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less in the remote provinces than in the centre of the empire. The distance of those provinces from the capital, from the principal seat of the great scramble of faction and ambition, makes them cnter less into the views of any of the contending parties, and renders them more indifferent and impartial spectators of the conduct of all. The spirit of party prevails less in Scotland than in England. In the case of a union, it would probably prevail less in Ireland than in Scotland, and the colonies would probably soon enjoy a degree of concord and unanimity at present unknown in any part of the British empire. Both Ireland and the colonies, indeed, would be subjected to heavier taxes than any which they at present pay. In consequence, however, of a diligent and faithful application of the public revenue towards the discharge of the national debt, the greater part of those taxes might not be of long continuance, and the public revenue of Great Britain might soon be reduced to what was necessary for maintaining a moderate peace establishment.

The territorial acquisitions of the East India Company, the undoubted right of the Crown, that is, of the State and people of Great Britain, might be rendered another source of revenue more abundant, perhaps, than all those already mentioned. Those countries are represented as more fertile, more extensive, and, in proportion to their extent, much richer and more populous than Great Britain. In order to draw a great revenue from them, it would not, probably, be necessary to introduce any new system of taxation into countries which are already sulliciently and more than sufliciently taxed. It might, perhaps, be more proper to lighten than to aggravate the burden of those unfortunate countries, and to endeavour to draw a revennie from them, not by imposing new taxes, but by preventing the embezzlement and misapplication of the greater part of those which they already pay.

If it should be found impracticable for Great Britain to draw any considerable augmentation of revenue from any of the resources above mentioned, the only resource which can remain to her is a diminution of hier expense. In the mode of collecting and in that of expending the public revenue, though in both there may be still room for improvement, Great Britain seems to be at least as economical as any of her neighbours. The military establishment which she maintains for her own defence in time of peace, is more

moderate than that of any European State which can pretend to rival her either in wealth or in power. None of those articles, therefore, seem to admit of any considerable reduction of expense. The expense of the peace establishment of the colonies was, before the commencement of the present disturbances, very considerable, and is an expense which may, and if no revenue can be drawn from them, ought certainly to be saved altogether. This constant expense in time of peace, though very great, is insignificant in comparison with what the defence of the colonies has cost us in time of war. The last war, which was undertaken altogether on account of the colonies, cost Great Britain, it has already been observed, upwards of ninety millions. The Spanish war of 1739 was principally undertaken on their account; in which, and in the French war that was the consequence of it, Great Britain spent upwards of forty millions, a great part of which ought justly to be charged to the colonies. In those two wars the colonies cost Great Britain much more than double the sum which the national debt amounted to before the commencement of the first of them. Had it not been for those wars that debt might, and probably would by this time, have been completely paid; and had it not been for the colonies, the former of those wars might not, and the latter certainly would not have been undertaken. It was because the colonies were supposed to be provinces of the British empire, that this expense was laid out upon them. But countries which contribute neither revenue nor military force towards the support of the empire, cannot be considered as provinces. They may perhaps be considered as appendages, as a sort of splendid and showy equipage of the empire. But if the empire can no longer support the expense of keeping up this equipage, it ought certainly to lay it down; and if it cannot raise its revenue in proportion to its expense, it ought, at least, to accommodate its expense to its revenue. If the colonies, notwithstanding their refusal to submit to British taxes, are still to be considered as provinces of the British empire, their defence in some future war may cost Great Britain as great an expense as it ever has done in any former war. The rulers of Great Britain have, for more than a century past, amused the people with the imagination that they possessed a great empire on the west side of the Atlantic. This empire, however, has hitherto existed in imagination only. It has hitherto been,

not an empire, but the project of an empire; not a gold mine, but the project of a gold mine; a project which has cost, which continues to cost, and which, if pursued in the same way as it has been hitherto, is likely to cost immense expense, without being likely to bring any profit; for the effects of the monopoly of the colony trade, it has been shown, are, to the great body of the people, mere loss instead of profit. It is surely now time that our rulers should either realize this golden dream, in which they have been indulging themselves, perhaps, as well as the people, or that they should awake from it themselves, and endeavour to awaken the people. If the project cannot be completed, it ought to be given up. If any of the provinces of the British empire cannot be made to contribute towards the support of the whole empire, it is surely time that Great Britain should free herself from the expense of defending those provinces in time of war, and of supporting any part of their civil or military establishments in time of peace, and endeavour to accommodate her future views and designs to the real mediocrity of her circumstances.

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Acts of Parliament-

7, 8 William III, cap. 28, ii. 232.
I William III, cap. 32, ii. 234.
13, 14 Charles II, cap. 7, ii. 238.
Undated, of Edward III, Henry

VIII, Edward VI, ii. 239.
5 William and Mary, cap. 17, ii. 240.
9, 10 William III, cap. 26, ib.

