetary policy network-based meetings nodes nomic nominal interest rate nondurable observed outcomes output p-value pairs paper parameters patients percent policy shock post.com preferences productivity PROPOSITION random regime relative response risk aversion sample SAN DIEGO Section sector Shapley value side payments simulations sticky prices stochastic dominance suppliers Table Theory tion tradable unemployment University utility variables vouchers wage workers zero