8 George I, cap 15, ib.

25 George II, ii. 241.

5 George III, cap. 37, ib.
14 George III, cap. 10, ii. 242.
7,8 William III, cap. 20, ii. 243.
14 George III, cap. 71, ib.

5 George I, cap. 27, ib.
23 George II, cap. 13, ib.
10, 11 William 111, cap. 6, ii. 318.
25 Charles II, cap. 7, ib.
26 George II, cap. 18, ii. 319.
23 George II, cap. 31, ii. 322.
4 George III, cap. 20, ib.
5 George III, cap. 44, ib.
IO Anne, cap. 12, ii. 395.
4 William and Mary, ii.
47 Edward III, ii. 476.
4 Richard II, ib.

418.

2 Henry IV, ib.

4 Henry IV, ib.

9, 10 William III, ii. 477.

12 Charles II, ib.

8 William III, cap. 20, ii. 513.

1 George I, cap. 12, ii. 514.

3 George I, cap. 8, ib.

5 George I, cap. 7, ib.
3 George I, cap. 7, ib.

:

Scotch Gulielmi (1695), i. 296.
James II (1449), i. 395.
forbad exportation of precious metals,

ii. 3.
Administration of India faulty, ii. 222;
local, not so liable to abuse as im-
perial, ii. 314.
Admiralty, Board of, their control over
African forts, ii. 323.
Adulteration of coin, an expedient for
reducing debt, ii. 534.
Advantage, of colonial trade rather rela-
tive than absolute, ii. 176.
olians, colonies of, ii. 135.
Æsop, fables of, their object, ii. 353-
Affectation of trading for the public good,
ii. 28.
Africa, internal, its want of rivers cause
that it is barbarous, i. 22; European
settlements on coast of, ii. 218; pos-
sessions of Great Britain in, ii. 241.
African company, obligations of, ii. 321.
Agamemnon, his offers to Achilles, ii. 300.
Age, influence and authority of, ii. 299.
Aggregate Fund, the, its origin, ii. 514.
Agio, of bank of Amsterdam, i. 330; of
banks of deposit, ii. 54.

Agrarian laws, at Rome, ii. 135.
Agricultural system, advocated by a few
French philosophers, ii. 246; capital
error of, ii. 259; nearest approxima-
tion to truth, ii. 263; why if it de-
presses manufactures, it injures its own
end, ii. 272.
Agriculture, productiveness of, i. 2 note;
depressed by policy of Europe, i. 3;
does not admit subdivisions of labour,
i. 7; few fortunes made by, i. 132; in-
numerable volumes on, i. 133; capital
of, local, i. 368; the poorer a country
is, the more its capital should be em-
ployed in, i. 370; superiority of, in
richest nations, i. 372; difficulty of
getting a fortune by, i. 380; preferred
to manufacture, i. 385; how bettered
by manufactures, i. 410; effects of,
more durable than those of commerce,
i. 423; system of, ii. 1; effects of mo-
nopoly on, ii. 32; improvements in, ii.
81 note; discouraged in Spain and
Portugal, ii. 87; proper business of
colonies, ii. 191; of France discou-
raged, ii. 247; in France, relieved by
efforts of Economists, ii. 263; more
easy in confined market, ii. 267; im-
plies a settlement, ii. 277.
Agrigentum, rapid growth of, ii. 146.
Aides, a form of French excise, ii. 499.
Air, waggon way in, banking is like, i.

322.

Alcalvala, a tax in Spain, destructive, ii.
498.

Alehouse, trade with the, apparently
losing, ii. 66.

Alehouses, do not cause drunkenness,
but vice versa, i. 365; licences to, ii.
446.

Alexander, taught Aristotle, i. 141.
Alexander III, bull of, i. 393.
Almayro, voyage of, to Chili and Peru, ii.

141.
America, discovery of mines in, i. 33;
mines in, effect on money, i. 35; popu-
lation in, i. 74; colonies of, rate of
interest in, i 96; mines of, their dis-
covery, i. 203; a market for its own
silver, i. 213; mines of, not only exist-
ing, i. 220; native grasses of, i. 234;
growth of population in, i. 418; at dis-
covery of, question put by Spaniards, ii.
2; manufactures of, flourished in their
own Civil War, ii. 18 note; real advan-
tages of its discovery, ii. 20; only two
civilised nations in, ii. 21; state of in
1775, ii. 73; peopled and cultivated by
folly and injustice of European Go-
vernments, ii. 169; discovery of, its
benefits to Europe, ii. 171; condition
of in time of Cromwell, ii. 178; leading

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